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Abstract
This dissertation argues that the American dream is a large-scale cultural myth,
and that through an analysis of the dream’s mythic structure we can locate a paradigm
according to which both American literature and American culture are organized. The
American dream has maintained unique relevance across the historical, regional, and
cultural diversity of the American nation, in part because it always remains abstract and
resists firm definition. Nevertheless, by breaking the broad myth into its most basic
elemental parts we can begin to see patterns across the many distinctive versions of the
American dream, such that we can identify the American dream as a generic category.
This project therefore proceeds by analyzing the most basic narrative features of the
American dream: its actor or hero, its setting or universe, and its primary action.
Through an analysis of the figure of the self-made man, the “frontier” as American
spatial metaphor, and the action of upward mobility, this dissertation locates common
features across myriad versions of this American dream myth in order to establish the
American dream as a pervasive organizing ideal within American culture.

This

dissertation focuses its study on American fiction of the twentieth century, where the
American dream finds its clearest articulations, and it has special recourse to
nineteenth-century and early American history and culture as the ground for this
modern sense of the American dream. Finally, I end with a discussion of American
literature of the last decade, in which I discuss prevalent contemporary attitudes about
the American dream in order to assess its current condition.

Ultimately, this

dissertation suggests that the American dream, because it is a genuine cultural myth,

vi

both organizes American cultural experience and structures American literature about
that experience.
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Introduction
What Is the American Dream?

An inquiry into the vast subject of the American dream must first establish some
definitional parameters for discussing that subject. I will therefore open with a working
definition—open to revision as necessary—at the outset. In brief, the American dream
is the myth that, in America, opportunity exists for reward that is directly
commensurate with one’s effort. This definition has been pieced together over the
course of this project’s development, and functions as a working articulation of a
pervasive and ambiguous cultural reality.

This American myth has functioned

integrally since the beginning of the nation, and it has persisted as a relevant
description of American values despite the great historical, regional, and cultural
diversity that makes up the nation. Indeed, it is the single-most definitive statement we
can make towards the outlining of an “American consciousness.”

Because the

American dream has consistently remained vague—it neither denotes a clear set of
goals nor offers a paradigm for their accomplishment—it has remained open to
interpretation for all Americans, regardless of their historical moment, socio-economic
position, or regional and cultural identity. It has also resisted definition for this same
reason. Because it stands as a unifying national statement, though, its study is essential
for an understanding of American culture generally; indeed, its study is the clearest
means of understanding American culture—as a coherent unit—at all.
The American dream functions vitally within American culture, despite its literal
ambiguity, because it operates mythically. Americans therefore have a kind of innate
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understanding of the myth as it has been passed on through American culture. Though
many different versions of the myth have existed and continue to exist, we can
recognize an overarching idea out of which these myriad versions are sprung. This
project is explicitly concerned with outlining the structure of this governing idea. The
many versions of this American myth, which we shall call “myths,” thus serve to
articulate the general national idea for specific American sub-cultures throughout
history. We cannot possibly pool all of the various myths together in order to abstract
the organizing idea from their commonalities.

We can, however, analyze the

overarching structure of the myth through its dominant mythic articulations, and arrive
at a working (and useful) description of the myth. This will offer us a unique tool for
the study and critique of American culture and of the American novel.
It must be remarked at the outset that the subject of “American culture” poses a
difficult definitional problem, for America is vastly multicultural, and so is naturally
resistant to the unified acculturation implied in the term “American culture.” This is a
problem that we must confront, however, if we are to discuss America generally as a
unified national culture. R. W. B. Lewis writes, in his prologue to The American Adam,
that “There may be no such thing as ‘American experience’; it is probably better not to
insist that there is. But there has been experience in America, and the account of it has
had its own specific form.”1 This is a fine place to begin our discussion, for it offers us a
concrete reality (the American continent) out of which we might abstract the dominant
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Lewis, The American Adam, 8.
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ideas about it. Myra Jehlen helps us to outline the real subject at stake when we discuss
American culture, in the introduction to her book, American Incarnation. She writes that
when Americans said “America” they meant something they took to be fact: that
their country, whose foundations defined and identified a previously vacant
continent, represented a new and culminating development in world history and
thus the fulfillment of progress. They could also, perhaps in smaller numbers,
mean an idea as such, an idea not necessarily enacted in the real country: a vision,
even self-consciously a myth, of individual transcendence and democratic
equality, of spiritual redemption and ultimate technological competence; or, for
that matter, a travesty in both fact and idea, the doom of real and ideal hopes.2
American culture, as a comprehensive term, encompasses all of these views about the
American nation and its corresponding idealism.

It is derived from real, concrete

experience in America, which experience has been recorded and critiqued throughout
American history. The American dream, as a large-scale cultural myth, represents an
“American” way of encountering the world; it describes experience unique to the
American continent, out of which is derived a fundamental conception of personal
identity, spatial milieu, and progressive purpose. That the American dream is uniquely
American will be demonstrated in due course; such a classification depends on the
existence of “Americanness” (or American identity, American culture, American
consciousness, etc.) as a subject, and so I use the term in the course of this project with
the meaning discussed here.

2

Jehlen, American Incarnation, 20.
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Another word of clarification might be said on this subject, and Sacvan
Bercovitch has offered such a clarification in his book The Rites of Assent. Bercovitch
discusses the stark connotative differences between an American continent and an
American culture, and finds that American literature bridges the gap between the two.
His reflection, then, is vital to the organization of this study. Bercovitch writes,
It seemed to me that the process by which the United States had become America
was nowhere more clearly displayed than in the bipolarities of American
Studies: on the one hand, a multiculturalism (or experiential pluralism) that
rendered invisible the structures of national cohesion; on the other hand, a
consensual identity, “American,” that by definition transcended the “ideological
limits” of class, region, generation, and race (i.e., redefined American identity,
ideologically, as a process of transcending the boundaries of class, region, etc.).
As this principle applied to American literary studies in particular, the relation
between text and context opened into a cultural symbology: configuration or
tangle of patterns of expression common to all areas of society, including the
aesthetic. So understood, “high literature” was neither an imitation of reality nor
a Platonic (or Hegelian) ladder to a higher reality. It was a mediation between
both, which I though of in terms of ideological mimesis: a representation of the
volatile relations between conceptual, imaginative, and social realities that was
different from, often opposed to, and yet fundamentally reciprocal with the ways
of the world in which it emerged.3

3
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Bercovitch’s insight here is quite helpful, for he effectively resolves the problem of
American cultural identity, at least within this study. American culture is derived from
real experience of the American continent (the United States), but there is always a great
difference between the practical reality of America and the theoretical figuration of a
national consciousness, founded on a social idealism. This is nothing more, really, than
the great divorce between ideal and reality that is always at the center of the American
dream. But in negotiating both the idea of America and its literal reality, American
literature offers a unique reflection that largely bridges this gap. The modern American
novel is crucial to our study of the American dream here, because it represents
American culture or identity, as an ideal figuration, in the real context of concrete
experience (which more often than not directly challenges the idealistic paradigm).
It will be useful in contextualizing this discussion to offer a brief survey of
popular definitions of the American dream, for our working definition is pieced
together from the various versions of the dream that have at different times held sway.
While a more detailed history of the theoretical term, “American dream,” will be
conducted in Chapter One, we can here discuss some of the more recent and general
understandings that have emerged over the course of the dream’s history. Cal Jillson’s
2004 study of the America dream, Spreading the American Dream, offers a nice
comprehensive overview of the ideal, emphasizing its basis on equality. Jillson writes,
The American Dream has always been, and continues to be, the gyroscope of
American life.

It is the Rosetta stone or interpretive key that has helped

throughout American history to solve the puzzles of how to balance liberty
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against equality, individualism against the rule of law, and populism against
constitutionalism. The American Dream demands that we constantly balance
and rebalance our creedal values to create and preserve an open, competitive
entrepreneurial society in which the opportunity to succeed is widely available.
Despite the many conflicting strands of the American Creed, the American
Dream insists that this must, and must increasingly, be a country in which
opportunity is available to all and honest hard work yields the chance to succeed
and thrive.4
Jillson’s description of the American dream (it is less a definition) emphasizes two of its
important features: it demands national equality of opportunity, and it functions as a
“Rosetta stone” for American culture. The demand for equality (of opportunity, not
condition) is the central idealistic premise on which the national progressive project is
enacted. Ernest Bormann’s book, The Force of Fantasy, also proposes this definition of
equality. Bormann takes his definition of the American dream from Martin Luther King,
Jr., quoting him accordingly: “[. . .] the American dream that one day this nation will
rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed—we hold these truths to be self
evident, that all men are created equal.” 5 For these critics, equality is the key
motivation and end of the American pursuit.

The American dream makes no

assurances of success, nor offers a clearly structured paradigm for pursuit in America;
instead, it promises opportunity for success. The promise of opportunity is contained in
the apparently endless physical abundance of the American continent, and also in the
4
5

Jillson, Pursuing the American Dream, 5.
Qtd. in Bormann, The Force of Fantasy, 236.
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governmental idealism that assures social equality—that all individuals have an equal
chance to pursue success.
But it is important to emphasize Jillson’s description of the American dream as a
gyroscope of American life—this is the precise understanding adopted by this project.
Because I contend that the American dream is a cultural myth, it describes the basic
structure of American experience. The American dream makes a clear statement of
American individuality, defining the ideal character of the American hero; it stems out
of and in turn contributes to Americans’ spatial understanding of the nation; and it
describes the progressive material and social goals that are the ideals of the American
nation. In short, it offers a summary portrait of goal-oriented American culture. Our
understanding of the myth, then, is an exploration of American culture in the sense that
any myth analysis tells us about the culture out of which that myth sprung. The
American dream describes the predominant models according to which Americans
have historically structured their lives, and in doing so constantly reveals a unique
practice of Americanness.
In her book, American Dream, American Nightmare, Kathryn Hume outlines a
broad idea of the American dream that focuses on the immigrant and encompasses
some the general attitudes adopted by Americans. She writes,
Many longings and desires are expressed through that rubric [the rubric of the
American dream].

Prosperity for anyone willing to work hard is a crucial

component of the Dream, a house of one’s own being the icon. In the past,
immigrants knew that they might have a hard life, but they trusted that their

7

children would be better off. For a long time, indeed, successive generations did
acquire more personal property than their parents did.

Reinforcing this

perception is the technology that makes each generation seem better off.
Indisputably, cars got faster, houses became larger and acquired more appliances,
and more miraculous medical interventions proved possible.6
That each generation should be better off than the previous has long served as a
practical description of the American dream, especially for immigrant families. Because
the dream depends on physical attestations to its viability, the steady increase of
material luxuries has been the real source of its persistence. Whatever idealism is no
doubt contained in the dream myth, it must always have a concrete material referent.
Other critics have adopted far more general descriptions of the American dream,
taking it as broadly indicative of societal goals. Richard Cornuelle writes that “For a
long time it seemed that the free society and the good society could be realized together
in America. This, I think, was the American dream.” Far from defining the American
dream as a coherent analytical unit, Cornuelle uses the term as descriptive of American
notions about society. He goes on to define what he means by a free and a good society:
We wanted, from the beginning, a free society, free in the sense that every man
was his own supervisor and the architect of his own ambitions. [. . . ] We wanted
as well, with equal fervor, a good society—a human, responsible society in which

6
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helping hands reached out to people in honest distress, in which common needs
were met freely and fully.7
Cornuelle is here offering an adequate description of the impulses that gave rise to
American society, and his discussion is relevant to the American dream even if he is
mistaken in identifying these impulses as the American dream. What we take from this
selection is that the American dream is always rooted in conceptions of political liberty
and a general social ethic.
But still, many critics have insisted on limited economic definitions of the
American dream. For Emily Rosenberg, the American dream is no more than “high
technology and mass consumption,”8 and hence the dream is most attested to by events
such as the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair, which showcase these material achievements. In
limiting the dream’s purview to technology and consumption, Rosenberg delineates an
economically determined material paradigm that has no hint of the social idealism that
also rests at the American dream’s core. For Wallace Peterson, “The post-World War II
experience of steady growth, abundant jobs, and low inflation shaped what we know as
the ‘American dream.’”9 Here, again, we see a view of the American dream that is
limited in scope by tracing only the economic parameters of the dream. Indeed, one
wonders why Peterson locates the dream only in a post-World War II context, since the
generation of the term predates World War II, and the idealism that shapes the dream
begins to form when the first settlers arrive in the New World. That Peterson really

Cornuelle, Reclaiming the American Dream, 21.
Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, 7.
9 Peterson, Silent Depression, 20.
7
8
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does mean to emphasize economics and materiality becomes clear right away, though.
He goes on:
There is a further set of expectation in the American Dream. First, a secure and
steady job at good wages that steadily improve, not just in terms of money but in
their purchasing power. Second, home ownership. Third, the affordability of an
increasing number of things that may make life easier and more enjoyable—
automobiles, washers, driers, microwaves, air conditioners, radios, TV, VCRs,
power mowers, snow blowers.

Fourth, an array of fringe benefits—paid

vacations, generous pensions, and adequate health care, to name the most
important. Fifth, travel and leisure, both of which require a growing amount of
“discretionary income”—income one is free to spend without constraint. Sixth,
college for the kids, and the hope and belief that the children’s economic life will
be better than their parents’. Finally, upward mobility.10
Peterson here lists seven expectations contained in the phrase, “American dream,” and
not a single one of them pertains to social idealism or the national project generally.
They are all about material, financial, and prestigious gains—they are all overtly socioeconomic. Again, Robert Ringer stresses that “high taxes, the frustration of trying to
keep pace with inflation, the fear of unemployment, and the feeling of being stifled at
every turn by ever-increasing [governmental] regulations”11 describe the real death of
the American dream. These critics are acutely aware of the socio-economic character of
the American dream. And to be sure, they are right to stress the materialism inherent in
10
11

Ibid., 20-21.
Ringer, Restoring the American Dream, 11.
10

it. But a thorough treatment of the American dream, which has vitally impacted nearly
all aspects of American culture and identity, must consider its materialism along with
its idealism, for the two shape each other.
If we take these definitions altogether, we can begin to arrive at a more
comprehensive definition of the American dream (while still realizing that no definition
can be finally perfect). I propose, as stated earlier, that the American dream is the myth
that, in America, opportunity exists for reward that is directly commensurate with one’s
effort. This definition is appropriately “loose,” so that it is generally applicable in
myriad contexts. First, it clearly outlines the material paradigm of the American dream
as one of effort-based reward (those rewards being socio-economic). In guaranteeing
opportunity, this definition at once describes America as a space of abundance (where
opportunity literally does exist) and it describes the American ideal of equality that
must exist in order for universal pursuit to be possible. This definition further contains
the seeds for a fuller development that will be this project’s aim.
Over the course of this project I will analyze the mythic structure of the American
dream, locating representative models of the myth in the modern American novel. In
Chapter One, I develop a methodology for the literary study of mythic structure using
Lévi-Strauss’ theory of structural anthropology. While this project is not explicitly LéviStraussian (nor is it anthropological), a literary critical apparatus can be derived from
Lévi-Strauss’ mythic structuralism. In brief, Lévi-Strauss finds that any myth exists in
many different versions, and there are always differences of content amongst these
various myths. However, he also finds that the different versions of a myth all contain

11

an identical structure—they describe the same action or sequence and appeal to the
same motifs, though the particulars of the story (characters, names, places, symbols)
will vary. Thus, in collecting many different versions of a myth, one can begin to derive
an understanding of that myth’s essential structure. The more myths (versions of the
myth) that one acquires, the better their understanding of the governing structure of
those myths.
Lévi-Strauss finds that the structure of a myth consists (in part) of linguistic
mythemes—component structural elements that consists of tense relations.

Each

mytheme, he says, functions elementally, like a sentence. Also like a sentence (which
contains a subject and a verb), each mytheme carries two terms, derived from a
culture’s experience, that are in contradiction with one another.

The myth, in

positioning these relational paradoxes together, presumes their reconciliation though
there is no resolution in fact. The myth, then, is the apparent resolution of a culture’s
paradoxes of experience.

For the purposes of this project, I adopt an analogical

approach to these mythemes, finding that structural, relational paradoxes persist in the
American dream because it has a mythic structure.
Thus I delineate a basic narrative structural paradigm for the analysis of the
American dream. Using F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby as a case study of the
American dream in fiction, I find that the mythic narrative is composed, most
fundamentally, of a mythic actor, a mythic context or universe, and a mythic action.
These structural elements make up the subjects of Chapters Two, Three, and Four,
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respectively. Within each structural element of the American dream myth, I find a
persistent relational tension, the resolution of which is the function of the myth.
Chapter Two, then, discusses the paradigm of the self-made man as the mythic
hero of the American dream.

Tracing his roots back to the agrarian and frontier

conception of the American Adam, I outline the religious moral paradigm that defines
the self-made man in the nineteenth century, and then discuss alterations to this model
as they are introduced in the twentieth century. I find that the self-made man contains
an inherent paradox of experience, or mythemic relation, found in the relationship
between effort and reward. The myth of the self-made man proposes that there is a
direct and causal relationship between one’s effort and one’s reward, such that if one is
industrious and dedicated, one will be successful. This ideal is an apparent resolution
of an experiential contradiction in reality: namely, that work and reward bear no
necessary relationship to each other.

Because such a figuration is devastating to

America’s self-conception, the myth suggests an apparent resolution in supposing an
overtly causal relationship. For my literary analysis in this chapter, I discuss Saul
Bellow’s The Adventures of Augie March, which consists of two competing narratives
about the self-made man and the act of self-making (in the characters of Augie himself
and his brother, Simon). I compare these characters to each other, as one enacts a
traditional self-made man pursuit and the other challenges this model in preference for
a more generally American process of self-making. Ultimately, I find that the self-made
man is the clearest articulation of the actor implied in the American dream myth.

13

Chapter Three discusses the spatial metaphor according to which the context (or
universe) of the American dream is organized. I find the spatial metaphor of the
frontier to be vitally important to American conceptions of the physical landscape, and I
develop this metaphor to be symbolic of territorial expansion, a nineteenth-century
nature/civilization tension, and the general belief that America is a land of endless
abundance and opportunity. The central tension contained in the frontier myth is,
again, one between the cultural ideal and the literal reality.

By the close of the

nineteenth century, there is no longer any available frontier space—Americans have
reached the westernmost coast and cannot continue in endless physical expansion. The
ideals promised by endless expansion, then, are challenged in this turn-of-the-century
moment. As a spatial metaphor, though, I contend that the frontier continues to govern
our conception of abundant physical space throughout the twentieth century, even in
the face of the literal exhaustion of available space. Insofar as the frontier continues to
function metaphorically as a spatial description, the myth of the American dream
apparently resolves the discrepancy between real and theoretically endless physical
space. In this chapter, I discuss John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath as a representation
of frontier idealism in a literally post-frontier space, and I discuss the dangers of
enacting a nineteenth-century conception of the frontier within a twentieth-century
context in Philip Roth’s American Pastoral. Ultimately, I delineate a mythic universe in
which the American dream plays out, and this universe is defined by a sense of endless
expansion towards increasingly abundant opportunity.

14

In Chapter Four I address the tensions inherent in the basic action of the
American dream. The action of the American dream, simply stated, is upward mobility.
This term has a very private sense, in that it pertains to the socio-economic ascension of
an individual. And yet, the action of the American dream also describes increasing
social justice—the guarantee of equality and liberty for every American. I find that
individual pursuits are often directly opposed to social ones, and that even personal
socio-economic progress is often dependent on the socio-economic decline of others.
The American dream makes the mythic assertion that there is no tension here, and that,
instead, personal progress spurs social betterment, and social betterment allows for
personal progress—such that the two are in a mutually beneficial and quite fluid
relationship.

In my literary analysis, I first discuss Frank Norris’ The Pit, which

demonstrates the material consequences of one’s man’s corner of the wheat market on
the entire economic system. I then move to treat Edith Wharton’s The House of Mirth,
which examines the limited female position in terms of Lily Bart’s inability to resolve
her material goals with her societal position. Finally, I discuss Toni Morrison’s most
recent novel, A Mercy, in which the author develops the pre-institutional roots of
slavery, establishing a direct correlation between one man’s material rise and the
establishment of slavery as a formal institution.
Chapter Five functions as a kind of addendum to this argument and does not
add to the theoretical paradigm developed over the course of Chapters One through
Four. Chapters One through Four offer a structural analysis of the American dream as
it has existed historically, with special emphasis on its twentieth-century incarnations.
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Chapter Five attempts to position this analysis of the American dream within a
contemporary context. I therefore examine novels published in the last decade, with
attention given to these novels’ representation of a widespread disillusionment with the
American dream. I first treat Paul Auster’s Sunset Park, which is set just after the 2008
economic crisis and uses the symbol of the foreclosed home to create a post-American
dream space in which the dream has lost all economic viability. I then discuss Chris
Bachelder’s Bear v. Shark as an appropriate correlative to Auster’s text. Bachelder’s
novel does not emphasize economic collapse, but rather idealistic collapse. In Bear v.
Shark, mass consumerism and materialism characterize the space of American
experience, and there is no trace of social idealism. These two novels, then, alternately
present disillusionment with an American dream that has been stripped of one or the
other of its essential features. Finally, I discuss Cormac McCarthy’s The Road as a postapocalyptic and post-American novel, which positions its characters after the total
annihilation of American culture. In the world of McCarthy’s novel, the American idea
is lost when a progressive worldview is obliterated. These novels together help to
contextualize the American dream in the present moment, and by implication they
appear to call for reassessments of the American dream.
Ultimately, then, this project details the formal, constitutive features of the
American dream and explores the representation of those features in the modern
American novel. This study is not meant to be exhaustive; the American dream is so
pervasive and diverse, that a totally comprehensive understanding of it is impossible.
That does not mean, however, that we cannot approach an increasingly enhanced
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understanding of our subject. In conducting a structural analysis of the dream myth,
we have, at least, a definitive and useful place to begin. Structural analysis allows us to
see beyond the endless diversity of American dreams and to locate their common
features, such that we can recognize the American dream insofar as it meets the formal
standards that we are establishing. In this sense, we are locating a kind of generic
paradigm to which the various American dream myths adhere. This study, then, offers
a tool for the analysis of literature and culture, and in turn exposes the history of an
active and still relevant myth that has consistently organized American experience.
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Chapter One
The American Dream as Myth:
Defining an Approach to Narrative Structural Analysis
No concept is more fully emblematic of American cultural idealism than the
American dream, which has consistently articulated the paradigmatic structure for
national and individual success in America.1 While the specific tenets of the American
dream have undergone developmental alterations since the nation’s beginning, the
ideal has persisted (under a variety of names and regional-historical interpretations) as
a natural byproduct, as it were, of the spirit of democracy. And yet, given the fervor
with which this ideal has been pursued almost universally and repeatedly across a
variety of American contexts, it must come as a surprise that its precise parameters and
the specificity of its meaning have consistently remained elusive. While the American
dream has been theorized and critiqued abundantly (though, perhaps, not quite as
abundantly as we might expect), it is nevertheless the substance of a massive cultural
idealism and so naturally resists the confines of strict definitional boundary. Indeed,
the American dream’s sustained cultural relevance is directly owing to its

The term “American cultural idealism” is notably ambiguous because America
consists in a great variety of diverse cultures, and no term exists which can adequately
encompass them all. However, a definable American nation does exist, and I use the
phrase “American cultural idealism” to refer to those values and ideals promoted by
that nation as it understands itself through national documents, dominant political
discourse, governmental structure, and social rhetoric.
Whether are not a unified “American identity” exists, it is nevertheless useful—
indeed, it is necessary—to talk about American identity generally. When I use
generally inclusive terms such as these, it should be noted that I do not mean to reduce
the diversity of Americanism to a single unified (and therefore limited) identity. Rather,
these inclusive phrases serve an analytical purpose by furnishing us with practical
definitional tools, so that we can even talk about a subject as broadly amorphous as
“America” in the first place.
1
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adaptability—that it can be uniquely appropriated by any given social set within the
nation. Such interpretive variance does not distort the ideal, but rather serves as the
source of its persistent strength and durability, for the ideal exists as the sum of its
collective interpretations.

Consequently, I will argue that the American dream

functions mythically in a Lévi-Straussian sense—as the apparent reconciliation of its
abundant versions.
The identification of the American dream as a large-scale cultural myth is no
great discovery, but such a classification is nevertheless an essential move for the
establishment of a theoretical history of the concept. Such a theoretical history should
serve as a resource for American studies, and will position a precise image of American
national ideology within the context of a trans-national, or global, space of experience. I
will argue that the mythological character of the American dream opens up an avenue
for its theorization by succinctly examining its constituent narrative elements, and that
by considering the tensions among these elements we can illuminate the structural
composition of the American dream. Figuring the American dream in this way—
through an analysis of its mythic structure— will not present us with a rigid definition,
but will undoubtedly enhance our understanding of “Americanism” as a unit of study.
In the course of this project, I will analyze literary texts of the twentieth century that
have as their goal the overt representation of the American dream in practice, creating
out of these multiple narrative instances a sense of the mythology generated by their
specific diversities. If the American dream has a mythic structure, it will be expressed
narratively, and so it will make obvious sense to concentrate our focus on the literary
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illustrations through which such mythology is represented. Ultimately, these American
dream narratives will echo the very structure of the myth in their representations,
insofar as these novels act as incarnations or “versions” of the myth itself.

Walter Lippmann and James Truslow Adams: Innovators of American Dream Theory
Before we move to treat the American dream as a national mythic reality,
however, we would do well to first consider the raw idea with which we will be
working. While the history of American dream theory strongly suggests that we cannot
arrive at a unified and wholly objective definition of the term, we can certainly trace an
adaptable outline around the term, so to speak, so as to familiarize ourselves with the
object of study and in order to set some loose parameters around that study. We might
naturally begin, then, with the historical generation of the term itself—a starting point
that will firmly ground this study within a twentieth century context.

While the

American dream undoubtedly has its roots in the earliest beginnings of American
democracy, the term itself does not emerge until rather recently in American history,
and even then it does not carry the specific connotations that now dominate our
understanding of it. The American dream makes its debut in print discourse in 1914 in
journalist and political commentator Walter Lippmann’s book, Drift and Mastery. While
Lippmann’s discussion of the American dream differs greatly from the sense that it
comes later to adopt, his insights are nevertheless integral to a fully rounded and
complete comprehension of the term, and they shed extensive light on the problematics
implicitly contained in the concept’s idealistic nature. Unlike our current standard
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sense of the American dream, the ideal is for Lippmann no dream of future fulfillment
at all; it is, rather, a dream of an idyllic past, of a kind of uneducated common man
living in a rural golden age. Lippmann’s exercise of the term replaces its standard push
for ambition with a call to reversion.

He writes, simply enough, that “the American

dream . . . may be summed up, I think, in the statement that the undisciplined man is
the salt of the earth.”2 This definition (if we may indeed call it one; this is, historically,
the first printed use of the term at all) follows on the heels of a discussion about men’s
natural tendency to past idealism. “Whenever the future is menacing and unfamiliar,”
Lippmann says, “whenever the day’s work seems insurmountable, men seek some
comfort in the warmth of memory.” He goes on: “The past which men create for
themselves is a place where thought is unnecessary and happiness inevitable,” finally
concluding that “the American temperament leans generally to a kind of mystical
anarchism, in which the ‘natural’ humanity in each man is adored as the savior of
society.”3
It is precisely Lippmann’s emphasis on this impulse towards past idealism that
marks his treatment of the American dream as distinct from a contemporary version of
it, and according to which his priority in the theoretical history of the American dream
might be denied. Indeed, there is certainly a sharp and evident distinction to be made
between looking backward and looking forward, as it were. Nevertheless, Lippmann’s
treatment of the topic recognizes something exact about American dreaming generally.
Lippmann observes a tendency in the American public (circa the turn of the nineteenth
2
3

Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 103.
Ibid., 102—3.
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century) towards a fantasy resolution of immediate unhappiness, and he is sharply
critical of this impulse. The American nation, still so early in its national development,
touts itself as a young and fresh land of opportunity. Dedicated to the now familiar
tenets of a new democracy, according to which all men are free, equal, and guaranteed
the rights to accumulate property and pursue happiness as they see fit (within, of
course, certain confines regarding a public good), America carries with it a definitive
notion that its citizens are already on the path towards success. Economic and social
failure, therefore, are notably debilitating to those citizens who, perhaps a bit naively,
had trusted in a better life.4 Because the promises the nation makes are idealistic (which
does not immediately mean they are also unrealizable5), such a cultural consciousness is
engendered that tends naturally to look outside the present moment for fulfillment and
happiness—national idealism, that is, creates idealistic citizens.

When Lippmann

observes his contemporaries placing their hope and faith in a lost time, in a previous
uncomplicated and rural age, he is observing a culturally created impulse away from
the reality of the present moment. But at the turn of the century, this impulse finds its
object in some golden age of the past—a dream-object which comes very soon after to

The struggle to ascend has always been an essential aspect of the American dream,
which has never shied away from emphasizing the importance of hard work and
endurance. However, if struggle is not rewarded with measurable progress, this spirit
of disillusion sets in rapidly.
5 Whether or not the goals and values of the American nation can be attained is, more or
less, irrelevant. The nation continues to function under this paradigm because, so long
as progress towards these goals and values is consistently made, these aims are in the
process of accomplishment, and this is enough to sustain the national enterprise. Indeed,
America has always endorsed an anti-utopian vision, preferring instead to encourage
concrete, visible, sustained socio-economic ascension.
4
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be replaced by a more appropriate end (at least in terms of standard American
ideology): hope in the future and the American virtue of ambition.
Walter Lippmann, though, is writing on the cusp of this great shift in American
thought from past idealism to future progress, and he does go on to briefly discuss this
newly burgeoning impulse. He writes (and here we might recognize a discussion of a
reality much more akin to our own sense of the American dream):
But there has arisen in our time a large group of people who look to the future.
They talk a great deal about their ultimate goal. Many of them do not differ in
any essential way from those who dream of a glorious past. They put Paradise
before them instead of behind them. They are going to be so rich, so great, and
so happy some day, that any concern about to-morrow seems a bit sordid.6
It is noteworthy that Lippmann recognizes the similarity between these dreamers of the
future and his already discussed past idealists, and he is critical of both. Lippmann
takes a middle course, claiming that American virtue lies in living in the present
moment, with an awareness of the past and a concern for the future, but not as more
relevant than the moment at hand. For this reason he launches a critique of these
future-lookers—a critique which we would do well to remember as we trace the current
sense of the American dream. He writes, “Now this habit of reposing in the sun of a
brilliant future is very enervating. It opens a chasm between fact and fancy, and the
whole fine dream is detached from the living zone of the present.” There are a couple
of points to be made here, the first of which is that Lippmann refers to the above future-

6

Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 104.
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looking impulse as a dream (albeit not the American one). Clearly (and as implicitly
evidenced by our discussion) there is a correlation between a kind of American dream
of the past and the inverse American dream of the future. Secondly, in his critique of
the latter, he talks about a “chasm between fact and fancy.”

Lippmann is here

recognizing precisely what so many later critics are quick to note: such idealizational
thinking about the progress of one’s own life leads, ultimately, to the very real problem
of finding some material referent for an immaterial object.

In other words, while

dreaming the future may offer a semblance of escape from present misfortune, there
always remains the difficulty—at times even the blatant impossibility—of ever truly
realizing that ideal.
The American dream, we can see, is for Lippmann a kind of cultural pitfall—a
dangerous tendency of American citizens towards unrealism and nonproductive fancy
that appears to be naturally derived from the most basic conditions of American cultural
ideology. In his later work, Lippmann characterizes the decade of the 1920’s (which
immediately follows the historical moment we are here discussing), where we can see
the fruition of such American dreaming, and he is sharply dismissive of this era.
Charles Wellborn writes,
He [Lippmann] sees the history of Western society since World War I as drastic
evidence of political decay.

Possessing the greatest accumulation of

technological power and potential the world has ever known, victorious in battle
over all enemies, committed to high ideals and noble purposes, the democratic
nations have still failed to achieve the kind of society expected by their people
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and demanded by the times. Lippmann wrote, “The more I have brooded upon
the events which I have lived through myself, the more astounding and
significant does it seem that the decline of the power and influence and selfconfidence of the Western democracies has been so steep and so sudden. We
have fallen far in a short span of time.”7
Despite all the progressive greatness of America that results from its citizens’
endorsement of the dream paradigm, Lippmann finds that this American dream has
deprived Americans of concrete substantial value.

Despite widespread apparent

“success,” Lippmann perceives an utter failure of democracy: in setting up such lofty,
idealistic social goals and expectations, America guarantees that it must fail to
accomplish them. For Lippmann, it seems, the infinite progressivism of the American
dream (which never finally attains its object) spoils it as a viable national paradigm.
Consequently, Lippmann ultimately dismisses the American dream as a useless and
dangerous flight of fancy.
Roughly twenty years after the appearance of Lippmann’s assessment, however,
James Truslow Adams published his attempt at an American history to date, The Epic of
America8, which paints the American dream in a more general, and far more positive,
light—one which bears a more striking resemblance to our currently predominant
version of the dream. Adams calls the American dream a “distinctive and unique gift to
mankind,” and he goes on to detail a large-scale cultural impulse that moves beyond
Wellborn, Twentieth Century Pilgrimage, 151.
An often told story relates that Adams originally intended to title his book, The
American Dream, but the title was rejected by his publisher, who claimed that no selfrespecting American would ever pay $3 for a “dream.” The irony here is brilliant.
7
8
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the pursuits of individual fulfillment (while still emphasizing their importance) in order
to draft a portrait of an ideological national enterprise. Adams writes:
But there has been also the American dream, that dream of a land in which life
should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each
according to his ability or achievement. It is a difficult dream for the European
upper classes to interpret adequately, and too many of us ourselves have grown
weary and mistrustful of it. It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages
merely, but a dream of a social order in which each man and each woman shall
be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be
recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous
circumstances of birth or position.9
This description certainly seems much more in line with our common understanding of
the American dream. Indeed, much of Adams’ rhetoric here is still actively employed
by contemporary politicians and taken for granted by average Americans—Adams is
describing a brand of American idealism that should strike us, today, as familiar and
relevant.10 And yet, this is simultaneously a national ideal that has existed, by Adams’

Adams, The Epic of America, 415.
Consider, for instance, the overt American dream rhetoric in President Barack
Obama’s recent 2011 State of the Union Address. Despite growing concerns of
America’s economic instability and the perceived decay of America’s authority and
privilege as a world power, Obama’s address nevertheless appeals directly to this
traditional dream idealism, updating the same rhetoric used by Adams for a
contemporary American audience. He says,
So, yes, the world has changed. The competition for jobs is real. But this
shouldn't discourage us. It should challenge us. Remember — for all the hits
we've taken these last few years, for all the naysayers predicting our decline,
America still has the largest, most prosperous economy in the world. (Applause.)
9

10
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measure, since the earliest beginnings of America.

As Allan Nevins relates in his

intellectual biography of Adams,
The central idea of the book [The Epic of America] was that American
development had been dominated by a dream, the dream of a better, richer,
happier existence for every citizen of whatever rank or condition. That dream or
hope had been a vital force from the moment the first colonists came to
Jamestown and Plymouth. It had contributed to the struggle for independence,
and from the hour when independence was won, every generation had
witnessed some kind of uprising of the common folk to protect the dream from
forces that seemed likely to overwhelm and dissipate it.11
Adams locates the American dream, before it is defined and set into public discourse as
such, in the early spirit of America, and this is an observation that sets Adams up as
quite distinct from Lippmann (who recognizes, rather, a markedly different incarnation
of the dream in his assessment of early America). Adams’ observation, though, is an

No workers — no workers are more productive than ours. No country has more
successful companies, or grants more patents to inventors and entrepreneurs.
We're the home to the world's best colleges and universities, where more
students come to study than any place on Earth.
What's more, we are the first nation to be founded for the sake of an idea
— the idea that each of us deserves the chance to shape our own destiny. That's
why centuries of pioneers and immigrants have risked everything to come here.
It's why our students don't just memorize equations, but answer questions like
"What do you think of that idea? What would you change about the world?
What do you want to be when you grow up?" (Obama, State of the Union, 2011)
Obama’s rhetoric here attests to the versatility of the American dream as a national
ideal. Just like Adams, Obama stresses a dream for all Americans that consists not only
in material excellence, but in intellectual and human idealism as well.
11 Nevins, James Truslow Adams, 68.
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important one, for it establishes the American dream as among the causes of American
development, and therefore as integral to the ongoing construction of American
identity, rather than as a mere effect (and so not necessarily a permanent one) of the
growth of American culture into the twentieth century. If the American dream does
indeed function as a myth, then the generation of that myth must be a complex cultural
process that begins right alongside the initial formation of its culture.
In The Epic of America, Adams paints a picture of a social order founded on the
principle of the American dream—a social order that seems characteristically defined
by a sense of social equality and liberty. But he is careful not to categorically eschew the
more mundane aspects of this ideal. “It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages
merely,” he says, but it is certainly those things at least. He goes on to emphasize this
point: “No, the American dream that has lured tens of millions of all nations to our
shores in the past century has not been a dream of merely material plenty, though that
has doubtless counted heavily.”12 Our understanding of the American dream seems to
rest tenuously between the two poles of lofty social idealism and immediate material
fortune.13 The American dream, according to Adams, seems to consist in the guarantee
of social equality and freedom to pursue a better life. The specifics of that “better life,”

Adams, The Epic of America, 416.
Indeed, the sustained tension between materialism and idealism is perhaps the single
greatest cause of the dream’s historical persistence, and will be analyzed in this project
accordingly.
12
13
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however, are vague at best, but measured by American standards, such a life seems
most often to be associated with economic and social rise.14
The national standard that Adams details, however, is not a promise of merely
economic success. There is a loftier principle at work in the guarantee of universal
opportunity, though such a guarantee must be evidenced by more mundane concrete
instances of individual fulfillment if it is to hold any real cultural currency. The initial
authors of this idea—Lippmann and Adams—are decidedly at odds with one another in
their conceptions of the national spirit engendered by the American dream. Whereas
Lippmann sees only danger in the urge towards this kind of self-betterment (one which
disengages itself from the starker realities of the present moment), Adams sees a larger
arena of social advancement implicit in the precepts that stem from equal and free
opportunity for all citizens. Undoubtedly, these critics present two different sides of the
same ideal, and an adequate understanding of that ideal must maintain the duality of
these positions. Indeed, this is the precise point at which a mythological understanding
of the American dream becomes not only relevant, but necessary.

Claude Lévi-Strauss and the Structuralist Model of Myth Analysis
To argue that the American dream functions mythologically demands, first of all,
a discussion of myth; and yet the field of mythology is so extensive and diverse, it can
be difficult to arrive at a coherent, generally accepted theory for the study of myth. For
Material gain serves as a concrete manifestation of the dream’s more idealistic
principles. If one has a great fortune, social affluence, etc., then this serves as “proof”
that America has made good on its promise. Consequently, ideals such as liberty and
equality have a tendency to take on materialistic definitions.
14
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this project, we are interested in demonstrating how the American dream has
consistently functioned in a mythic capacity; that is to say, we will be fundamentally
concerned with the structural principles that define the “shape” of the myth, or, one
could say, the mythic genre. If we can accurately identify the formal category of myth,
then we can move to address the extent to which the American dream fits into that
category—we can compare the underlying structure of the American dream to the
underlying structure of myth generally. Our project, at least at this stage, is one of
classification. And so, it will make sense that we now turn to an authority on the
organization of structural (i.e. formal) principles within mythic expression.
Our most comprehensive understanding of formal mythic structure comes from
one of the twentieth century’s preeminent structural anthropologists, the late Claude
Lévi-Strauss. Some readers may find that a theoretical reliance on Lévi-Strauss is too
‘dated’ for the contemporary “post-theoretical” era of literary studies. The twentieth
century was undoubtedly a period of great philosophical, psychological, linguistic, and
cultural evaluation in the field of literary studies, and while to some extent we may
have advanced past literary theory of the last century, we must nevertheless recognize
that the century’s theoretical contributions were enormous.

Structuralism, while

certainly limited in its approach by its own methodology (as are, arguably, all
theoretical schools of thought, to some degree), still continues to provide us with a most
basic set of critical tools for establishing a categorical distinction between the countless
texts available for analysis. In short, structuralism furnishes us with the means for
defining genres, based not in theme and content, but based in structural principles that
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demonstrate

an

overarching

logical similarity

between

the

organization

and

development of distinct texts. Of course, once we categorize, once we put materials in
relation to each other, we can begin to understand them outside of a vacuum. The tools
with which Lévi-Strauss has provided us over the long course of his impressive career
offer an invaluable resource: structuralism (suffering my own alterations to the theory)
will demonstrate for us that the American dream is structured like a myth and,
moreover, will provide us with the structural substance for our analysis of this myth.
At the onset, a precise definition of myth would be very useful. Unfortunately,
Lévi-Strauss does not supply us with one—or rather, he does not supply us with a
definition that is absolute and objective.

Simon Clarke discusses Lévi-Strauss’

“definition” of myth, finding that Lévi-Strauss contrasts myth with other similar
expressions of cultural thought (such as ritual, magic, folk-tales, etc.) on the basis of
their structures. “Hence,” Clarke writes, “Lévi-Strauss appears implicitly to define
myth as that which is structured like a myth. So long as the object in question can be
found to have a structure of reduplicated opposition, mediation and transformation,
then it is a myth.”15 We will address this matter of oppositions, mediations, and
transformations a little later, but suffice it to say here that, according to Clarke, LéviStrauss’ definition of myth is largely relative to the way one is looking at a mythic text.
Indeed, Clarke goes so far as to say, “Lévi-Strauss believes that the myth presents itself
as such to the analysis, and so reliance is placed on the intuition of the analyst.”16 This
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is far from satisfactory as a definition with any finality; intuition is never the safest
place to begin a serious analytical inquiry.
Of course, Lévi-Strauss does offer other definitions of myth, but none are exactly
satisfying. C. R. Badcock relates that “Lévi-Strauss starts his analysis of myth with a
simple definition; a myth is something which tells a story. It is an anecdote. Unlike
poetry, where the individual word is all-important, in myth what matters is the story,
not the word.”17 This distinction between poetry and myth will be important to our
discussion, and we will touch on it later. But we must recognize that, among the
countless materials that “tell a story,” Lévi-Strauss does nothing here to mark the myth
as distinctive. Once again, he implies a structural distinction, this time insisting that the
myth is recognizable not only because of its structure, but because that structure really
lacks relevant content, and so the myth essentially is its structure. This is certainly a
significant point for Robert Deliège, who notes that “Everywhere in the world people
relate myths, that is to say allegorical accounts meant to explain the origin of their
institutions. Such a universal phenomenon poses a question; [. . . ] If myths are found
the world over, it is because they express a way of thinking characteristic of all humans:
they partake of the laws of the mind’s structure.” 18 If we skip over Deliège’s
definition—a fine enough statement relating myth to allegory which, ultimately, does
not prove particularly useful for analytical definition—we find a more interesting
thought. Namely, Deliège recognizes that the universality of mythic thought implies
that the structure of myth must be universal (since we recognize “myth” as a structural
17
18
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category).

Deliège accounts for this, as does Lévi-Strauss, by finding that mythic

structure imitates human cognitive structure, and so myth is essentially an articulation
of the structure of logical, conflict-resolving, thought. It should be sufficient if we
recognize here that the structure of myth, then, ought to be fundamentally logical;
indeed, Lévi-Strauss organizes mythic material into a Hegelian dialectical process, such
that logical processes determine (wholly) the structure of the myth.

Beyond this

observation (which emphasizes the logical order behind the myth), Deliège’s statement
about the universality of myth delves into the realm of cognitive psychology, and so
will not be relevant to our discussion here.
Edmund Leach proposes a useful anthropological definition of myth in his book
on Lévi-Strauss, finding that Lévi-Strauss himself fails to offer one. “Myth is an illdefined category,” he writes:
Some people use the word as if it meant fallacious history—a story about the past
which we know to be false; to say that an event is “mythical” is equivalent to
saying that it didn’t happen. The theological usage is rather different: myth is a
formulation of religious mystery—“the expression of unobservable realities in
terms of observable phenomena.” This comes close to the anthropologist’s usual
view that “myth is a sacred tale.”19
We are approaching an understanding of myth out of these various definitions, even if
we cannot arrive at an absolute sense of myth that everyone will agree upon.
Essentially, the myth is a culture’s articulation of itself, structured in a certain way and

19

Leach, Claude Lévi-Strauss, 54.
33

with a distinctive purpose intended. In a nice statement by K. O. L. Burridge, “Myths
are reservoirs of articulate thought on the level of the collective. But they are not simply
‘articulate thought’ in a vacuum.

They represent the thought of people about

themselves and their condition.”20 We can accept Burridge’s definition at least in a
working form if we augment it somewhat to emphasize the structural elements of the
myth that, for Lévi-Strauss, ultimately define the myth as such. Cultures, of course,
express themselves in a multiplicity of ways, and myth is only one particular form of
cultural expression. Nevertheless, myth is unique in purpose, and it is here we will
look now.
Lévi-Strauss does give us a definitive statement about the purpose of myth in his
Structural Anthropology. He writes that “the purpose of myth is to provide a logical
model capable of overcoming a contradiction (an impossible achievement if, as it
happens, the contradiction is real).”21 For Lévi-Strauss, myth exists for the sole purpose
of conflict resolution—culturally perceived contradictions, contraries, and tensions in
reality are resolved through the structural expression of the myth (which, by
positioning contradictory elements into a logical relation, has the appearance of then
resolving the perceived absurdity in experience).

In this sense, myth speaks to a

cultural understanding of the structure of reality itself. As Badcock writes,
Myth does not convey commonsensical information, it is not for practical
purposes. It serves no utilitarian end whatsoever, and conveys no information
about the everyday world. Nor is it necessarily morally or politically pedagogic.
20
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[. . . ] [M]yth in reality is extremely purposeful. [. . . ] [M]yth is a means of
structuring and ordering reality, a means of understanding it in the sense that
totemism, for instance, is a means of understanding the people who practice it.
Whereas totemism, ritual, or modes of cooking may be seen as ways of ordering
and classifying natural phenomena and men, myth may be seen as exactly the
same undertaking with the difference that myth is above all an ordering of
concepts and an expression in anecdotes, since unlike these other examples it is
limited to realization in words alone.22
Simply stated, the purpose of myth is to resolve apparent contradictions in the way a
culture conceives its reality. And so, while the content of myths will vary from culture
to culture (and Lévi-Strauss ultimately claims that the content of the myth is irrelevant),
the inherent structure of myth will be identical from culture to culture. A myth is a
myth by nature of its structural ability to reorganize experience for a specific culture,
resolving the tensions that culture finds in its unique perception of reality. Burridge
gives us a clean statement about this purpose, writing that “myths provide concrete
situations capable of overcoming logical contradictions.” 23 With this purpose and
rough definition in mind, we can begin to outline a model for structural myth
analysis.24

Badcock, Lévi-Strauss, 55-6.
Burridge, “Lévi-Strauss and Myth,” 112.
24 I will include one more statement about the myth’s purpose in resolving culturally
perceived contradictions in reality, for the purposes of clarification. Mary Douglas
writes,
On the assumption that it is the nature of myth to mediate contradictions, the
method of analysis must proceed by distinguishing the oppositions and the
22
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Because Lévi-Strauss is a linguistic structuralist, his extensive analyses of
mythology have their roots in the precise linguistic construction of myths.

While

linguistic deconstruction will not be our primary aim here, we can nevertheless adopt
an analogical derivative of his understanding in order to develop a methodology for the
study of cultural mythology. For Lévi-Strauss, in order to understand a myth we must
first break it down into its most basic constituent parts, and through the rearrangement
and analysis of those parts we find repetitions and tensions, out of which the myth itself
is sprung. The myth, then, exists as the apparent reconciliation of its diverse and
contradictory elemental experiences, and it accomplishes such a reconciliation by virtue
of the specific manner in which those elements are brought into relation with one
another.
But we cannot understand the meaning contained within a myth, Lévi-Strauss
emphasizes, merely by breaking that myth into its constituent elements and analyzing
those elements each in turn. On the contrary, Lévi-Strauss writes, “If there is a meaning
to be found in mythology, it cannot reside in the isolated elements which enter into the
composition of a myth, but only in the way those elements are combined.”25 For Lévi-

mediating elements. And it follows, too, that the function of myth is to portray
the contradictions in the basic premises of the culture. The same goes for the
relation of myth to social reality. The myth is a contemplation of the
unsatisfactory compromises which, after all, compose social life. In the devious
statement of the myth, people can recognize indirectly what it would be difficult
to admit openly and what is patently clear to all and sundry, that the ideal is not
attainable. (Douglas, “The Meaning of Myth,” 52)
While largely restating the above discussion of mythic purpose, Douglas adds a
dimension to her treatment here that seems to resonate uniquely with the American
dream: namely, the unattainability of cultural idealism.
25 Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (v. 1), 210.
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Strauss, the structuralist, the most constituent parts of myth are identical with the most
constituent parts of language itself (for the myth exists as a linguistic construction
before anything else).

Hence a myth, most basically, consists of a collection of

phonemes, morphemes, and semes (here Lévi-Strauss’ theoretical debt to Roman
Jakobson is obvious). These most basic linguistic components, however, do not supply
us with the appropriate elemental substances that we require to understand mythic
meaning. For this reason Lévi-Strauss introduces a second and superior (in terms of
complexity) classification of mythic parts, locating what he terms “gross constituent
units” (or “mythemes”) as the basic relations that constitute a mythic structure.26
Here Lévi-Strauss’ analysis of myth delves more deeply into a linguistic
structuralism, and he moves to analyze sentences as the elemental constitutive relations
of myth (each sentence naturally containing a relation in the simultaneous presence of a
subject and a function). It is here that we can begin to steer our discussion away from a
strictly linguistic study and pursue an analogical line of inquiry, isolating these
constituent relations as the fundamental basis of a myth. Lévi-Strauss remarks that
“mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of oppositions toward their
resolution,”27 such that we can define myth as the apparent resolution of naturally
irresolvable realities.

These mythemes will be culturally grounded—based on the

For clarification, I quote Badcock’s assessment of this feature:
[T]he significant units of myths are phrases and sentences which are the
fundamental particles of the anecdote which the myth essentially is. Clearly, the
study of myth is the study of the structural inter-relations of these fundamental
particles of ‘mythemes’ as Lévi-Strauss calls them, using this term to underline
the parallel with the phoneme of structural linguistics. (Badcock, Lévi-Strauss,
53)
27 Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (v. 1), 224.
26
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specificity of experience belonging to a given social set—and so they will generate
uniquely cultural myths. Hence a myth is a given culture’s attempt at reconciling those
contradictions in human experience that that culture observes. If we now return our
attention to the American dream, a clear methodology for its study begins to emerge.
By breaking the myth down into its constituent mythemes, which will each hold a
primary and fundamental opposition or tension within itself, we can outline the
structure according to which the American dream attempts to resolve the problems of
American ideological experience.
The difficulty in this project arises because of the great difference between a
large-scale and vaguely represented cultural myth such as the American dream, and the
more concrete (though various) primitive mythological narratives that Lévi-Strauss
adopts for his study. Lévi-Strauss works with mythological narratives—stories that
relate cultural experiences and can individually be broken down into distinct narrative
parts and remapped based on the similarities and differences of those parts. While a
great variety of versions of any particular myth may abound, nevertheless “every
version belongs to the myth,”28 and the separate versions can be broken down and
mapped together.29 The American dream may function mythologically, but we do not

Ibid., 218.
In fact, the abundance of different versions of a myth is quite important to LéviStrauss’ understanding of myth. Because myths articulate cognitive structure, their
content is irrelevant. Multiple versions of a myth are seen as equally authentic with no
regard for significant differences in content, because they reproduce identical
mythological structures. Thus, whereas different versions of a literary text pose
problems of authenticity and authority, different versions of a myth are encouraged, for
the more versions that exist, the more clearly the structural similarities of distinct
versions can emerge.
28
29
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find it contained in a variety of narratively based myths. What we do find, however, is
an extensive collection of American literary texts that attempt to represent the substance
of the American dream in action. An important clarification must be made here, namely
that these American literary texts that adopt the American dream as their subject are not
identical with Lévi-Strauss’ myths. The American dream, as I am contending, is an
American cultural myth. The American novel about the dream, rather, is a literary
representation of the myth—not the myth itself in raw form.
But the American nation, as such, never existed in a genuine primitive state, in
the sense that Lévi-Strauss locates primitive cultures (for Lévi-Strauss the primitive
culture is that which lacks written language), and so original, authentic, primitive
myths do not occur. Instead, we have highly developed, artistically advanced literary
representations of this mythic reality, and I adopt these texts for analysis in the absence
of more “genuine” incarnations of the myth.
Richard Slotkin notes this precise problem with constructing an American
mythology:
[T]his artificially created American nation—the self-baptized “American
people”—first saw light in the age of the printing press.

Mythologies arise

spontaneously in the preliterary epochs of a people’s history and consequently
are “artless” in their portrayal of the world and the gods, appealing to the
emotions rather than the intelligence.

American myths—tales of heroes in

particular—frequently turn out to be the work of literary hacks or of promoters
seeking to sell American real estate by mythologizing the landscape. One of the
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problems with which this study has to deal is the question of the relationship
between myth and literature.30
Setting aside those “literary hacks” that Slotkin notes, I contend that one of the roles of
the literature selected for analysis in this project is to represent a mythic reality. This
implies a firm distinction between myth and literature, while still maintaining the
importance of literature for the study of myth. Now, while a Lévi-Straussian linguistic
analysis of each American dream narrative is a far too massive and tedious critical
pursuit, we can appoint for our study certain preeminent literary texts that are most
clearly representative of the tensions and oppositions that are apparently resolved in
the structure of the American dream.31
There is some precedent for this analogical adaption of Lévi-Strauss’ explicitly
linguistic structuralism. It might seem that this methodological course departs radically
from Lévi-Strauss’ original structural methodology. This methodology does depart
from Lévi-Strauss’ insofar as it repurposes his statements and conclusions about mythic
thought, yet the departure is not quite so radical as it might appear. Lévi-Strauss
emphasizes that his method of study is a kind of pure structuralism: he ignores content
outright and relates his elemental units of analysis to the elemental structures of
language. Yet, when we watch Lévi-Strauss’ actual myth analyses, we find that his
structuralism is perhaps not so pure as he implies. Lévi-Strauss’ mythemic units are not
Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 6.
It is worth nothing here that the contradictory views about the American dream
presented by Lippmann and Adams might now both be held as definitive assessments
of the American dream. As interpretive devices, at least, we would do well not to
categorically privilege one over the other, for they appear to represent something akin
to Lévi-Strauss’ distinct “versions” of a myth.
30
31
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really analogous to the constituent elements of language on a sentence level; his
mythemes are not concerned with themes in the myth, but they are concerned with
action in the myth. It is ultimately the events of the myth that Lévi-Strauss maps
together—the myth’s “plot” (however undeveloped) is the myth’s structure, and when
we realize this it is not so strange to adopt a broader approach to this structural
methodology in order to apply it to literary texts.
Clarke points out this fact, even if he fails to really develop his point. He writes,
“Although Lévi-Strauss makes use of many terms borrowed from linguistics and makes
frequent allusions to linguistics, specific borrowings are rare.

Thus many

commentators have noted that Lévi-Strauss’ allusions to linguistics are largely
metaphorical.” 32 Further, Douglas insists that we cannot “take him [Lévi-Strauss]
literally” on this matter. She writes,
[Lévi-Strauss’ methodology] assumes that the analysis of myth should proceed
like the analysis of language. In both language and myth the separate units have
no meaning by themselves, they acquire it only because of the way in which they
are combined. [. . . ] Lévi-Strauss unguardedly says that the units of mythological
structure are sentences. If he took this statement seriously it would be an absurd
limitation on his analysis. But in fact, quite rightly, he abandons it at once [. . . ]
Linguists would be at a loss to identify these units of language structure which
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Lévi-Strauss claims to be able to put on punched cards and into a computing
machine as surely and simply as if they were phonemes and morphemes.33
What Douglas is pointing out is that, despite what Lévi-Strauss claims about his
methodology, his analysis nevertheless proceeds in much the same manner as this
project proposes to do. The underlying elements of myth that determine its structure
and meaning do not, in fact, resemble the constituent elements within a sentence. In
fact, they resemble the sentences themselves, arranged with direct reference to the
actions those sentences describe (and these actions in turn determine the shape and
direction of the myth narrative).
Douglas, for one, cannot understand Lévi-Strauss’ reluctance to relate myth to
literature in light of this fact. “Why does he want so vigorously to detach myth criticism
from literary criticism?” she writes; “It is on the literary plane that we have his best
contribution to the subject of mythology.”34 She goes on:
Lévi-Strauss claims to be revealing the formal structures of myths. But he can
never put aside his interest in what the myth discourse is about. He seems to
think that if he had the formal structure it would look not so much like a
grammar book as like a summary of the themes which analyzing the particular
structure of a myth cycle has produced. [. . . ] He falls into the trap of claiming to
discover the real underlying meanings of myths because he never separates the
particular artistic structure of a particular set of myths from their general or
purely formal structure. Just as knowing that the rhyme structure is a, b, b, a,
33
34

Douglas, “The Meaning of Myth,” 50.
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does not tell us anything about the content of a sonnet, so the formal structure of
a myth would not help very much in interpreting it.35
Douglas makes a great point here—Lévi-Strauss evidently tends to equate formal
structure with artistic structure, such that, in fact, the analysis of myth—insofar as it
sustains a Lévi-Straussian analysis of structure—should be only minimally different
from the structural analysis of literature. With this in mind, we will proceed with our
discussion of the American dream (now figuring it as myth), and set our sights on
American narratives about the American dream—for while these narratives are not
myths, per se, our structural analysis of them can nevertheless proceed as LéviStraussian myth analysis.

The Great Gatsby As American Mythic Paradigm: A Case Study
F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby serves wonderfully for a preliminary
discussion of the American dream as represented in concrete narrative form, for many
critics easily recognize this novel as the paradigmatic American dream narrative. We
can turn to The Great Gatsby, then, as a definitive version of the American dream myth,
out of which we might derive the mythemes that will be the ultimate subjects of this
study. The dominating tension of Fitzgerald’s novel rests in the discrepancy between
conflicting versions of success, and is summed up quite nicely in the narrator’s ongoing
assessment of Gatsby. Nick Carraway witnesses Gatsby’s monumental failure firsthand
and, to be sure, he recognizes it as such. Nevertheless, he opens the novel with the
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striking claim that, “No—Gatsby turned out all right at the end.”36 Fitzgerald’s novel
has survived extensive critical scrutiny precisely because its tensions are not easily
resolved: Gatsby is at once a success and a failure, whether we measure his success by
the material trappings he acquires, the social prestige to which he rises, or the implicitly
nobler end of the attainment of Daisy’s affections. In fact, the great complexity of
Gatsby’s American dream objective is what sets the novel up as a grand reflection on an
all too obscure cultural myth.
Nick lauds Gatsby for his terrific ability to dream—to locate and articulate a solid
material referent for his desire that moves beyond the merely mundane. Gatsby has
what Nick calls “an extraordinary gift for hope, a romantic readiness such as I have
never found in any other person and which it is not likely I shall ever find again.”37
Gatsby’s dream is not abstract and therefore innately unattainable, but neither is it
wholly concrete and therefore transient. In fact, it is in breaching these boundaries that
his dream-object merits the distinction that Nick assigns it.

We must recall that

Gatsby’s dream had been, first and foremost, a more standard dream of upward
mobility in terms of economic and social increase. Before ever laying eyes on Daisy he
is already several years into his advancing career—he has changed his name, spent
educative time under the tutelage of Dan Cody the millionaire, and begun to map out
the shape that his success will take. He does not spend his life amassing a fortune for
the sole end of impressing and thereby attaining Daisy, as many reader have wrongly
asumed. Rather, he spends his life in pursuit of Daisy because he has made her the
36
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romantically appropriate conclusion to his desire for an amassed fortune. Daisy is the
object of Gatsby’s American dream because she seems already to contain in herself the
standard trappings of material success and luxury. Right after Gatsby and Daisy begin
their original love affair, we are given the following description of Daisy, no doubt
narratively influenced by Gatsby’s own imaginative perception of her: “She had caught
a cold and it made her voice huskier and more charming than ever and Gatsby was
overwhelmingly aware of the youth and mystery that wealth imprisons and preserves,
of the freshness of many clothes and of Daisy, gleaming like silver, safe and proud
above the hot struggles of the poor.”38 Daisy is, for Gatsby, the complete incarnation of
the total idea of her life. She is a physical embodiment of the material ideals that
hitherto had made up the content of Gatsby’s pursuit, and as the natural extension of
this ideal, she becomes—quite naturally—the object of Gatsby’s American dream.39
It is Daisy’s voice, above all, that characterizes her according to Gatsby’s ideal—
the very voice with its distinctive quality that Nick finds himself unable to identify
throughout the novel and which Gatsby suddenly and strikingly describes near the
Ibid., 157.
Roger Lewis expands on this argument, demonstrating the direct correlation between
Daisy and money in Gatsby’s mind. He writes,
[. . .] the means by which Gatsby expresses his feelings for Daisy—even though
those feelings are sincere—is by showing off his possessions. Urging Daisy and
Nick to explore his house, he tells them: “‘It took me just three years to earn the
money that bought it’” (p. 109). The very language in which Nick describes
Gatsby’s love for Daisy is commercial: “I think he revalued everything in his
house according to the measure of response it drew from her well-loved eyes” (p.
11). (Lewis, “Money, Love, and Aspiration in The Great Gatsby,” 45-6)
This passage does not demand much commentary; it is sufficient to state that, not only
does Daisy embody a monetary ideal for Gatsby, the economic nature of Gatsby and
Daisy’s love affair is reflected, among other ways, in the very substance of their
courtship.
38
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novel’s end: “Her voice is full of money.”

Nick immediately reflects on Gatsby’s

observation, saying, “That was it. I’d never understood before. It was full of money—
that was the inexhaustible charm that rose and fell in it, the jingle of it, the cymbals’
song of it. . . High in a white palace the king’s daughter, the golden girl. . .”40 The tone
of Daisy’s voice has a symbolic effect more durable than the other ways in which the
narrative presentation suggests that Daisy stands for Gatsby’s ideal—and this is even a
fact that Nick recognizes when he reflects on Gatsby’s catalogue of imaginative symbols
associated with Daisy.

The casual way in which Daisy fits into her expensive,

extravagant, “better” surroundings crafts for us an image of a girl who belongs in the
midst of riches and fine things; the direct way in which her voice is characterized by
physical wealth, though, makes Daisy properly symbolic, for she suddenly embodies
(and not only incidentally) the very ideal for which she has come to stand. It is all the
more striking that Daisy’s monetary tones are not merely the product of Gatsby’s fancy,
but rather her money-fluid voice is heard as such by our more grounded and sensibleminded narrator. If Nick, our point of critical reference from Gatsby, shares such a
perception of Daisy, then the novel seems to be implying that there is a definite quality
according to which Daisy’s character naturally lends herself to Gatsby’s fantastical
creations. She becomes, most exactly, the objective, physical reality behind Gatsby’s
immaterial idealism.
The novel makes this move clear, pinpointing the exact moment at which Daisy
becomes the material referent of Gatsby’s idealism, and suggesting the peril of Gatsby’s
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dream in adopting her as such. The transformation of Daisy into an enduring image of
success and fulfillment occurs as she and Gatsby share their first kiss:
His heart beat faster as Daisy’s white face came up to his own. He knew that
when he kissed this girl, and forever wed his unutterable visions to her
perishable breath, his mind would never romp again like the mind of God. So he
waited, listening for a moment longer to the tuning fork that had been struck
upon a star. Then he kissed her. At his lips’ touch she blossomed for him like a
flower and the incarnation was complete.41
The narrative suggests that there is some necessary danger in the adoption of a physical
image for Gatsby’s idealism.

Daisy is perishable, and so her adoption into his

imagination guarantees its ultimate dissipation. Yet, without her, his dream lacks any
concrete purpose and loses all its merit. Hence Nick assigns greatness to Gatsby’s
pursuit only when he learns that it includes Daisy and is not limited to the mundane
trappings of wealth that surround Gatsby. Jordan Baker tells Nick, “Gatsby bought that
house so that Daisy would be just across the bay,” and in doing so she triggers a
profound alteration in Nick’s judgment of Gatsby. “Then it had not been merely the
stars to which he had aspired on that June night,” Nick reflects. “He came alive to me,
delivered suddenly from the womb of his purposeless splendor.”42
And yet, as much as Gatsby’s pursuit is an avid progression forwards towards
success, it is simultaneously tethered to the past. His dream-object seems to occupy a
space between the idealistic tendencies that Lippmann details, for it is something like a
41
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longing for a better time that has passed, which can only be practically located in the
future. This temporal paradox is not one that Gatsby rightly comprehends, for his
idealism results in a skewed understanding of temporal reality. In an attempt to call
Gatsby’s attention to this discrepancy, Nick plainly points out that one cannot repeat
the past. “Can’t repeat the past?” Gatsby famously remarks, “Why of course you
can!”43 In commenting on this passage, Marius Bewley does a fine job of characterizing
the complexity of Gatsby’s ties to the past in relation to the future. He writes,
The American dream, stretched between a golden past and a golden future, is
always betrayed by a desolate present—a moment of fruit rinds and discarded
favors and crushed flowers. Imprisoned in his present, Gatsby belongs even
more to the past than to the future. His aspirations have been rehearsed, and his
tragedy suffered, by all the generations of Americans who have gone before. His
sense of the future, of the possibilities of life, he has learned from the dead.44
Gatsby, as a mythic embodiment of the hero of the American dream, repeats this
discrepancy between past and future idealism in the whole design of his life. As a
figurative model, he speaks directly to the contradictory tension inherent in the
American dream vision.
Fitzgerald’s novel, then, presents a very convoluted portrait of the American
dream, suggesting thereby that the myth persists because of (rather than in spite of) the
assorted contradictions that inhere in it. Gatsby’s dream is, in fact, a dream: it is a
constructed illusion that forges a great gulf between reality and fancy. So long as he
43
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pursues the concretized ideal in Daisy, Gatsby’s action retains the character of
magnificence. As he comes closer to actually attaining that ideal, however, it steadily
recedes before him, for it cannot persist in the face of reality. Hence when Daisy is no
longer just across the bay, when she is physically with Gatsby, that dream begins
already to fade. Nick observes:
As I went over to say goodbye I saw that the expression of bewilderment had
come back into Gatsby’s face, as though a faint doubt had occurred to him as to
the quality of his present happiness. Almost five years! There must have been
moments even that afternoon when Daisy tumbled short of his dreams—not
through her own fault but because of the colossal vitality of his illusion. It had
gone beyond her, beyond everything. He had thrown himself into it with a
creative passion, adding to it all the time, decking it out with every bright feather
that drifted his way.45
Gatsby’s project is remarkable so long as it remains a hopeful pursuit.

But the

American dream never guarantees fulfillment, and seems to call for the regular revision
of ideals, such that the end of pursuit is never finally accomplished. And so, Nick
reflects that Gatsby’s demise is the high price he paid “for living too long with a single
dream.” With the loss of Daisy, which amounts to the collapse of Gatsby’s entire
idealistic system, the world profoundly changes its character for him: “He must have
looked up at an unfamiliar sky through frightening leaves and shivered as he found
what a grotesque thing a rose is and how raw the sunlight was upon the scarcely
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created grass. A new world, material without being real, where poor ghosts, breathing
dreams like air, drifted fortuitously about…”46 Without Daisy, Gatsby is left with the
empty shell of his many accomplishments, accomplishments that lack real value when
divorced from the purpose that had hitherto informed them.

It is narratively

appropriate that Gatsby is killed after this revelation, for he has been suddenly thrown
into a world that he cannot abide.47
What, then, does the progress of Gatsby’s action tell us about the internal
structure of the American dream myth? Most centrally, The Great Gatsby makes clear
the illusory quality of the American dream.

The American dream functions

mythologically, to be sure, but it is also a practical guide to self-fulfillment. As such, it
occupies a dangerous space—dangerous because reality always threatens the whole
idealistic project. The underlying tension of the American dream, as evidenced by The
Great Gatsby, is that progressive forward movement towards a concretized goal or set of
goals actually causes the dissolution of those goals. As the American dream pursuer
approaches nearer his objective, the objective more and more evades him, or else
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Bewley makes this point very clearly:
Paradoxically, it was Gatsby’s dream that conferred reality upon the world. The
reality was in his faith in the goodness of creation, and in the possibilities of life.
That these possibilities were intrinsically related to such romantic components
limited and distorted his dream, and finally left it helpless in the face of the
Buchanans, but it did not corrupt it. When the dream melted, it knocked the
prop of reality from under the universe, and face to face with the physical
substance at last, Gatsby realized that the illusion was there—there where Tom
and Daisy, and generations of small-minded, ruthless Americans had found it—
in the dreamless, visionless complacency of mere matter, substance without form.
After this recognition, Gatsby’s death is only a symbolic formality [. . . ] (Bewley,
“Scott Fitzgerald’s Criticism of America,” 52-53)
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becomes increasingly devalued relative to his proximity to it.

The well-known

conclusion of Fitzgerald’s novel speaks directly to this phenomenon:
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes
before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter—tomorrow we will run faster,
stretch out our arms farther… And one fine morning⎯
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the
past.48
The fundamental paradox that underlies the American dream—that which the
American dream attempts or appears to resolve—is a kind of absurdity of progress.
This endlessly progressive movement (that which is in constant motion towards a
constantly receding object) is imbued with meaning by the mythology of the American
dream. This is, after all, the purpose of myth if we continue to follow a Lévi-Straussian
understanding that myth acts as the apparent resolution of inherent contradictions in
human or cultural experience in order to justify, or assign value to, human action. The
American dream quite simply posits that all American citizens have the right and
opportunity to rise, economically and socially, regardless of the conditions into which
they are born.

It notably offers no guarantee of success, but rather implies the

opportunity for perpetual motion towards a goal. And yet, in focusing on the capacity
for increase, the American dream seems to resolve the inanity of unattainable pursuit
(for there is doubtless some absurdity in what ultimately amounts to progress for its
own sake). The mythic resolution of this absurdity rests in the manner in which the
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American dream demands a concretization of one’s goals. Gatsby is a great dreamer
because of the manner in which he finds a concrete value to attribute to his otherwise
purposeless rise. And indeed, as an adherent to the myth, Gatsby is blithely unaware of
the flaw in his design, for as far as he is concerned the myth has successfully resolved
the conflict of his experience.
Now, this mythic interpretation of self-sufficient progress is remarkably
American in kind. We can recall here Adams’ commentary that the American dream
constitutes a national imperative. As much as it encourages individual fulfillment, the
American dream has the larger scope of establishing a national social order. Stemming
from the basic tenets of democracy, the American project has always been one of
national progress.

This national scale of upward or forward mobility informs the

individual pursuits of American citizens, which essentially constitute the larger arena
that is at stake. If the nation is to be always advancing, then such motion can only be
accomplished through the perpetual advancement of its citizens.

Grounded in

democracy, however, American national idealism is not merely ordered to the increased
attainment of power (though this is certainly a primary aim). Rather, the ideals of
freedom and equality, on which the dream is premised, serve as the nation’s idealistic
goals. But the American project is decidedly not a Marxist one: the nation is not
ordered to the final realization of its ideals in some future national utopia. There is no
point in time, at least as far as the American imagination is concerned, at which these
national ideals are attained. Instead, the nation constantly strives for increased freedom
and equality (and, we can say, global power) for its citizens, creating an ideological goal
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of perpetual progress. The culturally inherent nobility of these goals accounts for their
sustained durability and therefore maintains the whole structure of the American
dream, figured personally. In short, the American dream acts as a national mythic
resolution of the meaninglessness of progress in order to guarantee the ongoing
accomplishment of such progress.

Extracting Mythemes: The Identification of Structural Tensions in The Great Gatsby
Such is the mythic substance of the American dream generally, out of which we
might now derive the specific relational tenets whose analysis will result in a detailed
understanding of the structure of the American dream. Again, we can look to The Great
Gatsby in its particularity for an overview of these mythemes, but we must proceed with
caution. Because the American nation is so large and diverse, the American dream
defines a very broad set of goals and expectations, so as to maintain inclusivity.
Consequently, many mythemic tensions are contained in the abstract ideal of the
American dream, and we cannot possibly pursue them all in detail here. We must, then,
carefully select those mythemes that are most clearly pertinent to our discussion here—
those which really establish the basic structural components of the American dream as
myth. For this task, we can turn to yet another literary critic who has offered up a basic
model for the core narrative elements of a myth.
In his book Regeneration Through Violence, Richard Slotkin asserts that mythical
narratives—like any kind of narrative, really—have a most basic structural composition.
He writes,
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As artifacts, myths appear to be built of three basic structural elements: a
protagonist or hero, with whom the audience is presumed to identify in some
way; a universe in which the hero may act, which is presumably a reflection of
the audience’s conception of the world and the gods; and a narrative, in which
the interaction of hero and universe is described. Hero and universe may be
readily abstracted as “images,” which may in turn be evocative enough to
become equated in our minds with the whole of the myth itself. The narrative as
a whole is more difficult to abstract, since its action defines (explicitly and
implicitly) the relationship of hero to universe and of man to God—and so
establishes the laws of cause and effect, of natural process, and of morality. It is
the narrative which gives the images life by giving them a mode of interaction.49
Slotkin sets up for us a very clean, neat breakdown of mythic narrative structure.
Essentially, a myth consists of an actor, a setting, and an action; the interplay between
these structural aspects defines a culture’s mythic understanding of the basic structure
of reality.

Now, each of these narrative elements will certainly be present in

representations of the American dream. In fact, because the American dream functions
mythically, these structural elements will, in fact, act as Lévi-Straussian mythemes.
When we apply each of these elements—character, setting, and action—to the American
dream myth, each will consist in a mythemic tension that defines the basic structure of
that myth. In short, the most basic structural elements of the American dream myth
will each contain a relational tension, such that the American dream is structured by the
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very tensions that it seeks to resolve. This structure is ultimately what makes the
American dream a national myth.
Perhaps The Great Gatsby is so highly esteemed as a paradigmatic American text
because of its fluid incorporation of these mythemes into its narrative structure.50 To be
sure, Gatsby—like any other narrative—contains a basic actor, action, and setting. In
exploring the novel’s precise representation of these elements as mythemes, we will
arrive at the mythic structure of Gatsby, which will in turn serve as an example of that
structure which we will locate in the American dream myth itself, and also in other
novelistic representations of the dream.
Let us begin, then, by identifying Jay Gatsby as the novel’s unequivocal
protagonist, and then defining that which makes him a uniquely American protagonist.51
Gatsby is fabulously wealthy, but his possession of great wealth does not alone make
him a prototype of the ideal American hero. What does mark his Americanness, though,
is the fact that Gatsby was not always wealthy, and that he made his great fortune more
or less independently. In short, Gatsby is a self-made man. This designation— “selfThis would imply that critics and theorists of Fitzgerald’s novel are aware of the
mythemic structure of Gatsby; I do not mean to put forward this argument. Rather, I
contend that this structure is implicit, such that critics and theorists of the novel
recognize its paradigmatic American dream structure without necessarily identifying it
as such.
51 Most readers will not object to this identification, but some may contend that Nick
Carraway is more properly the novel’s protagonist. I reject this reading, for while there
is much to be said about Nick as a character and narrator, and while he decidedly
executes his own unique action in the novel, Nick’s story consistently develops Gatsby
as its protagonist, and it is Gatsby’s action which ultimately directs Nick’s (such that
Nick’s narrative development is always subject to the development of Gatsby’s own
action). Consequently, while other plots may take place within the novel, it is Gatsby
who most completely fills the role of the protagonist. This is, most likely, why the novel
bears his name for its title.
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made man”—is the paradigm for the protagonist of the American dream narrative, and,
by implication, the mythic hero of the American dream.

While a more precise

definition and understanding of the self-made man will be the subject of the next
chapter, we can here at least outline the basic tension that sits at the center of the selfmade man as American mythic protagonist.
Dedicated, hard work is the hallmark of the self-made man, and operates as the
real catalyst for success. While equal and universal opportunity for advancement is the
promise of the American dream (a promise never wholly made good on), such
opportunity is never a guarantee of success.

It is through personal initiative and

sustained dedication that the American dream implies such success might be really
attained—indeed, the myth of the self-made man is such that honest, genuine hard
work must pay off.

In the case of Gatsby—who is figurative of this mythic

understanding52—his great designs are accomplished because they are so pragmatically
constructed. Gatsby’s illusions about Daisy may be no more than dreamy abstractions,
but his path to wealth and prestige is concretely determined. We need only recall the

Bewley sets Gatsby up as a mythic hero by drawing the following conclusion:
In an essay called “Myths for Materialists” Mr. Jacques Barzun once wrote that
figures, whether of fact or fiction, insofar as they express destinies, aspirations,
attitudes, typical of man or particular groups, are invested with a mythical
character. In this sense Gatsby is a “mythic” character, and no other word will
define him. Not only is he an embodiment (as Fitzgerald makes clear at the
outset) of that conflict between illusion and reality at the heart of American life;
he is an heroic personification of the Amrican romantic hero, the true heir of the
American dream. (Bewley, “Scott Fitzgerald’s Criticism of America,” 40)
While Bewley is drawing his conclusion from an argument different than my own, his
reflection that Gatsby is mythic because he embodies this American tension certainly
speaks to the current discussion and provides a bit more support for the claim that
Gatsby, as self-made man, is a mythic hero.
52
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significance of his childhood schedule, whose exacting nature is indicative of severe
purpose, and which already contains the germ of his future aspirations.53 Indeed, for
Gatsby material rise seems inevitable given his character alone. His ultimate failure is
in no way owing to lethargy or lack of purpose, but results from the idealism behind his
practical progression, as we have seen.
Yet Gatsby has some inherent advantages, to be sure. While he may not be
imbued with a lofty social status from birth, he is nevertheless a fully-abled white
male—categories that, practically, become all too relevant to a discussion of realistic
ascension in American history. Moreover, Gatsby is lucky to a large extent. There are
an array of internal factors that contribute to Gatsby’s success, to be sure, but we cannot
overlook the extensive external factors that also assist him. In short, the narrative
suggests a quite fluid connection between Gatsby’s financial success and his personal
ambition, and it is through this direct connection that the myth of the self-made man is
realized and can be propagated. The simple facts that hard work does not always result
in success, that conditions outside oneself can impact one’s life severely and irrevocably,
and that opportunity for increase is not, in fact, universally and equally assigned,
present crude and harsh realities that belie the simple directive that honest ambition
must of necessity lead one to one’s goals. The myriad contradictions that persist in real
experience do not allow for a national endorsement of personal ambition, without
which the larger social ideals of the American dream cannot be accomplished (for lofty
national ideals are only achieved by real, concrete instances of success). The self-made
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Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, 181—82.
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man, then, constitutes one of these gross constituent units, or mythemes, out of which
the larger myth of the American dream is composed. The imagined resolution of the
tensions surrounding the self-made man ultimately make the American dream viable,
and a mythological analysis of the American dream demands a closer study of him.
The Great Gatsby also offers a mythemic tension in its setting, which contains
enough diverse trappings that we can take it as a general representation of idealistic
American terrain. Most notably, the tension regarding the novel’s setting exists in the
dichotomous representation of Long Island: The separation between a “West Egg” of
new money and an “East Egg” of old money speaks directly to the frontier idealism of
American optimism. The novel is set in the 1920’s—well after the supposedly endless
western frontier has been closed.54 Nevertheless, Gatsby repeats this theme of the
Western frontier in its representation of Long Island; hence Gatsby and his “new
money” occupy the West Egg—Gatsby’s wealth is literally associated with the promise
of the frontier enterprise (indeed, Gatsby’s economic success is a testament to the reality
of the “go west!” paradigm).

For Gatsby America really is the “Golden Land of

Opportunity”—a phrase that comes to embody the representative American setting that
constitutes the geographical paradigm of the myth’s structure. And yet, there is a
mysterious tension here nonetheless, for Gatsby’s “western” action is actually
accomplished by moving east. This is similarly echoed by Nick, who goes west at the
end of the novel, as though he will find new opportunity in the now exhausted

See here Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous frontier thesis, which is discussed at
length in a later chapter.
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frontier. 55 Essentially, the novel represents a clear understanding of the western
frontier paradigm, with all its promise of opportunity and material rise, from within a
physical space in which the frontier no longer exists. Consequently, the novel at once
attests to the viability of America as a land of opportunity (Gatsby, after all, makes his
great fortune within an opportunistic terrain), while simultaneously emphasizing the
closure of that opportunistic space.

Ultimately, the structural mythemic tension

contained here is that between the reality and the illusion behind an opportunistic
conception of American physical space.
The Great Gatsby’s most remarkable accomplishment is its representation of our
third and final structural mytheme: the action of the American dream. While typically
the most difficult narrative element to define, in the case of the American dream we can
easily enough identify “upward mobility” as its predominant action.

Within an

American mythic context, upward mobility refers specifically to the movement from
one socio-economic sphere to a “higher” or “better” one. Critics of the American dream
may emphasize the loftier national idealism behind the dream, but they consistently

Robert Emmet Long discusses the implied contradiction inherent in Nick Carraway’s
westward move at the novel’s end. He writes,
At the end, Carraway returns to the West, where he can keep his moral
distinctions straight. Or so he says. But there is a contradiction in terms in his
return, since he has already envisioned a darkness spreading across the entire
continent, including the West he returns to as sanctuary. Moreover, it is in the
West, in the environs of Chicago, that the Buchanan money was made, that
Gatsby was closed out of Daisy’s life originally, that Daisy chose Tom. Further
still, the frontier vision served first by Cody and then by Gatsby, and exploded as
a cruel illusion, was a dream of the West. Carraway returns to the West not, it
seems, as fact so much as admitted illusion of adolescence, which means that he,
like Gatsby, has no place to go, can envision no alternatives to the nightmare he
has lived through. (Long, The Achieving of the Great Gatsby, 181-82)
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insist (as they must) on the material parameters of the dream as well. Gatsby is a direct
attestation to this fact—even the grand ideal he locates in Daisy is, ultimately, an
extension of the drive towards wealth. A conflict arises here, though, when we attempt
to balance individual material rise with national idealistic accomplishment; these two
movements tend to be exclusive of one another.
The mythemic tension that we locate here exists in the frequent discrepancy
between the American dream’s supposed guarantee of personal material success and its
simultaneous promise of social betterment, and this tension, like the others just
mentioned, will be explored in detail in a later chapter. This conflicted notion of success
is perhaps the most complex tension that the American dream offers; this should not
come as a surprise if we recall that Slotkin emphasized that mythic action is always the
most difficult structural element to define. Essentially, in the recognition of American
mythic action, we find that private and social progress, while informing and assisting
one another in theory, too often espouse conflicting courses of action. The problem that
emerges is that, in advancing oneself, one inevitably restricts another individual and,
regardless of one’s degree of success, any individual can effect the social structure
according to which others are capable of material ascension. Coupled with the relative
nature of the American dream—that one’s measure of success is always calculated
against another’s level of success—the reality of upward mobility is competition. Far
from working for general social advancement and increased opportunities for everyone,
then, the action of the American dream (which is at once public and private) contains in
itself an overt contradiction. In short, the action of the American dream, insofar as it
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simultaneously defines contradictory personal and public goals, attempts to resolve the
illogicality of its own design.
While the mythemes briefly discussed here certainly do not encompass the
totality of elemental relations that compose the American dream, they are nevertheless
the most central and directly relevant to this analysis, insofar as they describe structural
tensions.

Through the historical development of each conflicting constitutive

relationship, as well as through the analysis of their various American literary
representations, we can arrive at a detailed understanding of the most integral
components of the American dream, through which the structure of the myth will
become evident. The American dream is absolutely a massive and complex attempt to
resolve the many discrepancies evident in the American social project. Its sustained
cultural relevance seems to attest to its success as a myth—that it does effectively
resolve the problems for which it exists. At any rate, the success or failure of the
American dream as a mythic system is assuredly an important matter for our discussion,
and will be taken up in turn. For now, we will do well to begin our more specifically
detailed analysis of these most fundamental mythemes.
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Chapter Two
Mythic Hero:
Augie March and the Self-Made Man in America
The American dream is most commonly associated with the idea that, regardless
of one’s origins, one may advance one’s economic and social standing given the basic
economic and political structure of America. It is not surprising, then, that the myth of
the self-made man thrives as a necessary constituent element of the larger social ideal,
for he is the evidentiary embodiment of the whole dream ideal. The self-made man, as
we understand him, is markedly American in kind—no other national society has
historically allowed for the fluidity with which the self-made man is able to drastically
alter his social and economic standing. The very existence of the self-made man says a
great deal about the historical social structure of America, and in turn about the whole
national consciousness underlying the American dream. The self-made man is, in short,
the most clearly constitutive unit of the American dream myth. As such, his theoretical
and historical figuration is fraught with tensions, contradictions, and other relational
paradoxes that his mythic existence actively attempts to resolve. If we are to understand
the complex structure of the American dream as it functions mythically, a historicaltheoretical study of the self-made man is the most obvious place to begin.
While the majority of Americans have a “household” understanding of the selfmade man (he is, after all, a part of Americans’ mythic reality), we would do well to
define him, simple as that definition may be. Michael Kimmel offers a brief historical
summary of the self-made man’s appearance in national discourse, and this summary
will help our characterization of him here. Kimmel writes,
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Even the term self-made man was an American neologism, first coined by Henry
Clay in a speech in the U. S. Senate in 1832. Defending a protective tariff that he
believed would widen opportunities for humble men to rise in business, he
declared that in Kentucky “almost every manufactory known to me is in the
hands of enterprising, self-made men, who have whatever wealth they possess
by patient and diligent labor.”1
Kimmel goes on to discuss the flourishing of this term by the 1840s and 1850s,
indicating the sudden preponderance of “popular biographies and inspirational
homilies” that have direct recourse to this new popular term.2 It is circa the midnineteenth century, then, that this term enters the public discourse and is quickly
adopted as a mainstream version of American myth. Simply put, the self-made man is
one whose rewards are directly commensurate with his work; the American dream
posits that the relationship between effort and reward is causal, such that hard work
naturally, logically results in success. This, of course, is simply the myth’s attempt at
resolving an apparent discrepancy in reality: namely, that success and effort do not, of
necessity, bear a causal relationship.
The idea that one’s social and economic status can be altered by a consistent
exercise of one’s natural abilities emerges simultaneously with the inception of the
American nation itself: it is inextricably rooted in the early modern notion of America as
the golden land of opportunity. As such, it is deeply embedded in the American
Kimmel, Manhood in America, 26.
In his discussion, Kimmel cites John Frost’s Self Made Men in America (1848), Charles
Seymore’s Self-Made Men (1858), and Freeman Hunt’s Worth and Wealth (1856) and Lives
of American Merchants (1858) as instances of such texts. Ibid., 26.
1
2
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consciousness (if we can name such a thing), and stands as a uniquely American ideal.
This fact is well worth noting. One pivotal assessment of the self-made man in America,
John G. Cawelti’s 1965 book, Apostles of the Self-Made Man, calls attention to this fact
right from its introduction. Cawelti writes,
When he becomes successful, the American self-made man likes to boast of his
achievement, to exaggerate the obscurity of his origin, and to point out the
“Horatio Alger” quality of his career. In Europe, where class traditions are
stronger, the successful man often prefers to forget his origins if they are in a
lower class. Even the words which different countries have created to describe
the “mobile man” indicate significant differences in attitude. Americans coined
the term “self-made man.” The French expressions parvenu and nouveau riche
point to the newness of the individual’s rise and not to the fact that he has
succeeded by his own exertions; in addition they carry a tone of condescension
which is absent from the American term.3
If the above statement is less true today than at the time it was written, we can
nevertheless stress the historically distinctive character of social mobility in America.
Indeed, if class structures are now less strict in other countries than they were in years
past, this is likely owing to the spread of American models of ascent and prosperity.4

Cawelti, Apostles of the Self-Made Man, 2.
Celeste MacLeod discusses the globalization of the self-made man at the beginning of
her book, Horatio Alger, Farewell. She writes,
The dream of riches for everybody originated in the United States, but it has
become one of our most popular exports. The idea that everyone who works
hard enough can become wealthy, regardless of social class or advantages (and
irrespective of the economic and political situation in one’s country), has
3
4
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Regardless, this self-made man is at least an American invention (however else he has
subsequently been adopted), and his existence thereby speaks directly and significantly
to the development of the myth of the American dream.
Let us consider, then, the features of this ideal American character. Irvin G.
Wyllie offers a summary picture of this “legendary hero” as we commonly know him:
He has been active in every field from politics to the arts, but nowhere has he
been more active, or more acclaimed, than in business. To most Americans he is
the office boy who has become the head of a great concern, making millions in
the process.

He represents our most cherished conceptions of success, and

particularly our belief that any man can achieve fortune though the practice of
industry, frugality, and sobriety.5
The self-made man is strong, durable, and hard-working, such that he can “pull himself
up from his bootstraps” (as has been the tradition) and rise to great social and economic
heights from all too obscure and mediocre origins. Indeed, the more dramatic the
discrepancy between whence he comes and where he arrives, the more valuable he is as
a representative figure. However, the path he takes to his success is just as important as
the measure of that success. The self-made man must not only rise a great distance, but
he must do so according to basic models of human virtue: he is honest, just, and wholly
upright in every aspect of his life. No writer stresses a virtuous model of the self-made
universal appeal. [. . . ] The American dream has helped raise expectations across
the globe. (MacLeod, Horatio Alger, Farewell, 3)
Certainly, then, this American model becomes a popular “export,” but this aspect of the
self-made man is less relevant to our current study, which is more concerned with his
American origins than his later European incarnations.
5 Wyllie, The Self-Made Man in America, 6.
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man more prominently than Benjamin Franklin, who is perhaps the nation’s most avid
promoter of this uniquely American “man of virtue.” In such aphoristic texts as Poor
Richard’s Almanack (which contains the later renamed preface, “The Way to Wealth”),
Franklin enumerates the many simple maxims that advise industry and honesty as the
hallmarks of the man of virtue.6 In his own autobiography, Franklin openly makes a
shining example of himself—his own grueling path from mediocre beginnings to grand
accomplishments being a direct and unfailing attestation to the realistic and very
natural conclusion of such virtuous behavior.
Franklin’s account of his own life can be generally taken as exemplary action for
the self-made man: Franklin means for us to emulate his practice of thrift and
dedication in the face of Providence, so as to earn the benefits of monetary and social
success. Franklin’s own literal success is a direct attestation to the viability of his project,
and accounts for the tremendous popularity of his work. In an uncredited introduction
to the 1895 Henry Altemus edition of the text, we are told that “In all his writings is
evidenced his wonderful gift of shrewd common-sense and practical wisdom” and that
His revelation of himself is a very frank one—almost the frankest that has ever
been written; and it is full of wise hints for those who know how to take them.
[. . . ] that active and ever-striving life, that began as a printer’s boy and ended as
Included here is a small sampling of some of the more relevant aphorisms we find in
Franklin’s Almanac: “Diligence is the mother of good luck”; “Diligence overcomes
difficulties, sloth makes them”; “Have you somewhat to do to-morrow; do it to-day”;
“If you know how to spend less than you get, you have the philosopher’s stone”; “No
gains without pains”; “Speak little, do much.” These brief aphorisms became a quick
bestseller, attesting to the popularity of (and therefore the widespread belief in) such
quick and easy statements about American opportunity through industry. Franklin,
Poor Richard’s Almanac, 14, 16, 19, 22, 24.
6
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one of the foremost makers of a nation, who, despite his political occupations,
ranked also among the leading philosophical and scientific men of his time.7
This is a characterization that we are accustomed to hearing, and the emphasis on
Franklin’s progress is always placed on his advocacy of common sense and practical
wisdom. Indeed, Franklin himself insists on the relevance of his autobiography:
From the poverty and obscurity in which I was born, and in which I passed my
earlier years, I have raised myself to some degree of affluence and celebrity in the
world. As constant good fortune has accompanied me even to an advanced
period of life, my posterity will perhaps be desirous of learning the means I
employed, and which, thanks to Providence, so well succeeded with me. They
may also deem them fit to be imitated, should any of them find themselves in
similar circumstances.8
There is no ambiguity here—Franklin means his text to be a straightforward self-made
man narrative.
There is a clear overarching ordering principle to Franklin’s text, and it is not just
the precise sequence of his life’s events. Rather, Franklin’s autobiography is organized
according to his life’s own personal attestation to a unique set of “American” virtues (so
laid out by Franklin himself). Rather than call for a direct imitation of Franklin’s own
life, Franklin establishes a clear moral standard according to which his life’s action was
conducted, and encourages others to adopt this same moral paradigm.

Franklin’s

Autobiography, then, does not insist that the successful American copy Franklin’s life;
7
8

Introduction to The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (1895), 15.
Franklin, Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (1879), 1.
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rather, he means that the successful American will apply the same moral standard to his
own life. That moral standard could not be made clearer by Franklin, who outlines
thirteen “American” moral virtues and their corollary precepts. He lists them:
1. Temperance.—Eat not to dullness; drink not to elevation
2. Silence.—Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; avoid trifling
conversation.
3. Order.—Let all your things have their places; let each part of your business
have its time.
4. Resolution.—Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without fail what
you resolve.
5. Frugality.—Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself; that is,
waste nothing.
6. Industry.—Lose no time; be always employed in something useful; cut off all
unnecessary actions.
7. Sincerity.—Use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and justly; and, if you
speak, speak accordingly.
8. Justice.—Wrong none by doing injustice, or omitting the benefits that are
your duty.
9. Moderation.—Avoid extremes; forbear resenting injuries so much as you
think they deserve.
10. Cleanliness.—Tolerate no uncleanliness in body, clothes, or habitation.
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11. Tranquility.—Be not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or
unavoidable.
12. Chastity.—Rarely use venery but for health or offspring, never to dullness,
weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace or reputation.
13. Humility.—Imitate Jesus and Socrates.9
There is surely something striking about this enumeration of virtues: they differ from
those proposed by classical philosophy.

In his Ethics, Aristotle, too, lists a set of

virtues—a set of virtues that have been a kind of moral cornerstone within the Western
tradition. Aristotle lists the following ideal virtues (both intellectual and moral), which
always rest between vicious extremes and deficiencies: Courage, Temperance, Liberality,
Magnificence, Magnanimity, Pride, Good Temper, Truthfulness, Ready Wittiness,
Friendliness, Modesty, and Righteous Indignation.10 While there are certainly some
virtues that fall under both Franklin and Aristotle’s lists, it is interesting to our
discussion here to note those that are anomalous. Franklin calls for the virtues of
cleanliness and order, for instance, which are notably absent from Aristotle’s list.
Indeed, Franklinian virtues such as silence and sincerity in conjunction with precisely
defined motivations towards industry and frugality approach a quite distinctive ethic.
Because so much meaning can be attached to Aristotelian classical virtues (they have
been re-appropriated and redefined countless times in the course of their history),

9

Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, (1895), 90-91.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.7 (959-62).
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Franklin insists on attaching specific, precise meanings to each virtue he enumerates,11
and this is a great help in defining the general “tone” of Franklin’s virtues. Franklin’s
virtues—all of them—are directly ordered to the creation of hard-working, successful
Americans.

They say little about attaining an Aristotelian mean that results in a

classical definition of happiness; rather, they espouse behaviors that result in an
American definition of success.

Franklin’s virtues are economically and socially

oriented, and they are a moral standard for productivity, innovation, and socioeconomic ascension in America. It is here that we begin to notice the emergence of a
materially-figured American morality.
And yet, while it is important to emphasize that a socio-economic model of the
self-made man does exist in Franklin’s Autobiography, and that the subsequent adoption
of an explicitly socio-economic model is derived from here, the text does not only
promote the socio-economic consequence of Franklin’s life.

In a seminal essay on

Franklin’s text, titled “Franklin’s Autobiography, and the American Dream,” J. A. Leo
Lemay traces iterations of the American dream in Franklin’s autobiography that stress
its non-socio-economic parameters.

And so, while he locates the “rags to riches”

paradigm in Franklin’s account, he does not find that this economically figured genre is
the text’s primary figuration of the American dream. A “more important aspect of the
American dream theme in the Autobiography is the rise from impotence to importance,

Franklin writes, “In the various enumerations of the moral virtues I had met with in
my reading, I found the catalogue more or less numerous, as different writers included
more or fewer ideas under the same name. [. . . ] I proposed to myself, for the sake of
clearness, to use rather more names, with fewer ideas attached to each, than a few
names with more ideas” (Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, (1895), 90).
11
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from dependence to independence, from helplessness to power,”12 he writes. Also,
Lemay contends that Franklin propounds a philosophy of individualism, which has a
general “hope for a better world, a new world, free of the ills of the old, existing
world,”13 and sees the individual as the agency of this hopeful new world. All of these
aspects of the narrative work to support a model of the self-made man—they
emphasize his many virtuous features, his many possibilities for experience, and his
fundamental sense of accomplishment (even outside the realm of materially figured
success). It is important to insist that the self-made man is a socio-economic hero, but
that he is not only this; there is a much larger, and morally-figured, context within
which the self-made man acts, and which informs his action.
The model of the self-made man embodied by Franklin and suggested by the
other critics discussed here has been represented extensively in American literary
history, and most notably in the work of Horatio Alger, Jr. While Alger’s novels may
not stand as paragons of aesthetic excellence, they clearly outline, however crudely or
simplistically, the basic plot and character structure for the paradigmatic American selfmade man narrative. We might consider Alger’s most famous novel, Ragged Dick, in
which a young and homeless New York city boot shiner decides one day to improve his
life, and then promptly sets about doing so.

The message of the novel is

straightforward—better living conditions await the industrious man, whatever his
origins or current state of affairs. Dick is not lucky, but rather reaps the benefits of
fortuitous circumstances that seem to emerge as a direct result of his openly virtuous
12
13

Lemay, “Franklin’s Autobiography and the American Dream,” 351-52.
Ibid., 353.
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behavior. His return of small change to a businessman, for instance, is a clear mark of
his honest disposition and as such serves as the impetus for that businessman’s
personal interest in Dick’s wellbeing. The novel insists on a causal relationship between
personal action and success, such that good fortune is never the result of luck or base
moral behavior. To be sure, circumstances frequently present themselves by chance,
but a chance occurrence never promises personal advancement. Rather, Dick must
consistently exercise his many virtues in the face of these occurrences, and it is his just
and upright response to chance encounters and events that makes them fruitful for his
career.
Ragged Dick insists that one’s social and economic circumstances are the direct
result of personal action, such that each individual creates their own circumstances.
Even when misfortune befalls Dick, it is always of a kind that can be resolved through
quick industry.14 Having had his savings book stolen, for instance, Dick needs only to
rush to his bank and hide out in order to catch the perpetrator and have his savings
restored. Misfortunes occur, the novel demonstrates, but the truly dedicated hardworker is never really impeded by them. Critics have long attacked Alger’s work for its
relatively naïve attitude in this respect, but, while such an attitude may be rather

Of course, Dick’s white male privileged status has much to do with his success.
Challenges to this paradigm have come in many different forms, but racial ones are
abundant. Consider Richard Wright’s Native Son, which opens with a character
seemingly destined to make something of himself, and then quickly establishes a set of
circumstances outside of his control that lead to his utter tragic destruction. Dick’s
circumstances are advantageous, so the implication goes, because of his privileged
racial status. Consider also Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, which is explicitly about selfmaking outside of this exclusive paradigm, and so attempts to rewrite the narrative in
some sense.
14
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simplistic, it is nevertheless the most basic representation of the national mythic ideal of
the self-made man. Alger stresses personal responsibility for his characters because the
myth of the self-made man does so, at least in its early incarnations. In fact, this myth
goes so far as to insist that all citizens, regardless of their inherited advantages or
disadvantages, can make the most of the opportunities that will undoubtedly present
themselves in the course of one’s life. Wyllie writes,
Economic salvation, like spiritual salvation, was not reserved for men of superior
physique and intellect, but could be attained by all men of good character. In
respect to character, presumably, all started as equals. It was not the boast of the
self-made man that nature had made him stronger and more intelligent than his
fellows, it was that through the cultivation of good character he had managed his
own elevation.15
According to such a paradigm, all men really are “equals,” and external circumstances
can ultimately have no final say on the outcome of one’s life. The direction one’s life
takes is a direct effect of the character one breeds in oneself.16 In short, America is the
golden land of endless opportunities and inexhaustible resources, and so, naturally, all

Wyllie, The Self-Made Man in America, 35.
We do see fictional instances of self-made men who adopt amoral or immoral means
to pursue their ends, and usually these texts have the force of challenging the
underlying idea of the American dream. Thomas Sutpen, of Faulkner’s Absalom,
Absalom!, perfectly embodies the self-made man and represents an American dream,
but his action is one of overt subjugation of others. Sutpen comes from humble origins
and rises to greatness (socio-economic viability is expressed through his monumental
home) through dedication and industry, as well as the enslavement of many AfricanAmericans and one French architect. This does not support the inherited paradigm of
the self-made man; rather, it is a representation of an ideal, realistically figured, and in
so considering the reality of the self-made man paradigm, it challenges it.
15
16
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wealth and social prestige do in fact await the industrious man of virtue. Or so the
myth goes.17
While doubtless some disillusionment has entered into our conception of the
self-made man,18 it is easy enough to see why this mythic figure was constructed as he
was, and why his figuration may have been more durable in the earlier years of the
nation’s development.

After all, early Americans saw the open and seemingly

unending landscape of America as a sort of blank slate (barring the inconvenience of the
country’s previous inhabitants, of course). As such, these early Americans set about
constructing social systems, political governmental bodies, and personal ideals that
would foster some new sense of identity. Because of the great enormity and difficulty
of this project, it is natural that a system of virtue which privileges endurance and
justice would develop along simple, clear moral lines. America cannot be built without
a mass and continued dedication to hard work and to the simple precepts that endorse
fair behavior, and so these values become essential characterizations of the properly

American fiction has, of course, offered many characters and actions that directly
resist or challenge this paradigm. Consider, for instance, Nathanael West’s parody of
Alger’s genre, A Cool Million. This novel traces a character who very much resembles
Dick (especially in his naiveté), except that his hard work and honesty only bring him
horrible misfortune. The novel reads like a slow descent into socio-economic depravity,
and thus self-consciously offers a counter-model to Alger’s text. Fiction often
challenges mythic paradigms in this way in order to expose the myth for critical
reflection.
18 This is often owing to adverse social conditions under which one’s effort and industry
are exploited, rather than rewarded. Examples are abundant and include Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle (indeed, all of Sinclair’s fiction is about the besieged laborer and
unfit working conditions), Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, Stephen Crane’s Maggie, A
Girl of the Streets, or even Pietro di Donato’s Christ in Concrete. We see that many of
these novels insist that opportunities are different, if not nearly non-existent, for
immigrant workers or the lower classes in big cities.
17
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moral American life. At a time when America is still in the early stages of construction,
the myth of the self-made man is integral to national development: it establishes a very
straightforward and easily understandable moral paradigm that, in effect, functions to
create “American” citizens (that is, citizens who are properly fitted to the generation
and ongoing development of this uniquely “American” nation).
Historically, we can argue that the morally figured self-made man develops out
of an earlier notion of the American hero. In his book, The American Adam, R. W. B.
Lewis suggests that, “a century ago [circa mid nineteenth century], the image contrived
to embody the most fruitful contemporary ideas was that of the authentic American as a
figure of heroic innocence and vast potentialities, poised at the start of a new history.”19
Lewis terms this hero “the American Adam,” for he resembles the prelapsarian hero of
Genesis, being at once innocent and ahistorical. Lewis offers a more comprehensive
discussion of this Adamic hero. He is
[. . . ] an individual emancipated from history, happily bereft of ancestry,
untouched and undefiled by the usual inheritances of family and race; an
individual standing alone, self-reliant and self-propelling, ready to confront
whatever awaited him with the aid of his own unique and inherent resources. It
was not surprising, in a Bible-reading generation, that the new hero (in praise or
disapproval) was most easily identified with Adam before the Fall. Adam was
the first, the archetypal, man. His moral position was prior to experience, and in
his very newness he was fundamentally innocent. The world and history lay all
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before him. And he was the type of creator, the poet par excellence, creating
language itself by naming the elements of the scene about him.20
This depiction of the standard American hero does not contradict the alternate model of
the self-made man; indeed, the two appear very similar in description. The self-made
man is not ahistorical, exactly, but he certainly enjoys many of the benefits of an
ahistorical existence: he, too, is “happily bereft of ancestry” (if not literally, then
figuratively) and “undefiled by the usual inheritances of family and race.” The selfmade man, like the Adamic hero, is self-motivated and self-reliant, and relies on the
cultivation of inherent talents to confront “whatever awaited him.” The difference
between these figures is largely contextual; the American Adam exists in a raw state of
nature, but emerges as the more clearly recognizable self-made man when he becomes a
figure of civilization.21 Essentially, the American Adam defines his cultural context, in
effect creating it, and is redefined in the process of doing so. Ultimately, the sharpest
distinction between the Adamic hero and the self-made man (and it is a significant
distinction) is the existence, for the self-made man, of a goal-oriented moral paradigm.
Prelapsarian and ahistorical, the Adamic hero lacks any need for a moral paradigm (and,
consequently, for the goals towards which such a paradigm is ordered). With the
expansion of American territory, the American Adam is naturally refigured as a more
practical standard for an emerging goal-oriented society.
Ibid., 5.
This image of American heroism coincides nicely with early American conceptions of
America as “Nature’s Nation” or with the myth (and the reality) of the American
frontier. Indeed, the shift from the standard of the Adamic hero to that of the self-made
man nicely parallels the movement from a frontier-based “natural” American terrain, to
a city-based “civilizational” American space.
20
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While the ideal of the self-made man certainly carries a strong moral component
(as indicated by Franklin and Alger’s treatments of it), it is ordered towards a relatively
base-looking end: that of wealth and status. Why ought the American citizen exercise
industry and fair dealings with others? The answer is simple—so that he might attain
the benefits of economic and social increase, and thereby contribute to the greater
extension of his nation.22 The nation’s endorsement of the self-made man is mutually
beneficial in this respect to both the nation and its individual citizens.23 By encouraging
honest labor that reaps wealth, which in turn reaps status, America is itself built up as a
stronger and more powerful nation. This economically oriented model, under the guise

Kimmel supports this definition of the purpose of the self-made man:
Yet that is precisely what defined the Self-Made Man: success in the market,
individual achievement, mobility, wealth.
America expressed political
autonomy; the Self-Made Man embodied economic autonomy. This was the
manhood of the rising middle class. The flip side of this economic autonomy is
anxiety, restlessness, lonelieness. Manhood is no longer fixed in land or smallscale property ownership or dutiful service. Success must be earned, manhood
must be proved—and proved constantly. (Kimmel, Manhood in America, 23)
For a discussion of this passage’s insistence on masculinity, see note 23 in this chapter.
23 It is perhaps necessary here to stress the masculinity inherent in this version of the selfmade man. While not the primary topic of this discussion, the ideal of the self-made
man is notably exclusive of women (who are, by and large, expected to marry into
success rather than to build it). Kimmel comments that “Between 1810 and 1820, the
term breadwinner was coined to denote this responsible family man. The breadwinner
ideal would remain one of the central characteristics of American manhood until the
present day. At its moment of origin, it meant that a man’s ‘great aim’ was ‘to fill his
station with dignity, and to be useful to his fellow beings’” (Kimmel, Manhood in
America, 20). Moreover, the emerging capitalist market opened up opportunities for
men to rise to new heights. In his discussion of the myth of the self-made man, James
Catano focuses the attentions of his book on masculinity, explicitly. This is an
important note to make, insofar as the gendered nature of this ideal has extensive social
implications. The pursuit of those social implications, however, lies outside the
purview of this discussion, which is strictly concerned with analyzing the structure of
the American dream as it exists, and it exists, of course, as an overtly masculine ideal.
See Catano, Ragged Dicks.
22
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of moral self-betterment, serves quite well for the attainment and consolidation of
increasingly extensive national power. In short, the success of the self-made man at
once generates American citizens (ideologically) and sustains and increases the
American national power structure. Consider the following passage, taken from one of
the many self-help books that sprung up in the nineteenth century, which explicitly
encourage precise paths for such a self-made man:
…every young man can see how great is the responsibility resting upon him as
an individual. If he commence with right principles as his guide,—that is, if in
every action he have regard to the good of the whole, as well as to his own
good,—he will not only secure his own well-being, but aid in the general
advancement toward a state of order. But if he […] follow only the impulses of
his appetites and passions, he will retard the general return to true order, and
secure for himself that unhappiness in the future which is the invariable
consequence of all violations of natural or divine laws.24
Following this line of thought, it is most interesting to consider the relationship between
wealth, moral virtue, and national success that permeates the nineteenth century
American imagination (and that defines the ideological substance of the self-made man).
To be sure, the nineteenth century is a period in which the complex relationship
between a man’s moral/religious character and his economic success undergoes a rapid
change. For nearly the first half of the century, traditional religious moral standards,
such as we find in the work of Cotton Mather, tend to hold sway. Mather himself does
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not attempt to establish a direct causal relationship between moral excellence and
material reward, but neither does he condemn the attainment of wealth outright.
Rather, he insists that with material prosperity comes certain religious obligations—
namely, the traditionally conceived service to the poor, most straightforwardly
accomplished through tithing. Indeed, the rich man who gives liberally and without
ostentation not only lives up to his moral responsibilities, but even, Mather hints, finds
greater material rewards: “Such liberal men, it is observed, are generally long-lived
men; and at last they pass from this into everlasting life.”25 Mather by no means
indicates wealth as a natural reward for moral excellence, but neither does he claim that
wealth precludes religious salvation. Mather’s teachings, still important guides for the
early nineteenth century American, at least allow for a space where a new conception of
morality and enterprise might open up.
In his book, The Rites of Assent, Sacvan Bercovitch brilliantly captures the tension
between material and spiritual rewards in Mather’s doctrines, ultimately demonstrating
the gradual emergence of a spiritually figured material paradigm. In a discussion of
Mather’s “harvest” metaphor (which represents both the spiritual and material benefits
of moral righteousness), Bercovitch writes:
The harvest, Mather promises, will yield blessings both in this world and in the
next. In light of current criticism, it needs to be reemphasized that the promise
does not mark a departure from orthodoxy. It was standard fare in the early
colonial churches, intrinsic to the rationale for corporate calling and for
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preparation for salvation. [. . . ] Because he knew that prosperity might follow the
labor of the covenanted (in the New Israel above all other lands), he set his sights
upon [wealth’s] positive implications; and because he could not resolve the
tension between dogma and practice, between a flourishing New England as it
should be and as it was, he turned as usual to rhetoric in order to dissolve it.
With an easy fluency which has shocked later theologians, he elaborated on the
metaphor that the righteous are the trustees of God’s world, on the parable of the
bread thrown upon the waters, and on the prophecies concerning the blessed
remnant. In these terms he measured the distance between the saintly rich and
those who rise by fraud, and, affirming the correspondence between God’s
temporal and spiritual aid, he urged parents never to “Concern themselves more to
get the World than Grace for their Children,” since “if God giveth Grace, Earthly
blessings shall never fail.”26
This is a striking analysis of Mather’s doctrine on the subject. While Bercovitch never
establishes a causal connection between wealth and salvation in Mather’s teaching, he
appears to come very close. What is of greatest note here is that, far from suggesting
that material wealth and spiritual salvation are mutually exclusive, Mather so arranges
his rhetoric as to insist that, ideally, the two exist in a kind of natural relation ordained
by God.
As the century progresses, the connection between moral righteousness and
physical wealth, and that between material and spiritual prosperity, becomes more
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explicit. Cawelti traces this development at some length, noting that, “the self-help
popularizers of the mid-nineteenth century resolved the pursuit of final ends and rising
in society into one and the same thing.” He goes on to illustrate this point:
Freeman Hunt was critical of those who went to church to advertise their
businesses, but he insists that “a truly religious man will give proper attention to
business; and a man who conducts a business as he ought, will do it on religious
principles.” “The destiny of mankind,” says T. S. Arthur, “is a return to heavenly
order and true happiness.” But he goes on to insist that this is to be achieved by
rising to respectability and wealth through the discipline of industry, temperance,
and frugality. According to Henry Ward Beecher, “the truest happiness implies
the development, the education, of the social and the spiritual, as well as the
physical elements of our being… it includes benevolence, and takes on the here
and the hereafter as well.” Yet two pages later he asserts, “I had almost said that
it is the beau ideal of happiness for a man to be so busy that he does not know
whether he is or is not happy.”27
In these selections, which preserve a certain inherited religious/moral imperative, we
can already see emerging a new material paradigm. Because this more basely figured
materialism cannot outright supplant the moral organization of the nation, the two
begin to seamlessly elide together. In these mid and late nineteenth century texts, the
American’s religious/moral life is not at odds with his material life; on the contrary, we
move into a space where the two are essentially one and the same.
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Esmond Wright further emphasizes this fact, arguing that Mather’s religious
doctrines have even been adopted as tenets for the action of the self-made man
(although he does not use this exact language). He writes,
As Max Weber and R. H. Tawney have shown, Calvinism and the business ethic
are closely linked. Benjamin Franklin derived a career of conspicuous secular
success largely from the adages of Cotton Mather. The Yankee emphasis on
sobriety and earnestness—even if in twentieth-century New England both gaiety
and Catholicism have indeed broken in; the search for wealth as a symbol of
success and the promptness to see God and Mammon as twin deities; the
mysticism indeed of success itself as at once reward and justification; these also
became American characteristics.28
By the close of the nineteenth century, then, the self-made man emerges as a figure of
spiritually (i.e. morally) informed material pursuit.

This figuration is largely

responsible for the fluidity with which the American ideal maintains a moral dimension
within the (seemingly amoral) pursuit of success.
It is tempting to imagine that as this ideal continues to develop throughout the
twentieth century, the materialism with which we are so accustomed to associate the
self-made man gradually comes to extinguish his religious/moral character. This is not,
however, the case—at least not exactly. While the religious character of the self-made
man is more or less supplanted with a more humanistic moral one, the ideal of the selfmade man is never couched in terms of immoral or amoral materialism. Indeed, the
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self-made man is “great” precisely because of his lofty moral character (here we must
stress again the American quality of this moral character—that it is defined by
Franklinian virtues such as Industry, Order, Frugality, and Moderation rather than the
more classical virtues of Courage, Pride, or Liberality). If we look to the twentieth
century, we have copious representations of this “modern” self-made man—one who
takes his moral cues not necessarily from religion, and not with an aim to his eternal
salvation, but rather one who takes them from a kind of civic moral ideal, which is in
turn ordered towards economic gratification and large-scale political well-being. It is
certainly culturally intriguing to consider the manner in which the model of the selfmade man comes to promote moral excellence, such as in turn contributes to national
development, within an increasingly secularized context.
And yet, while this economically oriented self-made man is the version which
tends most often to receive overt national endorsement (owing to its relevant impact on
national progression), the ideal of the self-made man is American precisely because it is
derived from the twin values of freedom and equality. Grounded in this way, the ideal
naturally opens itself up for interpretation. We must recall here that, far from outlining
a clearly defined set of motives and goals, the American dream functions as a loose
conglomeration of its various interpretations. Ideologically, Americans are conceived
as fundamentally free to pursue success, and while the nation naturally favors a
success-as-wealth model, the American dream affords a great deal of interpretive
liberty. It is for this reason that the self-made man does, in fact, come to be figured
outside the parameters of mere economic fulfillment. As a constituent mytheme of the
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American dream, the self-made man occupies no definitive position in the American
imagination (though, to be sure, certain versions of him predominate). Rather, this
ideal tends towards an American sense of the openness and possibility of experience.
The Algeran model of the self-made man is one with which we are intimately familiar,
but we also recognize other paradigms of American selfhood that operate differently,
yet still adhere to the ideal of the American dream. Consider, for instance, the pioneers
of the American beat movement—Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, William S. Burroughs,
etc. Kerouac’s On The Road is an explicit literary representation of self-making, though
it bears little resemblance to the ideal as outlined above. It is important to note that,
while the self-made man persists as a model for the attainment of success (i.e. the
American dream), the myth of success in America is diverse enough to sustain a
multitude of pursuant selves.
We should emphasize here that the typically figured self-made man is one who
adopts a strictly American moral code of conduct in order to gradually ascend the ranks
of financial and social security. It is inappropriate, if we are to be exact, to argue that
Kerouac or his fellow beats constitute an alternate version of “the self-made man.” The
term, after all, has a very strict historical meaning. This is not to say, however, that the
beat generation does not endorse an alternate mode of self-making—one derived from
the very same national precepts that allow for the traditional self-made man. But so as
not to be caught in a cloud of definitional contradictions, it will be important here to
maintain the self-made man, as a term, according to the conventional understanding
that has been discussed.
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Nevertheless, if we are to offer up a fully-rounded understanding of the
mythemic principles underlying the American dream, it is necessary to entertain
alternative models of self-making. After all, the self-made man exists as a paradigmatic
pursuer of an interpretation (albeit a predominant one) of the American dream.
Naturally, differing interpretations of the dream will entail contrary paradigms of
pursuit. Saul Bellow’s The Adventures of Augie March provides us with a wonderful
narrative instance of self-making in America, supplying us with contrary models of selfcreative American pursuit.

A rather extended narrative, Bellow’s novel traces the

diverse development of its titular character as he works towards self-creation. But
Augie’s story is regularly punctuated with that of his brother, who represents the
clearer, more traditional mythic rise of the self-made man. By weaving these separate
versions together, Bellow sustains a complex consideration of pursuit and success in
America, spanning physical, social, and economic milieus that together comprise a
national landscape portrait.
Bellow’s Augie March has been described as a vivid representation of the spirit of
1950s America (though the novel is set in the 1930s), and as such it describes the
American dream within a complex cultural context. Keith Michael Opdahl writes that
Bellow’s “portrayal of Chicago in the thirties caught the spirit of America in the fifties.
To J. B. Priestley, ‘this is the place, these the people.’ To Norman Podhoretz, Augie’s
adventures reflect ‘the intellectual’s joyous [new] sense of connection with the common
grain of American life.’”29 The novel becomes relevant to our discussion, beyond its
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overt self-making themes, because of the contrary nature of its 1950s context. Opdahl
goes on to describe this contrary context:
Augie’s happy acceptance of his time and place expresses the acquiescence of the
Eisenhower decade at the same time that it breaks through the narrow world of
the alienated hero. The “huge energy” which Bellow matches is at once the force
of the physical world and the force of society, particularly one that is exploding
in population and technology. It is also—in spite of Bellow’s use of an earlier
setting—the negative force of what many considered the inertia of the fifties,
what Bellow himself calls elsewhere “the reign of the fat gods” which “subverts
everything good and exalts lies, and . . . wears a crown of normalcy.”

By

portraying a vitality and color that is antithetical to “normalcy” and yet is the
very fabric of our nation, Bellow celebrates America at the same time that he
rejects false values.30
The historical context of the novel establishes it as an important critical reflection on its
dominant themes. For our discussion here, it becomes essential that we analyze a novel
that represents contrary modes of self-making within the precise context of this tension
between rapid development (which attests to the successful paradigm of the self-made
man) and widespread social inertia (which directly counters the notion of the self-made
man). The spirit of the fifties, which informs Augie March, positions this context nicely.
Moreover, there is something to be said for the novel’s Jewish perspective within
this context. Augie strikes the reader as more American than Jewish, perhaps, but it is
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important to note that Bellow means Augie’s Jewish identity to inform the novel. John
Jacob Clayton outlines for us the relevance of Jewish identity within Bellow’s twentieth
century American context. He writes,
Bellow’s despair is typically Jewish.

For while it is true that the Jew has

transformed suffering by means of irony and a celebration of endurance, it is also
true that Jews are expert sufferers. […] Indeed, when critics say that the Jewish
writer now speaks for all men and that this is the root of his current popularity,
they refer primarily to the “voices of powerlessness speaking in situations of
humiliation, nakedness, and weakness. . .” This is the Jewish voice “that speaks
most directly about the nature of present experience.” [Leslie] Fiedler agrees: “It
is the Jew who has been best able to recast this old American wisdom (that home
is exile, that it is the nature of man to feel himself everywhere alienated) in terms
valid for twentieth century Americans, which is to say, for dwellers in cities.”31
The Jewish experience of isolation and suffering, of “outsider-ness,” is interestingly the
very thing that characterizes Augie as American, for his resistance to “normal” paths of
self-creation sets him up for his optimistic journey of unique and diverse self-creation.
Ultimately, The Adventures of Augie March occupies an important socio-historical context,
within which it develops themes directly pertinent to our current discussion insofar as
they are informed by Augie’s own Jewish-American identity.32

Clayton, Saul Bellow, 50-51.
Everett Carter notes the importance of Augie March, also: “The Adventures of Augie
March is Bellow’s largest and most impressive defense of the idea of America; it is a
contemporary epic, and its hero, a young second-generation Jew in whom lives the
indestructible spirit of Franklin, Emerson, Mark Twain, and William James” (Carter, The
31
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Bellow sets the tone of his novel right from the start, and it is one that speaks at
once to Augie’s Americanness as well as to his manner of pursuit and self-creation:
I am an American, Chicago born—Chicago, that somber city—and go at things as
I have taught myself, freestyle, and will make the record in my own way: first to
knock, first admitted; sometimes an innocent knock, sometimes a not so innocent.
But a man’s character is his fate, says Heraclitus, and in the end there isn’t any
way to disguise the nature of the knocks by acoustical work on the door or
gloving the knuckles.33
As is immediately clear from the opening, the novel’s hero will not be molded after the
American self-made man model. The self-made man does not “go at things as I have
taught myself, freestyle,” but rather acts in accordance with inherited standards of
behavior, ordered towards pre-established ends. In this sense, the course of the selfmade man is more or less fully determined. Augie exists in a different American
tradition—that of uninformed but extensive freedom and opportunity. He moves from
one experience to the next as his ultimate goals undergo constant revision in light of
those experiences, such that he essentially discovers himself along the way. Opdahl
notes that
If Augie March caught the spirit of the fifties, however, it did so by embodying
some of that era’s difficulties. Norman Podhoretz goes on to say that in “the
willed spontaneity of the writing, the abstractness of the hero . . . we can also
Idea of America, 253). Carter nicely places Augie in a distinctly American heroic tradition,
while simultaneously insisting that his action is an important representation of the
American spirit.
33 Bellow, The Adventures of Augie March, 1.
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detect the uncertainty and emotional strain that lurked on the underside of the
new optimism.” The conflict between Augie’s announcement that he will write
catch as catch can—promising an episodic novel—and his assumption of moral
growth—claiming a Bildungsroman—suggests that this “uncertainty” exists in the
novel’s form.34
There is something dark lurking in the background of Augie’s character, and this
darkness stems from the anti-Americanness of his pursuit.

Opdahl notes that the

tension that exists in Augie’s tenuous optimism is reflected in the novel’s structure.35
Whereas the traditional American self-made man narrative adopts a bildungsroman style
of self-creation36—wherein the protagonist develops according to a specific model of
betterment already discussed—Bellow’s novel blends this style with the picaresque,
which, leaving itself open to myriad and episodic experience, never implies growth on
the part of its protagonist. The result is a formal representation of Augie’s character:
Bellow attempts to create a character who can develop through his episodic and
accidental experiences, because that character actively sees his picaresque experience as
his means of self-formation. Whether or not Augie is successful in his act of self-making
will be discussed further on.

Opdahl, The Novels of Saul Bellow, 71.
This is not an original insight, but rather one that has been noted and commented on
at some length. See Fuchs, Saul Bellow, 59-77 and Clayton, Saul Bellow, 122-28.
36 The bildungsroman traces the education and development of its hero, usually through
a detailed life account. Traditionally, the bildungsroman allows its hero more freedom
than is available to the self-made man, whose process of development occurs
accordingly to a quite rigidly pre-established form. Nevertheless, the process and
development of the self-made man still tends to follow a pattern of experiential
education, and in this sense participates in the bildungsroman.
34
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But while Augie adopts this open, vague, indirect, and non-committal pursuit of
experience, his brother Simon takes a different route—one not propelled by selfdiscovery, but by self-formation. Simon decides what he wants out of life and then goes
about acquiring it in an intensely calculated way. In him, we see the strength of
dedication that results in grand success, and then we see the all-too-overlooked
consequence of such success. I will examine the character of Simon first, as his action is
far simpler and makes up the novel’s most substantial counterpoint for its primary
action.
Simon March bears the signs of his potential greatness in nearly every aspect of
his comportment—he has an air of authority that those around him recognize
instinctively. We are told that he has a “governor’s clear-eyed gaze,” and “a lifted look
of unforgiving, cosmological captaincy… where honesty had the strength of a prejudice,
and foresight appeared as the noble cramp of impersonal worry in the forehead.”37
Even his passivity causes him to stand out in a crowd, such that every aspect of his
character is infused with a kind of over-active, compelling American authority. He is
exactly the kind of character that one imagines running a major business or holding a
high political position, because he demands respectability. This shaping of his character
prepares the reader for the man that Simon becomes—we expect lavish wealth to come
to Simon (though his origins are as poorly obscure as Augie’s) because he perfectly
personifies that spirit of American honor which cannot but be accompanied with the
material trappings of success. And so, even in his youth Augie witnesses his brother
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cultivating himself according to these lofty American ideals, though Augie himself does
not yet understand Simon’s efforts. Augie describes this process of cultivation, which is
wholly foreign to the dingy poverty with which he (and Simon, at this point) is familiar:
And now he [Simon] was on soggy ground and forced to cut down the speed he
had been making toward the mark he secretly aimed at. I didn’t know at the
time which mark or exactly understand why there needed to be a mark; it was
over my head. But he was getting in, all the time, a big variety of information
and arts, like dancing, conversation with women, courtship, gift-giving, romantic
letter-writing, the ins and outs of restaurants and night clubs, dance halls, the
knotting of four-in-hands and bow ties, what was correct and incorrect in
tucking a handkerchief in the breast pocket, how to choose clothes, how to take
care of himself in a tough crowd. Or in a respectable household… I name these
things, negligible to many people, because we were totally unfamiliar with them.
I watched him study the skill of how to put on a hat, smoke a cigarette, fold a
pair of gloves and put them in an inner pocket, and I admired and wondered
where it came from, and learned some of it myself. But I never got the sense of
luxury he had in doing it.38
Not yet having wealth at his disposal, Simon sets about learning the trappings, the basic
behavioral strategies and customs, that will be invaluable to him when he does come
into money (Simon’s eventual financial success is always anticipated in the novel
because of the sheer intensity of his character). This is important, for the self-made man
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is no bumbling millionaire.

Mythically, or idealistically, the self-made man is the

paragon of American excellence. He is wealthy and powerful, virtuous (“where honor
had the strength of a prejudice”), and yet completely respectable—every detail of his
life pays ornate tribute to the whole symbol of his existence. Simon does not mean to
attain wealth merely; he means, ultimately, to succeed in the American way.
We are given accounts of several menial jobs that Simon holds in his youth, at
which he performs exceedingly well. These positions are not, however, enough to
secure him a firm financial position.

Here he somewhat undercuts the traditional

model of the self-made man, who builds his empire wholly from the ground up. Simon
cultivates respectability so that he can marry Charlotte Magnus, a wealthy, even if not
particularly attractive, girl. Using her money, Simon is then able to establish himself in
ever-increasing financial stability.

While marrying up certainly goes against the

understood ethic of the self-made man, it does not appear to do so for Simon, for he is
no mere scrounger. Rather, he views his marriage as just one of many financial steps—
a way to get a solid start. Indeed, Simon himself reflects on his status as “self-made,”
well after he is established in his married life: “Oh, but you’re not a Henry Ford,”
Augie tells him; “After all, you married a rich girl.” Simon replies, “The question is…
what you have to suffer to get money, how much effort there is in it. Not that you start
with a nickel, like the Alger story… and run it into a fortune. But if you get a stake,
what you do with it, whether you plunge or not.”39 Simon views himself as self-made,
even though his arc is not identical to that of a Ragged Dick, for he has exerted genuine
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effort to get to where he is, and he maintains his industrious disposition such that his
wealth steadily increases instead of simply being used up. Going on to work in the
Magnus family’s coal business, Simon finally presents a figure whose wealth, power,
and grandiose presentation, given where he began and what all it took for his rise,
speak directly to the ideal of the self-made man.
Augie’s own career is dramatically different from his brother’s, though Simon
does attempt to set Augie on the same path (presenting an opportunity for marriage to
his sister-in-law, through which Augie might carve out a life identical to Simon’s).
Augie’s progress in the novel follows no strict guide—he is in pursuit of no definitive
‘mark’ as Simon was. Instead, Augie is characterized by a certain romantic openness to
experience, such that he never crafts a firm plan for his life, but instead steadily revises
his aspirations from one moment to the next. 40 This is certainly not for lack of
opportunity. Indeed, Augie frequently finds himself in a position from which he might
benefit, and through which he might enter on a more traditional track of socioeconomic ascension. There is something in Augie, though, that resists such a lifestyle.
Augie’s narrative progression lends him a certain insight, for while he never formally

Robert R. Dutton provides a nice abbreviated catalogue of Augie’s myriad pursuits,
which helps to characterize the extremity of Augie’s diverse experiences and, by
implication, his lack of commitments:
[Augie] works as a stock boy in a department store, sells trivia in a railway
station, steals and sells textbooks, begins a university education, becomes a coal
salesman, enters the fringes of the underworld, helps to manage a professional
fighter, takes care of dogs for the socially elite, falls in love twice, becomes a
union organizer, trains an eagle to catch giant lizards in Mexico, skirts the edges
of joining Trotsky’s cause, joins the Merchant Marine; and he finally marries and
settles in Paris, where he is last seen participating in some form of shady
business. (Dutton, Saul Bellow, 42)
40
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belongs within an upper social echelon, there are periods in his life where he has access
to these circles—and not only through his brother’s influence. When he spends time
with the wealthy Renlings (who own and operate a successful sporting goods store),
they offer to legally adopt Augie and pay for his college education. We expect such an
offer to hold Augie’s interest, for his tendencies at that time (indeed, throughout the
novel) are towards formal education. But Augie resists this offer, causing him to break
with the Renlings, because he is unwilling to enter into such a world where his free
individuality might be subsumed into a larger and normative cultural context.
Essentially, his rejection of the Renlings amounts to a rejection of the American ideal.
About Mrs. Renling and her offer of adoption, Augie muses:
However, I was in a state of removal from all her intentions for me. Why should
I turn into one of these people who didn’t know who they themselves were?
And the unvarnished truth is that it wasn’t a fate good enough for me […] But all
the same I was not going to be built into Mrs. Renling’s world, to consolidate
what she affirmed she was. And it isn’t only she but a class of people who trust
they will be justified, that their thoughts will be as substantial as the seven hills
to build on, and by spreading their power they will have an eternal city for
vindication on the day when their founders have gone down, bricks and planks,
whose thoughts were not real and who built on soft swamp. What this means is
not a single Tower of Babel plotted in common, but hundreds of thousands of
separate beginnings, the length and breadth of America. Energetic people who
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build against pains and uncertainties, as weaker ones merely hope against
them.41
Augie’s reflections here amount to a rejection of a certain reading of the American
dream, and it is precisely in this that he is set apart from figures such as his brother,
who wholly endorse such a reading.
The American dream, as understood by such as Simon or the Renlings, is about
the attainment of security (socially, economically, politically).

It is about carefully

selecting what one wants to become, and then gruelingly building up a kind of fortress
around that personal ideal, so as to be safe from dissolution. By holding oneself intact
in this way, one can assign positive value to their life as an ongoing project. Clayton
discusses the manner in which every character in the novel, to some degree or another,
attempts to stamp their individuality on the world, in effect recreating the world in
their own image.42 This is the exact action described by the novel’s wealth-driven
characters—they are attempting to live the American dream, so as to preserve the idea
that it exists.

Ultimately, this is the very purpose that the self-made man serves:

through enacting the drama of the American dream, he secures for himself its promises;
the dream becomes reality through individual, purposeful action (so long as that action
is successful).
Augie’s objection to this ideal rests in his unwillingness to be fully pinned down,
and this is likely the reason behind his inability to really commit to any durable career
or lifestyle. It is a typical romantic quandary—having all opportunities before him,
41
42
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Augie cannot choose any path that might close off the others. And while the structure
of America is built on these ideals that do so easily lend themselves to romantic impulse,
the national imagination tends not to endorse Augie’s kind of indecision. Augie is an
American dreamer—no doubt—but he never finds that space where he might begin
realizing his dream. Indeed, he never settles on any given dream long enough to
genuinely pursue it.
Augie’s overt resistance to the American ideal persists throughout the novel,
such that he regularly challenges the precepts that define American virtue and success.
When a fellow of his comments, regarding an upcoming university test, that “Either this
stuff comes easy or it doesn’t come at all,” Augie is set off on a reflective path that
concludes with a complete subversion of the whole ethic of the self-made man.
Whereas Simon had stressed the importance of effort, above all, Augie contemplates a
contrary model:
Of course! Easily or not at all. People were mad to be knocking themselves out
over difficulties because they thought difficulty was a sign of the right thing. So I
decided to try this out and, to begin with, to experiment with book stealing. […] I
didn’t mean to settle down to a career of stealing even if it were to come easy,
but only to give myself a start at something better.43
This is quite an interesting passage, for while it sets Augie up as, really, an anti-selfmade man, it echoes a sentiment that we find in Simon (our preeminent self-made man).
Two things are strikingly anti-self-made in Augie’s plan: his decision to steal (which

43
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directly transgresses the moral ideal on which the self-made man is built) and his
conclusion that ease, and not difficulty, is the real key to success. And yet, Augie says
he does not intend to settle down to a life of thievery (remember here that Augie is
incapable of settling down to any lifestyle), but only to “give myself a start at something
better” (he says he wants to raise just enough money to pay his university tuition fee).
There is a note of ease in Simon’s beginning, though it involves nothing so base as theft,
but Simon does not see it as such. Hence he insists that effort constitutes the value of
one’s life, and he works hard to increase the benefits he received from an easy marriage
(though one, to be sure, that required tremendous effort in social cultivation). What
Simon and Augie have in common is their desire to find some means of getting an easy
start; but they differ greatly both in the easy start they select (Simon’s being an entrance
into respectability and Augie’s being the exact opposite) and in the theoretical ground
underlying their pursuits.
Augie’s action takes him across the American border to Mexico, and later
overseas to France—a natural progression given his inability to become American. But
towards the finish of the novel Augie vocalizes a kind of regressive American dream—
one which fits as the culmination of his rising romantic tendencies. He tells a friend,
I aim to get myself a piece of property and settle down on it. Right here in
Illinois would suit me fine, though I wouldn’t object to Indiana or Wisconsin.
Don’t worry, I’m not thinking about becoming a farmer, though I might do a
little farming, but what I’d like most is to get married and set up a kind of home
and teach school. I’ll marry—of course my wife would have to agree with me
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about this—and then I’d get my mother out of the blind-home and my brother
George up from the South. I think Simon might give me some dough to get a
start. Oh, I don’t expect to set up the Happy Isles. I don’t consider myself any
Prospero. I haven’t got the build. I have no daughter. I never was a king, for
instance. No, no, I’m not looking for any Pindar Hyperborean dwelling with the
gods in ease a tearless life, never aging—44
Despite what Augie says, his idyllic dream does reek of Prosperan romanticism. It is
not a goal he ever reaches (nor one that he takes any real steps towards). But it is a
version of the American dream, in that Lippmann-esque sense of hope in a better past.
Clayton argues that Augie’s ongoing pursuit throughout the novel “is an orphan’s
quest for a personal Eden,”45 and we can certainly read this statement from Augie as an
Edenic longing. What it notably lacks is the spirit of American materialism, as this
dream opposes the ideal that locates value in a person’s material trappings. Indeed,
Augie’s assessment of the vileness of materialism is one of his most pointed
commentaries in the novel, and goes a long way in establishing an ideal that rejects the
standard definition of success in America. He reflects,
But in this modern power of luxury, with its battalions of service workers and
engineers, it’s the things themselves, the products that are distinguished, and the
individual man isn’t nearly equal to their great sum. Finally they are what
becomes great—the multitude of baths with never-failing hot water, the
enormous air-conditioning units and the elaborate machinery.
44
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No opposing

greatness is allowed, and the disturbing person is the one who won’t serve by
using or denies by not wishing to enjoy.46
Augie’s assessment is a keen one in that it draws attention to the material paradigm that
prevalent understandings of the American dream have generated.

If success is

measured in terms of prosperity, then it is the things one owns that become of value.
This is quite natural, for material possessions act as a concrete attestation of what a
person has attained—a physical manifestation of the more abstract goal of reaching
one’s dream. Established in this way, mainstream versions of the American dream
quickly follow suit, endorsing less the pursuit of one’s abstract dreams in favor of the
far more concrete pursuit of material possessions, which hold imagined value as status
symbols and become the real ground of one’s personal worth.
And so the novel presents two different sides of self-making, one ordered to the
traditional ideal of success as wealth through industry, and the other a sort of
unrealized, dreamy hope in personal value wholly independent of material fortune.
Because Augie does not reach his bucolic retreat, the novel implicitly comments on the
unfeasibility of his ideal—at least within a twentieth century American context. 47
Indeed, many critics have simply called Augie an outright failure, finding no hint of
reality in his dreamy ideal (nor any genuine purpose to fulfill it), and finding that,
ultimately, Augie fails to attain self-knowledge. If we recall the formal discrepancy

Bellow, The Adventures of Augie March, 259.
Dutton insists that Augie is a failure, despite his many redeeming qualities, because
he is ultimately too passive; he lacks the “directness” that belongs to the American
pursuit and that is the very means of attaining goals (i.e. success). Dutton, Saul Bellow,
48-52.
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between the picaresque and the bildungsroman that organizes the novel, we can think of
Augie’s development in these terms. Daniel Fuchs writes that “For better or worse,
Bellow’s narrative strategy is to have Augie necessarily fall short of the self-knowledge
that the Bildungsroman hero has—he is left with the limited perception of the picaro.”48
Augie, then, represents a version of American self-making, but he is ultimately
something of a failure (he is, though, an American failure). And yet the novel does not
exactly endorse Simon’s progressive rise, either. Indeed, Augie becomes disillusioned
with Simon’s lifestyle when he witnesses the elaborate operations of his brother’s love
affair, as well as the isolating effect of Simon’s robust authority. Having overreached
his peers, Simon attains something of an ivory tower (as represented by his lavish
penthouse, for instance), in which he is essentially alone in the lap of luxury, totally cut
off from real, personal relations.

But in this position Simon becomes a point of

reference for those around him—he is the ideal after which they all strive.
The Adventures of Augie March, then, offers no ideal path to happy success, but we
do not expect this from works of literature. Rather, what the novel does is outline the
potential conclusions of its characters’ pursuits without casting any definitive judgment
on those conclusions. Simon is successful—according to this American paradigm—
whatever else he may be. And Augie, having never really set out to attain anything
concrete, ends with nothing concrete. Both men are self-made, after different fashions
and according to distinct standards of success, and both find that their respective
realities do not measure up to the idealistic dreams to which they had aspired. But this
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disassociation is built into nearly every version of the American dream, and indeed
constitutes the primary tension that the myth exists to resolve. The self-made man, and
the act of self-making, are the underlying means by which that mythic dream can be
realistically pursued—a means of attempting to bridge the gap between fantasy and
realistic possibility. However we read the careers of Simon and Augie, one thing is
certain: that they embody paradigms of pursuit in America. As such, they demonstrate
the realistic viability of the American dream insofar as it can be concretely imagined,
and insofar as it can (or cannot) be abstractly pursued. There is, here, no value-based
assessment of the self-made man ideal or of the American dream; instead, we have a
representative fictionalization of models of self-creation, which work to enhance our
understanding of the American dream in practical action—which essentially amounts to
a demonstration of a standard (the self-made man and the act of self-creation) that is
crucial to the mythic existence of the American dream.
The ideal of the self-made man is thus a central underlying principle according to
which the myth of the American dream functions. Without him, the whole dream ideal
remains abstract, for it is the self-made man—grounded in utmost practicality—who
represents for the general public a very concrete regimen according to which material
rise is a realistic possibility and no mere dream. This is why literary works in America
may strive to present self-made characters in order to understand the process and
consequences of their rising, but why those literary characters do not become the
ground on which hinges the viability of the myth. We talk about Algeran models of
self-creation, certainly, but always with heavy recourse to “real” historical instances of
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the self-made man. We cherish Benjamin Franklin, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, all
the way up to Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerburg, because these actual Americans are the
most substantial evidence of the literal reality of the American dream myth. Now, in
fact, these figures hold no more place in the American imagination than the fictional
characters that a culture adopts (because, for the average American, these figures have
an almost fictional, if not mythical, kind of existence). But the fact that we conceive of
them as historically successful implicitly lends credence to the physical reality of the
American dream. At any rate, Americans would be loath to accept fictionalized stories
of success that have no realistic referent.

The fact that we can point to historical

examples of ascent in America—ascent according to the paradigm of the self-made
man—is what finally justifies the fictionalization of the self-made man and the mythic
ideal of the American dream towards which he labors.
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Chapter Three
Mythic World:
The American Frontier as Spatial Metaphor for Abundance
Always it has been the frontier which has allured many of our boldest souls. And
always just back of the frontier, advancing, receding, crossing it this way and that,
succeeding and failing, hoping and despairing—but steadily advancing in the
net result—has come that portion of the population which builds homes and lives
in them, and which is not content with a blanket for a bed and the sky for a roof
above. . . The frontier has been the lasting and ineradicable influence for the good
of the United States. It was there we showed our fighting edge, our inconquerable
resolution, our undying faith. There, for a time at least, we were Americans. We
had our frontier. We shall do ill indeed if we forget and abandon its strong
lessons, its great hopes, its splendid human dreams.
—Emerson Hugh1
Among the myriad ways we might define “America” stands what is perhaps the
most obvious—that it consists in the physical, geographical space that it has claimed for
itself to date. Anyone wishing to know “where” America lies can simply turn to a Rand
McNally map or run a quick search on Google Earth. Granted, a purely geographic
understanding of the American nation is not a comprehensive one, but the spatiality of
a nation is nevertheless an integral component of that nation’s existence. Whatever
ideological and mythological tenets of the nation are not contained in the physical
landscape it occupies, those tenets are in some part derived from the culture’s
interactive experience with the terrain, which is to say that the physicality of the nation
is ultimately integral to the abstract idealization of it. Indeed, the very terms used to
describe early America directly imply a larger national idealization, as with “the New

1
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World,” “the Golden Land,” “Nature’s Nation,” or “the Virgin Land,” all which point to
an optimism and inherent faith in the past, present, and future greatness of America.
Conceptions of physical landscape are often metaphorical devices through which
a national mission is articulated. The American dream, for all its abstraction, carries
also a very practical referent—it is evidenced by real people executing real actions upon
a real terrain. The subjective cultural conceptions of this physical terrain act at once
towards the formation of American cultural ideology, and in particular function directly
in the construction of the American dream mythology. As we have seen, the American
dream requires the demonstration of realistic attainability in order to function viably
within the national consciousness. What better way to accomplish this, we might reflect,
than to imbue the physical landscape of America with meaning that is directly
applicable to the greater national design outlined by the American dream, such that the
operation of the dream-myth can be figured as naturally derived from the very space it
occupies?
The American dream is not the result of a global understanding of success and
opportunity. It is a unique national mythology, created in part as a natural derivative
of

early

Americans’

understanding

of

the

land

they

inhabit.

Territorial

characterizations do not merely reflect a national spirit that informs them; they work to
engender the larger national spirit itself. Before the forms and institutions of American
national government are conceived and executed, the physical landscape has already
taken on an imaginative existence, imparted by the unique perceptions of its early
observers. Consider, for instance, Columbus’ description of Hispaniola in his 1493
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letter of Barcelona, after his first voyage. As a depiction of the New World, this is an
important characterization of “American” space:
Hispaniola is a wonder. The mountains and hills, the plains and meadow lands
are both fertile and beautiful. They are most suitable for planting crops and for
raising cattle of all kinds, and there are good sites for building towns and villages.
The harbours are incredibly fine and there are many great rivers with broad
channels and the majority contain gold. The trees, fruits and plants are very
different from those of Cuba. In Hispaniola there are many spices and large
mines of gold and other metals…2
What is striking about this passage is its insistence on colonizable space in America.
Columbus here emphasizes the fertility of the land and the vast availability of gold and
precious resources. Conceived as a new, plentiful, and virgin world, America—the real,
geographical space—seems already to physically embody the idea of limitless
opportunity.
J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur develops this sense of American opportunity
embedded in the landscape in his well-known Letters from an American Farmer. His
discussion focuses on the discrepancy between American and European experience,
and he paints a picture of the European’s sensations upon first occupying this new
American space. He writes,
He [the European] is arrived on a new continent; a modern society offers itself to
his contemplation, different from what he had hitherto seen. It is not composed,
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as in Europe, of great lords who possess everything, and of a herd of people who
have nothing. Here are no aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no bishops,
no ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power giving to a few a very visible one;
no great refinements of luxury. The rich and the poor are not so far removed
from each other as they are in Europe.3
Here Crèvecoeur demonstrates the social differences between America and Europe,
which exist because of the unique fact of American rural life. The landscape is the
immediate cause of this American character and society, according to Crèvecoeur,
because the landscape enables the American agrarian lifestyle.4 Hence, as Crèvecoeur
recounts later, the European on American shores will be immediately swept up in the
sense of teeming possibility apparent everywhere in the landscape:
An European, when he first arrives, seems limited in his intentions, as well as in
his views; but he very suddenly alters his scale; two hundred miles formerly
appeared a very great distance, it is now but a trifle; he no sooner breathes our
air than he forms schemes, and embarks in designs he never would have thought
of in his own country. There the plenitude of society confines many useful ideas,
and often extinguishes the most laudable schemes which here ripen into
maturity. Thus Europeans become Americans.5
Here the American continent has certain inherent American features, such that
occupying American space already engenders an American spirit. In this sense, it
Crèvecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer, 42.
Willa Cather’s My Ántonia offers a nice fictional representation of this idealized
agrarian American life (for the immigrant), often highlighting that life’s hardships.
5 Crèvecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer, 55-56.
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appears that the American spirit really is derived from landscape impressions, rather
than vice versa.
The American dream is not the sort of ideal that can be easily adopted by any
cultural consciousness; it somehow belongs to America, as if naturally, and this is due in
part to the associations Americans have had with the landscape surrounding them.
America—the idealistic national enterprise—is largely shaped out of its early
inhabitants’ relationship to and ongoing interaction with the physical space onto which
that enterprise comes to be inscribed. As Anne Mackin nicely summarizes,
If we borrow the cultural anthropologist’s lens to examine the historic
relationship of European Americans with their land, we find many complexities.
Ours is a transplanted culture—an Old World culture planted in a new,
uncrowded world of seemingly limitless fertile land. But the beaching of the first
European shallop on American shores initiated an alchemy of nature and culture
that produced a uniquely American society. With the motherland a two- or
three-month sea voyage away, and with enough land and other resources to
spread out and start anew almost continually, attitudes toward all traditions—
including social conformity, civic responsibilities, individual freedoms, class and
wealth, and the role of community—began an organic transformation.6
Insofar as this landscape (or rather, early Americans’ experience of it) is undergoing
constant revision and expansion in the nation’s early years, the execution of the

6

Mackin, Americans and Their Land, 1.
107

American project (and, consequently, the genesis of the myth of the American dream) is
accordingly organic.
What this means is that the spatial metaphor through which we read the
American landscape (and which is the pivotal incarnation of the dominant landscape
myth) grows out of a developing sense of the greater American myth even insofar as it
contributes to the underlying structure of that myth. In this organic relationship, the
land becomes a source of mythology because it is in the process of being mythologized.
Consider Myra Jehlen’s characterization of the American land as immanent
transcendence—a description that insists on this kind of organic evolution:
I want to stress the land, the continent’s physical reality, or more basically, its
physicality. For it is precisely because the concept of America is rooted in the
physical finite that it can be infinitely metaphysical. The concept of the New
World could not come to everyday life as a pure abstraction; it had to interpret
some actual territory, a real place. Lately, in order to refute the identification of
the United States with the whole continent, historical revisionists have worked to
separate the idea and myth of America from its material reality. The dichotomy
that is thus established very usefully counters a prior tendency among even
historians and critics to assume that “America” is a reality as such, so that we
have only to examine its historical implementation.

But through such

demystifications, the connection of mystique to reality can be lost to analysis,
and it is particularly this connection that interests me. For the myth of America
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has been both ideal and material (idealist and materialist): if it is transcendent, it
is immanently transcendent.7
Jehlen makes an important comment here: however important it is to the study of
history to separate the American idea from the American material reality, it is likewise
important to the cultural theorist to avoid such a separation. We cannot understand the
American landscape mythically if we fail to see the significance of its metaphorical
characterization as mythic expression—that is, if we fail to see the landscape as both
material and ideal: as immanent transcendence.8 What concerns us in this study is the
manner in which America’s spatial existence has been figured mythically; we are
seeking the dominant spatial metaphor according to which American mythic idealism
has been articulated.
The founding and development of America has often been historically figured
through the landscape metaphor of the “frontier,” and hence the complex fact of
westward expansion has traditionally taken on great significance as an embodiment of
national progression. We need only recall here the thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner’s
1893 paper, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” which quite simply
states its revolutionary thesis right up front: “The existence of an area of free land, its
continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain

Jehlen, American Incarnation, 9-10.
Elsewhere in her book Jehlen writes that “the American teleology cites the will of
heaven and the human spirit, but it rests its case on the integrity of the continent.” This
simple statement nicely summarizes the importance of the American landscape as
immanent transcendence. Ibid., 5.
7
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American development.”9 To be sure, Turner has been thoroughly criticized for the
extremity of this claim—which essentially asserts that “the American experience” can
be reduced entirely to the fact of westward expansion—as well as for the larger
implications of his paper.

Nevertheless, Turner’s thesis was a novel theoretical

innovation for its time, and effectively identified a spatially figured history by which
the ever-elusive “American character” could be re-imagined in terms of some concrete
physical referent. Turner’s thesis essentially suggested the theoretical parameters for
delineating a properly mythic universe—a truly essential move if the American dream
myth were ever to become an enduring national paradigm.
Let us first, then, place Turner’s thesis in a more current critical context so that
we can assess its viability within our study.

Shortly after Turner introduced his

revolutionary thesis—one which essentially delineated new terms for the historical
study of America as “unique”—his idea was adopted by historians for the
establishment of “frontier studies.” As Gregory Nobles details this historical moment,
“the freshness of the frontier provided an upbeat, positive perspective on the past that
soon attracted a loyal following among historians,” and “By the time of his death in
1932, the ‘Turner School’ of historians had secured a prominent place in the profession,
and an able body of followers helped maintain the Turnerian legacy throughout the
first half of the twentieth century.”10 Despite the early impact of Turner’s frontier thesis,
however, his claims come under sharp criticism by mid-century with the result that the
Turner thesis now appears greatly deflated to contemporary critics.
9
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The major critique of Turner’s frontier thesis is one of its limited vision: that
Turner avows the existence of a frontier space as the single most important factor in the
formation of American identity.

Nobles writes that “Other factors—urbanization,

immigration, and industrialization, to name the most significant—were equally
important, if not more so.”11 This is certainly true, and we must be careful to remember
it. We cannot, as Turner does, reduce American experience to frontier mythology.
Rather, we would benefit from considering the frontier space as a relevant and
important version of the mythic spatial metaphor of American terrain. Nobles continues
his overview of Turner criticism by highlighting some of the other important facts of
American experience that lie outside the purview of Turner’s frontier. He writes,
Other historians of Turner’s generation pointed out that westward migration was
not the only significant form of human movement in the United States in the
nineteenth century: continued waves of immigrants from Europe and other parts
of the world made a major contribution not just to the nation’s population but to
its very character. Turner’s emphasis on American exceptionalism overlooked or
obscured the continuing significance of international influence on American
culture. Moreover, scholars also noted that migration within the United States
did not always move in one direction, toward open land in the West: people
moved from farm to city and, in many cases, from west to east. Thus, the
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factories of Eastern cities were as much a part of the American experience as the
farms of the Western frontier.12
Today, historians recognize the revolutionary importance of Turner’s thesis while
simultaneously recognizing its severe limitations. Despite those limitations, though,
Turner’s thesis has directly contributed to the existence of frontier studies in the early to
mid twentieth century (even if the frontier is not regularly studied today). As we
pursue our own line of inquiry, we would do well to preserve the fact of the frontier as
a representative spatial metaphor of the American dream. This does not imply that
there are no other spatial metaphors according to which the landscape of the American
dream has been written; it does recognize that, as a version of mythic landscape
articulation, the frontier is a thorough representation of the ideal of American terrain.
As such, we will discuss it as a relevant instance of America’s mythic articulation of
itself through the landscape.
Turner’s American frontier is significant for its consistent recession, which is to
say that, however far westward one travelled, there was always a new frontier on the
western horizon. 13 This seemingly unending potential for territorial extension, he

Ibid., 9-10.
Gregory Nobles identifies this feature of the frontier—its continued recession—as the
fundamental difference between American and European conceptions of a “frontier.”
He writes,
In Europe, the term “frontier” referred to the border zone between two nations.
In North America, Turner explained, the frontier was not a fixed boundary but a
moving line, “the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery
and civilization.” More to the point, there was no single line, but a succession of
frontiers that followed upon each other [. . . ] The frontier was not simply a place;
it was a recurring process that moved (or, to use Turner’s more energetic terms,
12
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argues, figured immensely in the formation of American identity. The unique dynamic
of constant resettlement worked to supply the nation with the ground for its ideological
tenets.14 Turner writes, “American social development has been continually beginning
over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this
expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the
simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character.”15
We can clearly hear in Turner’s statement the rhetoric of the American dream: “rebirth,”
“fluidity,” “expansion,” “opportunity,” and “simplicity”—these are the familiar
buzzwords of American dream theory. And while Turner’s discussion has no direct
recourse to the American dream, insofar as he is attempting to locate a ground for
national character his historical assessment has more than a cursory relevance to our
discussion here. Indeed, according to Turner’s thesis, America actually becomes more
American with each successive move westward—it is in relation to the vast frontier that
“leaped” or “skipped”) across the continent in stages, leaving newly born
societies to develop in its wake. (Nobles, American Frontiers, 6-7)
14 Esmond Wright attempts a characterization of the American values engendered on
the American frontier. He writes that Turner
first gave expression to the view that it was the moving belt of human
population pushing ever-westwards that was the unique feature in the story; and
that to this were due many of the characteristics of American society. As safety
valve for urban tensions and discontents, it created a resourceful, independent
and egalitarian society, with freedom of opportunity and free land available to
every man who had the energy, courage and will to work it; it called for initiative,
ingenuity and self-reliance; it was hostile to remote authority because it was
remote and because it was authority; it was activist, un-intellectual, and strongly
optimistic. (Wright, The American Dream, 8)
Again, we see stressed here the importance of available land and opportunity for
industrious workers. Wright makes a nice characterization of the spirit of the Adamic
hero/self-made man in the context of physical opportunity, such that the American
mythic hero does seem to emerge from this unique mythic context.
15 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 2-3.
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an entire political, social, and, yes, mythological, identity is formed. This is largely owing
to the direct influence of western mobilization on a national sense of independence. As
Turner describes, “At first, the frontier was the Atlantic coast. It was the frontier of
Europe in a very real sense. Moving westward, the frontier became more and more
American. [. . .] Thus the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away
from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines.”16
Turner spends the bulk of his paper detailing some of the predominant, specific effects
of westward migration in America in order to demonstrate this claim. He argues that
westward migration “promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the
American people,” that it “decreased our dependence on England,” that it conditioned
the “legislation which most developed the powers of the national government,” and
that, most importantly, its production of individualism worked to promote the national
standard of democracy.17 Certainly Turner is right to stress a connection between these
historical conditions. If we are to critique him, we ought not disregard his thesis
outright. Clearly the frontier is not the sole factor in the formation of American national
identity—but neither is it a negligible one. As we trace the spatial metaphor according
to which the myth of the American dream is enacted, we would do well to recognize the
importance of Turner’s contribution.
We ought, however, to introduce a slight caveat to the above discussion, which
may emphasize too much a unique position for America. America’s history largely
revolves around a receding frontier, and the existence and population of this frontier
16
17

Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 22, 23, 24, 30.
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space contributes in no small part to the formation of American identity. But we must
be reluctant to call America unique in this respect. Gus Emerson, in his book The New
Frontier, adopts Turner’s thesis in an effort to demonstrate the specific American traits
that are born out of frontier life. While he argues that the frontier terrain is indeed
formative of American identity, he also stresses that America is in no way different
from other countries in having a frontier to conquer. This is an important point to make
if we seek some singular quality in the American frontier. Emerson writes,
[T]he American spirit is not to be distinguished from any other national spirit to
any great extent by reason of the exclusive possession of any particular qualities.
Other nations have had frontiers. National character has in other instances been
influenced by restless and vigorous pioneers. But no state or nation, no people,
has been, to the same extent, influenced by the elements in human character
growing out of the continuous opening up of new country, the repeated seeking
out of new homes by the people, the constantly refreshed and perpetuated spirit
of reliance upon self as the only stable and permanent element in a constantly
shifting environment.18
Emerson’s point here is that the frontier is not unique to America, but the individual
who is born from American frontier life is unique to America.

This argument

essentially allows Emerson to straddle the fence on the question of American
singularity. All nations develop along similar lines, but the geographical, political, and
social peculiarities of those nations lead to the generation of diverse national spirits.

18

Gus Emerson, The New Frontier, 15.
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The quality of American pioneer life, therefore, defines the unique status of American
culture.
The pivotal signification of the American frontier—at least for our discussion of
the American dream—is that of opportunity. The frontier as a physical embodiment of
the ideal of opportunity, in fact, is the most vital and significant meaning that Turner
himself attaches to it. Reaching the conclusion of his paper, he writes, “Since the days
when the fleet of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New World, America has been
another name for opportunity, and the people of the United States have taken their tone
from the incessant expansion which has not only been open but has even been forced
upon them.” 19

The central structuring ideal of the American dream is that of

opportunity—that the possibility for social and economic advancement not only exists
in inexhaustible abundance, but that it is an avenue open to all who choose to pursue it.
This is why, despite is limitations, the frontier metaphor serves our purposes so well: it
is one of many articulations of the endless opportunity inherent in the American
landscape. Because the frontier metaphor emphasizes a constantly receding physical
boundary, it insists on limitless abundance (materially figured), which amounts to real,
inexhaustible opportunity. It should now be clear that the frontier—this imaginative
perception of American space—functions as an important version of this central
mythological tenet.
And indeed, we find in the frontier an underlying structural tension, according
to which we can locate its mythemic relevance to our American dream discussion. This

19

Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 37.
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tension is derived from the reality of America’s physical expansion—that it eventually
reaches a point, as Turner concludes, where the seemingly endless frontier is exhausted.
As Perry Miller describes in his book Nature’s Nation, “in America Nature is going
down in swift and inexorable defeat.

She is being defaced, conquered—actually

ravished.”20 The limitless frontier that characterized American experience through the
nineteenth century is, by the onset of the twentieth century, being quickly “used up.”21
We see this sentiment expressed in James Fenimore Cooper’s The Pioneers, in a debate
over the expendability of resources.

Judge Marmaduke Temple (the novel’s

protagonist) remarks upon the wasting of wood for hearth fires: “Really, it behoves the
owner of woods so extensive as mine, to be cautious what example he sets to his people,
who are already felling the forests, as it no end could be found to their reassures, nor
any limits to their extent. If we go on in this way, twenty years hence we shall want
fuel.” Richard answers the Judge’s comment, saying, “why, you might as well predict,
that the fish will die, for want of water in the lake, because I intend, when the frost gets
out of the ground, to lead one or two of the springs, through logs, into the village.”22
While this discussion, subsequently interrupted in the novel, offers no resolution to the
question of resource exhaustion, it presents the question in a summary way,

Miller, Nature’s Nation, 198.
This is the important theme of Louise Erdrich’s fiction. Erdrich’s fiction represents
the disenfranchisement of the Native American throughout the twentieth century, and
so we see the question of exhausted expansion refocused as a problem for those being
conquered, rather than for those who have nothing left to conquer. See Love Medicine
for a more comprehensive representation of this idea, or Bingo Palace for a more specific
reflection on contemporary Native American life in the context of the increasing
devastation of nature.
22 Cooper, The Pioneers, 94-95.
20
21
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highlighting the tension between apparently endless resources and the realistic
possibility of their exhaustion over the course of multiple generations. It makes clear
that the ideal/real tension that inheres in nineteenth-century conceptions of frontier
space is a cause for immediate concern.
The impending exhaustion of frontier space represents a kind of limit to
American abundance, and this is clearly a threat to the American dream, which
demands a space of endless resources to populate its opportunistic world. Within the
nineteenth century, this tension between the reality and the ideal of American
abundance becomes figured through an understanding of the interactive relationship
between ‘nature’ and ‘civilization.’ Without a western frontier to move towards, nature
is not perennially reborn in American experience; instead, America becomes
increasingly civilized. The tension arises, within this historical moment, of mediating
the contrary supposed virtues that belong separately to nature and civilization, for the
nineteenth-century imagination sees a dynamic tension between nature and civilization
that arises in the liminal space of the frontier and that sustains a complex American
identity—such that the frontier space ultimately describes both the literal field of
opportunity in America as well as the sustenance of American identity through this
ongoing development.23 Miller succinctly outlines this paradox, claiming that Thoreau,

Nobles’ book, American Frontiers, sets out to reimagine Turner’s frontier in a more
generally applicable context. Because late twentieth-century cultural historians have
largely debunked the Turnerian hypothesis of the frontier as the space where
civilization meets nature or savagery (because these terms are always subjective or
relative to one another), it is more adequate to recognize the frontier as a generally
liminal space. “In recent years,” Nobles writes, “post-Turnerian scholars have begun to
use terms like ‘contact zone,’ ‘zone of interpenetration,’ or ‘middle ground,’ thus
23
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Melville, and Whitman “present us with the problem of American self-recognition as
being essentially an irreconcilable opposition between Nature and civilization—which
is to say, between forest and town, spontaneity and calculation, heart and head, the
unconscious and the self-conscious, the innocent and the debauched.” 24 Whereas
landscape artists, poets, and preachers may have avowed the preeminence of Nature for
its authentic, untarnished purity, Miller gives us a fine description of the alternate
mood, which in pushing towards increasing civilization does not recognize any
inherent vice or evil in the move. He writes,
This was the expanding, prospering, booming America of the 1840’s; here, if ever
in the annals of man, was an era of optimism, with a vision of limitless
possibilities, with faith in a boundless future. There was indeed some fear that
the strife of North and South might wreck the chariot of progress, but the more
that threat loomed the more enthusiastically the nation shouted the prospects of
wealth and prosperity, if only in order to show the folly of allowing politics to
spoil the golden opportunity.

Dickens and other foreign visitors report a

republic constantly flinging into their faces preposterous vaunts about what it
would shortly become, and then steadily making good its wildest boasts. Surely
suggesting an area of interaction between two or more cultures in which neither culture
is assumed to have an altogether superior position.” In this sense, the frontier can be
reimagined “not just as a place, or even as a frequently repeated, one-dimensional
process of contact, settlement, and development,” but as a “much more complex
process of mutual exchange in which neither culture, Native American of EuroAmerican, could remain unchanged.” In this sense, the frontier stands as a broad
metaphorical characterization of spaces of multi-cultural exchange, and Turner’s thesis
can be used without privileging one cultural perception over another. Nobles, American
Frontiers, 12.
24 Miller, Nature’s Nation, 199.
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this society was not wracked by a secret, hidden horror that its gigantic exertion
would end only in some nightmare of debauchery called “civilization”?25
Again we clearly see the overt rhetoric of optimism—that mythic feature which
consistently attempts to resolve an irresolvable paradox of experience. The American
dream is built on the supposition that America is unique, and so not subject to the
pitfalls of other nations. Without really resolving the nature-civilization dichotomy, the
American dream casually asserts their perfect coexistence (for this is how myths appear
to resolve the irresolvable). As Miller describes this supposed resolution, “America can
progress indefinitely into an expanding future without acquiring sinful delusions of
grandeur simply because it is nestled in Nature, is instructed and guided by mountains,
is chastened by cataracts.”26 It is from this unique relationship that the term “Nature’s
Nation” is derived: in the face of choosing between a natural or a civilized state,
America boldly proclaims that it is both, simultaneously and without contradiction.27

Ibid., 198.
Ibid., 202.
27 Regarding the symbiotic relationship between nature and culture in America, Myra
Jehlen comments that,
But when the democratic Enlightenment became associated with the North
American continent, something new did emerge, for with this added dimension
the theory of liberal individualism entered a culminating stage that was
substantially different from its intermediate European form. Grounded, literally,
in American soil, liberalism’s hitherto arguable theses metamorphosed into
nature’s material necessities. Thus European reformers had argued in accord
with Natural Law philosophy that their societies should parallel and
complement nature. But the forming of American society was a still more
ambitious enterprise. Americans saw themselves as building their civilization
out of nature itself, as neither the analogue nor the translation of Natural Law
but its direct expression. (Jehlen, American Incarnation, 3)
Taking this sense of balance a step further, Leo Marx finds that the relationship between
nature and civilization in America essentially represents the attainment of a pastoral
25
26
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The resolution of this nature/civilization tension is an important one for the nineteenthcentury frontier imagination, but it is less relevant to the larger opportunity-based
figuration of the spatial metaphor. For our purposes, the existence of a perpetual
frontier space has the quality of assuring sustainable abundance.

The Turnerian

frontier as a liminal space between savagery and civility is undoubtedly an essential
characterization for the representation of a historical moment in the American dream
mythology, but with increased urbanization, industrialization, and technologization,
the location of such a liminal space becomes less relevant to the larger idealistic
paradigm in the twentieth century.28

ideal—and this is precisely why the frontier metaphor is ultimately not sustainable as
such through the twentieth century. He writes,
In the New World [. . . ] it actually seemed possible, as never before, for
migrating Europeans to establish a society that might realize the ancient pastoral
dream of harmony: a via media between decadence and wildness, too much and
too little civilization. For the revolutionary generation of Americans, notably
Thomas Jefferson, this Rousseauistic possibility was represented by the
captivating topographical image, or mental map, of the new nation as an ideal
society of the “middle landscape” midway between l’ancien régime and the wild
frontier. [. . . ] [The Machine in the Garden] ended in the present tense with a
suggestion that today, in the era of high technology, pastoralism almost certainly
had become anachronistic, even less feasible as the basis for a political ideology
than it had been in Jefferson’s time, and therefore it soon might be expected to
lose its hold on the minds of disaffected Americans. (Marx, “Pastoralism in
America,” 38)
We will do well to keep in mind this figuration of the frontier as pastoral harmony, for
it speaks directly to the nineteenth-century American imagination and, in doing so,
represents the danger of adopting a frontier-based idealism in the twentieth century.
28 Some authors, though, have attempted to reposition the significance of this
nature/civilization tension within the twentieth century. I am thinking here of Toni
Morrison. In both Song of Solomon and Jazz, Morrison’s narratives make substantial
detours into rural settings. This is perhaps surprising, since both novels depend in
large part on the bustling city for their actions. But Milkman’s self-creative journey
requires that he make contact with his “natural” roots, and the city of Harlem in Jazz, it
seems, cannot be fully represented as a city without a narrative detour (about seemingly
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For the fact remains that there is no more western frontier left to conquer by the
close of the nineteenth century. This is problematic, for the frontier functions as a
spatial metaphor for the guarantee of sustained abundance and opportunity, and
without this (or another) spatial metaphor, the American dream lacks a grounded,
physical context (which it requires in order to function mythically). It is for this reason
that Turner’s paper reaches an abrupt conclusion. Describing the character of American
life, Turner remarks that “movement has been its dominant fact” and, consequently,
“the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise. But never
again will such gifts of free land offer themselves.”29 With the exhaustion of available
frontier space, so ends “the first period of American history”30 in Turner’s estimation.
This is certainly a pivotal moment in American history if we at all accept Turner’s
insistence on the nationally formative aspect of the frontier. Indeed, if we are to locate a
mythemic unit in the frontier symbol,31 then we must consider how the myth of the
American dream persists in the post-frontier space of the twentieth century.
Emerson’s book is specifically concerned with this question. His “new frontier”
picks up where Turner’s paper leaves off—at the point of the exhaustion of American
frontier space. “What are we to do today,” he asks, “who live in crowded cities? What

irrelevant characters and actions) into rural Virginia. These narratives attest to the
importance of contact with nature in light of civilization.
29 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 37.
30 Ibid., 38.
31 This is not to claim that the frontier is the dominant articulation of American mythic
space. Rather, I am arguing that the frontier is one version of such an articulation. I
concentrate on the frontier in this discussion because, as a version of this mythic spatial
metaphor, it is a good one: it nicely captures the spirit of limitless abundance in the
context of consistent progress, all as a characterization of material space.
122

are we to do today who grow up and die without ever setting foot on a forest path?
What are we to do today when one set of problems confronts the people of the Atlantic
Coast, the people in the conquered wilderness of the Mississippi Valley and the people
of the Far West?”32 Emerson is posing the question that now presents itself before us,
and his solution depends wholly on a symbolic understanding of the frontier. He
writes, “Our last material frontier having been conquered, we now face the great problems of
social, political and industrial organization and of artistic creation. A frontier still confronts us,
and only in the frontier spirit can we meet it.”33 This answer indicates the direction our
discussion must now take.34 The physical frontier of America is significant for the
symbolic role it plays in the generation of American character. If the dawn of the
twentieth century demands an alternate conception of the frontier—one still rooted in
the spatial metaphor of opportunity—then we must re-conceive it accordingly.
It is important to clarify that the western space of the frontier does not simply
vanish overnight, even when the very concrete boundary of the Pacific Ocean is reached
and the whole western coastline is mapped. This is because, well after the exhaustion
of realistically viable frontier space, the frontier nevertheless continues to function
symbolically within the American imagination as a spatial articulation of abundant
Gus Emerson, The New Frontier, 207.
Ibid.
34 Henry Nash Smith supports this kind of reading of the frontier in the twentieth
century, noting in a short paper that “If we look upon the frontier as a place where the
spirit of capitalistic accumulation could flower without restraint, we can perhaps begin
to recapture its significance for American history in general.” Indeed, Turner’s frontier
supports such a reading, but this reading also allows us to carry the function of the
frontier space into the twentieth century, where capitalism flourishes to an even greater
extent than it ever could in the nineteenth century. Smith, “Symbol and Idea in Virgin
Land,” 32.
32
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opportunity. Hence, well into the twentieth century, the idea of westward migration is
no less powerful than it had been for the past few hundred years, despite the absence of
“new” terrain or even literal westward motion.

This is because the heightened

industrialist capitalism of the twentieth century does not enter into the American
consciousness as a sudden and foreign new element, but rather develops organically
out of the developing American consciousness.

Leo Marx describes this organic

development between a pastoral and an industrial frontier, heavily implying a
resolution to the problem of Turner’s closed frontier in the twentieth century. He writes,
The machine-in-the-landscape episode marks the emergence of a distinctive
industrial age variant of pastoralism.

In the symbolic topography that had

previously lent expression to that ancient world view, the locus of power, wealth,
hierarchy, sophistication—of the complex world—had been fixed in space. It
characteristically had been a city or royal court or aristocratic household, or at
any rate a place unambiguously separated from the green world: the realm of
urbane social life here, the countryside (and wilderness) there. But the new
machine power figured forth a fundamental transformation in relations between
society and nature—it introduced a vivid awareness of the unprecedented
dynamism of industrial society into nineteenth-century conceptions of landscape.
Power machinery, factories, steamboats, canals, railroads, telegraph lines,
wherever they appeared, were perceived as extensions of urban power and
complexity.

Potential invaders of all sectors of the environment, the forces

represented by the new technology necessarily blur (if they do not erase) the
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immemorial boundary lines between city, countryside, and wilderness.

By

threatening to take dominion everywhere, they intensify—at times to the point of
apocalyptic stridency—the dissonance that pastoralism always had generated at
the junction of civilization and nature.35
Marx’s argument here does not directly resolve our immediate problem—that of
finding this frontier vision of the landscape as a sustained cultural metaphor through
the twentieth century—but it hints at how a resolution can be made.

When we

recognize that the features of the frontier are developing right alongside the intrusion of
technology (which is having a widespread impact on the American environment
everywhere), it is not so difficult to see how the new cultural terrain of the twentieth
century maintains strong ties to early American conceptions of the frontier.
Indeed, Turner’s thesis is notably introduced into academic discourse at the close
of the frontier. As such, it describes a past moment with heavy recourse to the present
and future of America. The theory of the early American frontier is a turn-of-thecentury theory, and so it describes a landscape metaphor in perfectly relevant language.
This is why Turner insists on uncovering the spirit of frontier Americans, for it is
presumably a spirit that is still with us, and that establishes a cultural connection
between early and twentieth-century America. 36

Richard Slotkin offers a fluid

Marx, “Pastoralism in America,” 58.
On this subject, Allen Trachtenberg poses the question, “Would the America
fashioned on the frontier survive the caldrons of the city?” His answer appeals to
Turner’s “frontier spirit”:
To be sure, [Turner] argued, the story of the frontier had reached its end, but the
product of that experience remains. It remains in the predominant character, the
traits of selfhood, with which the frontier experience had endowed Americans,
35
36
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description of the transformation of the frontier myth at the turn of the century and,
because it is important to this discussion, I quote it at length:
Theodore Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for the West and pioneer history, and his
linkage of Progressivism with the “strenuous life” of the Frontier, was the central
formulation of this revised version of the myth; and Roosevelt himself was the
center of a web of associations (community) of more or less like-minded men.
The group included such political titans as Henry Cabot Lodge, the
conservationist Gifford Pinchot, the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, novelists
Owen Wister and S. E. White, racist-anthropologists Madison Grant and Henry
Fairfield Osborn, and other business, political, and cultural magnates. These
men identified their particular concerns—economic progress, political reform,
literary “realism”—with the “frontier” virtues of “red-bloodedness,” macho
individualism, and heroic dominance that Roosevelt located in the personalities
of frontier heroes. It was this group, working at the “end of the frontier,” that
formulated the myth-ideological system associated with that phase of American
history into its most significant form, and used it as the basis of a general theory
of American history and politics. In doing so, they transformed the ambivalently
democratic and agrarian materials of the original myth into a set of doctrines and
fables suited to the ideological needs of an industrial economy and a managerial
policy. Thus discontent breaks down the “harmonious display of essences,”
that “dominant individualism” which now must learn to cope with novel
demands. The thesis projects a national character, a type of person fit for the
struggles and strategies of an urban future. (Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of
America, 15-16.
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degrading sacred myth into secular ideology; and ideology, in the hands of a
class-seeking hegemony, reaches out to co-opt myth.37
Here we see how the frontier continues to function as an organizing spatial metaphor
within the twentieth century, even after the exhaustion of literal frontier space. Because
the myth of the frontier denotes a complex system of American idealism, virtue,
progress, and opportunity, it sustains its relevance as a spatial metaphor despite the
exhaustion of its literal context.

As a metaphorical characterization of the American

landscape (and, by implication, of American pursuit generally), it is no less relevant
today than at the time when a very real frontier space existed: it continues to describe
America as the land of opportunity.38 For our purposes here, then, we would do well to
consider this “new” frontier space—this modification of the early American myth—and
for this we turn our attention to twentieth century representations of the frontier in
America.

Slotkin, “Myth and the Production of History,” 86-87.
Daniel Elazar finds that the presence of metaphorical frontiers have always
characterized American experience, and this helps us to position the frontier—as a
metaphor for America’s spatial existence—into a more general American context. He
writes,
American society is a frontier society. It has chosen—or had thrust upon it—a
path which involves continuing economic, social and political change of the first
magnitude based on a constant effort at continued growth and development
designed to periodically alter the very environment in which Americans live.
[. . . ] The governments of the United States have always been called upon to
encourage the scientific and technological development needed to discover and
open new frontiers, to create a political framework without which nongovernmental and individual enterprise could move out onto those frontiers, and
to provide the necessary public infrastructure for their conquest. (Elazar, Building
Cities in America, 49)
In this sense, again, we can see how the frontier continues to function as an organizing
spatial metaphor long after its literal closure.
37
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Let us consider John Steinbeck’s novel, The Grapes of Wrath, which is set in the
1930s and is explicitly concerned with westward migration. Because Steinbeck’s novel
is set in the midst of the Great Depression,39 the hope that his characters have in their
westward progress is in extremely sharp contrast to their present circumstances.
Indeed, the failure of the Joads’ Oklahoma “dustbowl” farm life, within which the
entire American governmental system is demonized for its mechanism and lifecrushing expansion, acts to directly undercut the substance of the American dream,
while at the same time the American dream is championed and endorsed by the
characters’ active pursuit of it westward. The novel, to put it simply, cleverly manages
a representation of persistent hope in a dream that appears to have no genuine potential
for actualization.

This dichotomous representation of the American dream is

accomplished through the novel’s shifting narrative structure, in which the narrator
alters his storytelling focus from one chapter to the next. And so, while the majority of
the novel’s chapters detail the actions of the Joad family, who consistently struggle
onwards and periodically renew their hopeful aspirations, the alternate chapters (which
are notably far shorter, and which dominant critical consensus has termed
“interchapters”) adopt a pseudo-objective account of the starkness of American
experience. These interchapters, which give no intimate attention to specific characters
so as to maintain an impersonal tone, often detail the rugged conditions of the
landscape and demonstrate the unstoppable mechanical (and overtly evil) progression
We must keep the context of the Great Depression in mind, for it substantially colors
the features of Steinbeck’s world in The Grapes of Wrath, and we must consider whether
the novel challenges the American ideal generally, or if it does so within the specific
context of the Great Depression’s unique historical threat to economic gain.
39
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of American capitalism.40 The novel allows these two narratives to run side by side,
thereby allowing a fictional development of the American dream that more closely
approximates its realistic context. As John J. Conder argues, the interchapters work
together with the novel’s primary story to create a universe that is economically
determined, and yet one in which free will persists. He writes,
The interchapters display the growth of a group consciousness controlled by
instinct’s response to the dynamic of economic forces. [. . . ] But in the story
proper, instinct does not rule each person with equal power. The instinctual
power that drives the group in the interchapters is unequally distributed among
its individual members. [. . . ] In the plot, then, free will plays a major role.41
In The Grapes of Wrath, then, Steinbeck manages a narrative organization that maintains
his character’s freedom of identity (such that they are “Americans” in the frontier
spirit42), while simultaneously insisting on a deterministic economic model that governs
American experience. In other words, the characters in the novel are openly pitted
against the world (i.e. the landscape) in which they function.
Representations of the American landscape abound in Steinbeck’s novel—rich,
elaborate representations that detail the diversity of conditions in the land (from
extreme drought to torrential flooding, for instance). These descriptions are essential to
Conder writes that, “The interchapters of Steinbeck’s novel create a network of
interlocking determinism through their emphasis on the operations of abstract,
impersonal forces in the lives of the Oklahomans.” He locates “economic determinism”
as the governing motif of the interchapters. Conder, “Steinbeck and Nature’s Self,” 99100.
41 Ibid., 102.
42 “For these are a people with pioneer blood in their veins,” writes Peter Lisca about
the Joads. Lisca, “The Dynamics of Community in The Grapes of Wrath,” 87.
40
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the development of the narrative, as well as to our discussion here, for they emphasize
the physical geography of the Joads’ pursuit.

Steinbeck’s novel sets up a clear

antagonism between the dual forces of nature and civilization, implying a clear
breakdown of their supposed harmonious relationship in America.

The Joads’

westward movement to California is a heavily symbolic action that takes its significance
from the frontier ideal. Their journey, though difficult, is suffused with an optimism
derived from the rich promises of an abundant landscape. Indeed, this tension in the
novel between the lavishness of its setting and the destitution of its characters
constitutes the central tension with which we are concerned here.
Depictions of California in the novel differ powerfully from those of the
dustbowl, out of which the Joads are migrating. California is the new frontier, teeming
with opportunity, while the dustbowl is a dried up, hollow desert—an exhausted
dream. Our narrator describes the migration generally (i.e. not specific to the Joads),
adopting the highway as the preeminent symbol for the migratory boom that is
sweeping the nation:
Highway 66 is the main migrant road. 66—the long concrete path across the
country, waving gently up and down on the map, from Mississippi to
Bakersfield—over the red lands and the gray lands, twisting up into the
mountains, crossing the Divide and down into the bright and terrible desert, and
across the desert to the mountains again, and into the rich California valleys.
66 is the path of a people in flight, refugees from dust and shrinking land,
from the thunder of tractors and shrinking ownership, from the desert’s slow
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northward invasion, from the twisting winds that howl up out of Texas, from the
floods that bring no richness to the land and steal what little richness is there.
From all these the people are in flight, and they come into 66 from the tributary
side roads, from the wagon tracks and the rutted country roads. 66 is the mother
road, the road of flight.43
It is worth noting that, as represented in the novel, the Midwest is essentially a dried up
wasteland with no promise of success or even basic sustenance. This is not the notion of
a successfully accomplished “Nature’s Nation,” which continually expands westward
as a means of recreating and reinforcing the cultural values that allow civilization to
prosper. Rather, this is the image of a ravenous governmental machine, which must
continually expand westward as it continually consumes its present resources. As one
ambiguous property owner in the novel describes, “The bank—the monster has to have
profits all the time. It can’t wait. It’ll die. No, taxes go on. When the monster stops
growing, it dies. It can’t stay one size.”44 The evils of capitalism are here laid bare in
the symbol of the bank-monster, which exploits individuals and ravages the landscape.
The effect of this ravage is the Midwestern wasteland of the novel, wherein the
American terrain ceases to function as a figurative articulation of American abundance.
Clearly, then, as is the case with most novelistic representations of the American
dream, The Grapes of Wrath does not paint an idealized dreamscape of American cultural
success, but rather points to the realistic pitfalls of such idealization.

But in

demonstrating the discrepancy between the frontier as reality and the frontier as ideal,
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the novel does powerfully expose the enduring dynamic of American dreaming, for
hope (however ill-grounded) appears to persist to the novel’s end. We see this at
regular points in the novel, whenever the Joads are in motion from one place to the next.
This is an interesting fact in and of itself, for it emphasizes the dream as a pursuit
towards an ideal, rather than as any substantial possession of that ideal. Time after time,
the Joads vocally express their lofty expectations while en route to some destination,
only to find those expectations far from met upon arrival. Rose of Sharon, the eldest
(and pregnant) daughter of the family, most overtly embodies this dreamy spirit of
expectation. Before they arrive in California, she describes the life she hopes to have
with Connie, her husband:
Connie gonna get a job in a store or maybe a fact’ry. An’ he’s gonna study at
home, maybe radio, so he can git to be a expert an’ maybe later have his own
store. An’ we’ll go to pitchers whenever. An’ Connie says I’m gonna have a
doctor when the baby’s born; an’ he says we’ll see how times is, an’ maybe I’ll go
to a hospiddle. An’ we’ll have a car, little car. An’ after he studies at night,
why—it’ll be nice, an’ he tore a page outa Western Love Stories, an’ he’s gonna
send off for a course, ‘cause it don’t cost nothin’ to send off. Says right on that
clipping. I seen it. An’, why—they even get you a job when you take that
course—radios, it is—nice clean work, and a future. An’ we’ll live in town an’ go
to pitchers whenever, an’—well, I’m gonna have a ‘lectric iron, an’ the baby’ll
have all new stuff. Connie says all new stuff—white an’—Well, you seen in the
catalogue all the stuff they got for a baby. Maybe right at first while Connie’s
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studyin’ at home it won’t be so easy, but—well, when the baby comes, maybe
he’ll be all done studyin’ an’ we’ll have a place little bit of a place.45
Rose of Sharon’s description rambles on in this dreamy way, and it is not long after she
makes this speech that her hopes are, quite definitively, made impossible: upon the
family’s arrival in California, Connie promptly deserts his wife, failing to reappear
before the novel’s end. Rose of Sharon is, perhaps, the most clearly hopeful character in
the novel (even persisting in her belief that Connie will return to her once he finds
work), but all of the characters cling to some ideal of success in one form or another,
despite the failures and blighted prospects with which they are continually met. The
family is driven into nearly constant motion, searching the entire state of California for
work, and never finding any lasting positions, let only those that pay decently. But it is
the fact of this regular motion that sustains their dreamy hopes, for they are consistently
moving to an imagined better place—one which, wherever they stop, is always just a
little further on.
By the novel’s end (when the Joads have clearly lost the rampant optimism that
characterized them when they first set out westward), lofty promises are still being
made amongst the Joads, such as Tom’s promise to his mother that, come winter, she
will definitely have a house.46 It is unclear, exactly, how much confidence the family
members have in these promises by this point in the novel. It is the hope of fulfillment
that sustains them, though, even while the novel darkly suggests that such hope is
ultimately empty, for the real circumstances of their position guarantee failure. This is
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an interesting take on the American dream insofar as it is set up as a kind of necessary
empty promise.
The defining tension between frontier reality and idealism is embodied in the
novel’s characterization of governmental impact on an abundant landscape.

This

tension is recounted, in brilliant narrative detail, in chapter twenty-five, where
abundance turns to putrid waste in the course of a few pages. We move from fragrant
pink fruit blossoms and the fresh white waters of a shallow sea to rotted grapes and
shriveled, soured pears and prunes.

All across the state of California, laborers

diligently toil for far less than livable wages in horrible conditions, while the luscious
produce of the land spoils (if it is not intentionally ruined), in a mad effort to adjust
profit margins for the banks and landowners, who are abstract and distant from the
concrete process of labor. This, to our narrator, amounts to a great national failure, one
which “hangs over the State like a great sorrow.” We are told,
There is a crime here that goes beyond denunciation. There is a sorrow here that
weeping cannot symbolize. There is a failure here that topples all our success.
The fertile earth, the straight tree rows, the sturdy trunks, and the ripe fruit. And
children dying of pellagra must die because a profit cannot be taken from an
orange. And coroner must fill in the certificates—died of malnutrition—because
the food must rot, must be forced to rot.47
This passage is deliberate and direct: the circumstances portrayed in the novel describe
the absolute failure of the American dream project. Rather than deriving its national
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strength from its great natural heritage, the American nation has become a profithungry, cold business, ruining its own plentiful bounty in order to financially enslave
its striving citizens. This is the very definition of the “evil” of civilization that America
is supposed to avoid by virtue of its natural foundations. The fact that Steinbeck
explores natural, land-rooted labor (peach picking, ditch digging, cotton picking), as
opposed to, say, debased factory working conditions, further attests to the emphasis his
novel means to place on the natural consequences of American capitalist expansion.
Are we to conclude from the novel, then, that the American dream circa the
1930s is dead, or at best a personal illusion with no real ground in possibility? If the
American dream is still with us today (as I strongly propose), then we cannot come to
such a conclusion. Rather, we must explore the subtlety of a national “dream.” The
American dream, after all, is a national ideal towards which we collectively and
individually strive. If there are periods in American history where advancement is
notably improbable, this does not necessarily mean that the dream has lost all viability.
The dream, indeed, persists despite the great historical threats to its real fulfillment. But
The Grapes of Wrath calls attention to the very real expiration of expandable space, and
so seems to indicate a significant change in the open landscape that previously allowed
for fresh beginnings.

The novel does not argue that the American dream simply

exhausted itself; rather, it describes a significant moment in American history when
there is a unique threat to the dream.

Steinbeck’s novel is set in Turner’s post-

expansion America, and amidst the Great Depression, no less. It describes a historical
moment in which the frontier as an organizing spatial metaphor must be refigured—
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that is, the myth of America as a constantly expanding land of opportunity must here be
rewritten. The Grapes of Wrath represents the defeat of the old world frontier myth, and
we will have to consider to what extent it replaces the old myth with a new one.
Louis Owens describes the basic narrative pattern that underlies the Joad’s quest
in the novel as one of perpetual search for a New Eden, in his book The Grapes of Wrath:
Trouble in the Promised Land. He writes,
The settlement of America may be seen as a process of ever westward expansion
in search of that Eden which seemed to recede always before the eyes of the first
colonists. The process became one of despoiling the Garden in search for the
Garden until, finally, Americans stood at the edge of the Pacific, having
slaughtered and driven from their lands the original inhabitants, having
deforested enormous portions of the continent, and having fought and gouged
with all other claimants to the continent in order to reach the western shore.
Surely, if there were ever to be a Garden it must be at the western edge. And the
beauty and fecundity of California seemed to fulfill that promise.

Still,

Americans were left with a feeling of loss, emptiness, summed up in Walt
Whitman’s great poem, “Facing West from California’s Shores,” in which he
concludes with a parenthetic question that resounds throughout American
history and American literature: “But where is what I started for so long ago? /
And why is it yet unfound?”48
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Owens’ reading is ultimately bleak, for he details how the Joads enact this traditionally
repeated drama in its last iteration—at the moment of a closed frontier—and, like
Whitman, discover that there is no realistic substance to their dreams, no possibility for
attainment. Owens does find that, at the novel’s end, Tom Joad becomes a kind of
leader in a new tradition that no longer repeats the “New Eden quest” narrative, but
rather seeks to recreate the current world instead of moving ever westward. He writes
that Tom “will not lead the people ‘someplace’ but will lead them toward a new
understanding of the place they inhabit here and now.”49 Owens is notably unclear
about the precise features of this “new understanding,” perhaps because the novel is so.
The novel does indeed set Tom up as a new paradigm for heroic action, but it does little
more then merely set him up in such a position. The novel concludes—with a note of
hope in Tom Joad’s future—before we see this “new Tom” in action.
The defeat of the old frontier myth and its subsequent replacement by a new
frontier myth is discussed in a short paper by Peter Lisca (though not in these terms,
exactly). Lisca details competing versions of community in the novel, insofar as they
are expressive of these different traditions. He writes,
The Grapes of Wrath moves not only along Route 66, east to west, like some
delayed Wagon Wheels adventure, but along the unmapped roads of social
change, from an old concept of community based on sociological conditions
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breaking up under an economic upheaval, to a new and very different sense of
community formulating itself gradually on the new social realities.50
The old order of community in the novel is represented in the Joads’ dustbowl life. This
communal identity is “invested in the land, the houses, and personal possessions,” but
also “in terms of social customs and mores.”51 It is patriarchal and family-based, and
rooted in a specific location, such that migration represents a very literal uprooting of
the old communal order. Lisca therefore details the many scenes of transition during
the liminal migratory journey to California, in which the old sense of community is put
to rest in preparation for a new one.52 And yet, a new ideal of communal structure is
not fully fleshed out in the novel. As Lisca writes, “But in The Grapes of Wrath we do not
see the realization of utopian community, for there are anticommunity forces as well;
and these, too, manifest themselves in a wide range.”53 These anticommunity forces
include a biological imperative for survival, selfishness and greed, and the creation and
subsequent existence of the deterministic economic (bank) system. In Lisca’s reading,
the persistence of these social evils is what ultimately prevents the actualization of a
new communal ideal, but we do see some hints at the structure of that ideal nonetheless.
Lisca writes that “It is this growing knowledge of the necessity of sharing with
strangers far beyond the usual circle of family and friends that becomes the most
Lisca, “The Dynamics of Community in The Grapes of Wrath,” 87.
Ibid., 88.
52 Examples of these transitional moments include: Casy’s inclusion in the Joad family,
despite his not being a Joad; the Joad family’s inability to properly bury Grandpa Joad
while en route; and Connie’s abandonment of his wife and unborn child upon first
reaching California. All of these instances, which take place in the liminal space of
Route 66, attest to the breakdown of an older communal order.
53 Lisca, “The Dynamics of Community in The Grapes of Wrath,” 93.
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powerful force for establishing the new community.”54 Acts of extra-familial sharing
are abundant in the novel, but Lisca’s case is made most definitively in the novel’s
concluding scene, in which Rose of Sharon, having delivered a stillborn child, shares
her breast milk with a starving old man (who is also a complete stranger). These scenes
of sharing attest to the formation of a new American community—solidly allied—which
might “repossess” this defiled and wasted America. And so The Grapes of Wrath ends
with a metaphorical frontier (as yet unconquered), even as it crushes the notion of a
literal one.55
Here we ought to recall Gus Emerson and Henry Nash Smith’s metaphorical
characterizations of frontier space, for these critics outline the persistent relevance of the
frontier as a governing, organizing spatial metaphor. The American myth is not static,
which is why it has been continually relevant to each subsequent generation. Just as the
paradigm of the self-made man gradually moved from a dictum of religious
responsibility to a humanistic model of (American) virtue, so also does the world in

Ibid., 96.
David Wyatt further emphasizes this point, arguing that Steinbeck uses his homestate
of California to mythologize the western migration, creating a non-spatial terrain of the
imagination in which the frontier continues to function. He writes,
Steinbeck’s best work naturalizes in his home state the central Western legend of
loss. During the 1930s he wrote a series of books that deal, in sequence, with the
acts of settlement, corruption, fall, and eviction. The Grapes of Wrath is the last of
these, and California is the garden lost. Steinbeck treats his birthplace as a
natural and imaginative fact. Although its specific locales and landscapes shape
the course of a story’s action, its location on a map of the mind converts it into a
kind of national or even global destiny, the end point of humanity’s incessant
“westering.” Steinbeck’s contribution to the literature of his nation and his
region is to discover ways in which the unique features and history of a place can
be discreetly raised up toward the status of myth. (Wyatt, “Introduction” to New
Essays on the Grapes of Wrath, 17.)
54
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which his mythic action exists become something other than the natural frontier out of
which it began. Americans still live in a “frontier world” and, as Emerson writes, “only
in the frontier spirit can we meet it.”

As a structural spatial metaphor, the frontier

excellently describes the American ideology that underlies perceptions of physical
space—it continues to define the context of the American dream myth as one of
expansion, abundance, opportunity, progress, and mobility.
And yet, The Grapes of Wrath insists that the literal frontier is exhausted. Indeed,
American authors have warned against a too literal reading of the frontier. In Philip
Roth’s 1997 novel, American Pastoral, we are given an explicit outline of the dangers
inherent in pastoral frontier idealism, and the novel emphasizes the importance of
“updating” one’s perception of American context within the twentieth century. Rather
than deal with the question of a literal versus a symbolic frontier space, Roth’s novel
instead pursues a representation of the ideal that underlies the old frontier myth, and
then proceeds to dispel the relevance of that ideal. American Pastoral describes the
danger of pastoral idealism—a landscape-based, “pre-cultural” ideal based on the raw,
fresh beginnings of the old world frontier imagination—and in doing so insists on the
importance of building one’s American dreams within the appropriate national context.
American Pastoral sets up an image of the American dream pursuit that rather
resembles the model (discussed earlier in chapter one) outlined by Walter Lippmann
that privileges past over future idealism: the novel’s hero attempts to retreat into a
simpler and more rural American life that is no longer a viable option in 1960s America.
Before considering the text at any length, it is necessary to first emphasize the inherent
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instability written into it: the narrator, Nathan “Skip” Zuckerman, imaginatively creates
the story of the novel from a handful of facts he comes to learn about the former athletic
hero of his Newark high school, Seymour “Swede” Levov. Within the context of the
novel, the story Zuckerman recounts is not true—it is an invented possibility that
Zuckerman uses to reflect on “[t]he tragedy of the man not set up for tragedy.”56 It is,
essentially, Zuckerman’s own attempt at working out the ambiguity of the American
dream. Zuckerman remembers the Swede as the all-American hero, “the household
Apollo of the Weequahic Jews”57 for whom the cheerleaders have their own cheer, and
in whom rests all the hopes of the previous generation. After his graduation, the Swede
marries Dawn Dwyer, the former Miss New Jersey and one time competitor in the Miss
America pageant, and joins his father’s glove factory, solidifying for himself an
idealistic, pastoral life.

But through a much later conversation with the Swede’s

younger brother at their forty-fifth high school reunion, Zuckerman learns that the
Swede’s teenage daughter was the infamous “Rimrock Bomber” who blew up the local
post office as a Vietnam War protest, killing a doctor, and causing her father
irreconcilable grief. It is this piece of information—that the one time god of Weequahic
High could be made to suffer tragedy—that spurs the rest of the novel, which becomes
Zuckerman’s attempt to suggest a plausible account of the Swede’s life. Zuckerman
relates, “To the honeysweet strains of ‘Dream,’ I pulled away from myself, pulled away
from the reunion, and I dreamed . . . I dreamed a realistic chronicle. I began gazing into
his life—not his life as a god or a demigod in whose triumphs one could exult as a boy
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but his life as another assailable man.”58 The Swede’s failure to maintain his ideal
American dream-like lifestyle is a fact to which Zuckerman has great difficulty
reconciling himself. The narrative thus stands as an extended attempt to make sense of
the senseless: the failure of the American dream in one for whom its success seemed
destined.
The Swede’s dream is not completely unattainable, but is rather something he
does achieve and enjoy in peace for half his life. By the very nature of its construction,
however, it is ultimately not sustainable (in his contemporary milieu) and so must
finally collapse. Swede Levov pursues a dream of pastoral idealism, a quiet, perfect,
and typically “American” existence that is altogether free of any cultural, social, even
economic complications.

It is for this reason that Zuckerman makes a point of

considering Swede apart from his Jewish identity, for he seems to manage a very
smooth and easy assimilation into mainstream (non-Jewish) Americanism. For one
thing, he presents a very atypical figure of a Jew: “Of the fair-complexioned Jewish
students in our preponderantly Jewish public high school, none possessed anything
remotely like the steep-jawed, insentient Viking mask of this blue-eyed blond born into
our tribe as Seymour Irving Levov.”59 Zuckerman constructs a story of the Swede’s
failure owing to an idealizational cause, not a straightforwardly ethnic one, because it is
one of the accomplishments of which the Swede can boast that he has overcome the preestablished limitations against him owing to his ethnic identity. Indeed, Zuckerman
can consider the collapse of the Swede’s dream precisely because the Swede had
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seemingly managed to overcome the cultural restrictions that might have worked
against him.

The narrator means to indicate an essential flaw in American dream

ideology, not merely an incidental one (as racial or ethnic restrictions undoubtedly are).
Hence Zuckerman writes, just before he begins constructing the Swede’s story,
I lifted onto my stage the boy we were all going to follow into America, our point
man into the next immersion, at home here the way the Wasps were at home
here, an American not by sheer striving, not by being a Jew who invents a
famous vaccine or a Jew on the Supreme Court, not by being the most brilliant or
the most eminent or the best. Instead—by virtue of his isomorphism to the Wasp
world—he does it the ordinary way, the natural way, the regular American-guy
way.60
Zuckerman means to construct an explanation for unprecedented failure. The Swede’s
Jewish identity, while always a fact in the novel, cannot be the explicit cause of his
failure; if it were, it simply would not be unprecedented.
The Swede’s pastoral idealism—Zuckerman’s invented cause for the Swede’s
failure— begins at an early age, and is evident when he first sees the house in which he
will later settle his family:
The stone house was not only engagingly ingenious-looking to his eyes—all that
irregularity regularized, a jigsaw puzzle fitted patiently together into this square,
solid thing to make a beautiful shelter—but it looked indestructible, an
impregnable house that could never burn to the ground and that had probably
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been standing there since the country began.

Primitive stones, rudimentary

stones of the sort that you would see scattered about among the trees if you took
a walk along the paths in Weequahic Park, and out there they were a house. He
couldn’t get over it.61
This description functions as a fine summary of the Swede’s sentiments and
expectations: he means to construct a primitive stronghold, built out of the very
substance of the American frontier, both ancient and enduring, and markedly antimodern. The house itself takes on a symbolic role as the image of success for the Swede
(in a manner very akin to Gatsby’s adoption of Daisy as the image of his success). We
are told that “The random design of the stones said ‘House’ to him”62 as no other house
(even his childhood home) ever could.

Not so much an instance of an idea, Old

Rimrock (the estate’s name) is the symbolic embodiment of what, for the Swede, a
house ought to be. It is not merely an empty structure, but is the product of the Swede’s
imaginative enhancements—it is garnished with the trappings of his idea of familial
serenity, right down to the image of the little girl “on a swing suspended from a low
branch of one of those big trees, swinging herself high into the air, just as happy, he
imagined, as a kid can be.”63 Old Rimrock is the place where the Swede can live out his
American dream of pastoral bliss. And indeed, the life Swede Levov constructs in this
house is exactly appropriate to the structure itself. It is a life founded on the dream of a
quiet, natural, and perfectly free and harmonious existence (this is the “New Eden”
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which the traditional frontier imagination pursues) cut off all but entirely from (indeed,
rigidly protected against) the then current social and political upheaval of the nation.
The primary action of Swede Levov’s life is set in the 1960s and early 1970s—a
time clearly marked by tremendous social and political activity. The Swede’s ideal life
is destroyed because he makes the attempt to live a life cut off from the larger context
outside of it, such that his daughter’s Vietnam War protest (a political fact the Swede
refuses to acknowledge), intrudes directly into his happy existence. As his brother Jerry
puts it, “His life was blown up by that bomb.” He goes on: “Seymour was into quaint
Americana. But the kid wasn’t. He took the kid out of real time and she put him right
back in. My brother thought he could take his family out of human confusion and into
Old Rimrock, and she put them right back in.”64 In a manner analogous to Gatsby’s
failure, ignored reality (here literally) explodes the ideal. Derek Parker Royal observes
that the Swede is unable to admit “the ambiguity underlying the American project.” He
goes on, saying of Swede Levov and Ira Ringold (of Roth’s I Married a Communist):
“Their attempts to discover their own American pastoral—a paradise free of ethnic,
economic, and political complications—prevents any awareness of the unflattering or
even malignant characteristics of their surroundings.”65 The Swede’s pastoral ideal fails

Ibid., 68-69.
This passage of Royal’s goes on to make comparisons to other American literary
figures, indicating thereby this American trend towards idealism: “Much like
Hawthorne’s Goodman Brown, who will not admit the darker side of the human heart;
much like Melville’s Ahab, who must know without any doubt the reality behind the
pasteboard masks; and much like Fitzgerald’s Gatsby, who refuses to see the more
sordid reality behind the green lights of Daisy’s dock, Swede Levov and Ira Ringold
attempt to live an idealized American life.” Royal, “Pastoral Dreams and National
Identity,” 202.
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because the very nature of that ideal to ignore all reality outside itself leaves it more
than a little vulnerable to the influences of those unacknowledged factors.
This flaw in the Swede’s American dream course is precisely that against which
Lippmann has expressly warned. Lippmann stresses that this tendency towards past
idealism, where men can theoretically be left alone to their own harmonic devices
(trusting that, as he originally defines the American dream, “the undisciplined man is
the salt of the earth”), is rooted in escapist desire. Human beings, Lippmann writes,
want fundamentally to be taken charge of by a “benevolent guardian, be it a ‘good man
in office’ or a perfect constitution, or the evolution of nature.” “If they have to think for
themselves,” he goes on, “they turn either to the past or to a distant future: but they
manage to escape the real effort of the imagination which is to weave a dream into the
turning present.”66 Swede Levov is rather a paradigm of Lippmann’s description of the
misinterpreted American impulse towards betterment.

As could be expected, the

construction of a pastoral world cut off from its contemporary reality results in the very
natural self-destruction of that world. To imaginatively weave a dream into the turning
present, as Lippmann describes it, is the difficult task in which the “true” American
dreamer must engage if he is to be really successful.
Yet Zuckerman finds some cause for mourning Swede’s destruction. His final
assessment adopts a more somber, even nostalgic tone in an attempt, it seems, to lift the
Swede from blame. Zuckerman says,
Yes, the breach had been pounded in their fortification, even out here in secure
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Old Rimrock, and now that it was opened it would not be closed again. They’ll
never recover. Everything is against them, everyone and everything that does
not like their life. All the voices from without, condemning and rejecting their
life!
And what is wrong with their life? What on earth is less reprehensible
than the life of the Levovs?67
The question Zuckerman poses here that finishes the novel is one that the novel has
already implicitly answered: there is nothing “reprehensible” about the Levovs in a
moral sense; they are merely anachronistic. The illusion (or dream) that they pursue is,
by nature of its historical context, resistant to reality, and so inevitably shatters in the
attempt to be realized. This is absolutely vital to our understanding of the American
dream, for the Swede’s idealistic misstep is an overt failure to recognize a significant
historical revision to the dominant national mythology of American dreaming. Set
some forty years after The Grapes of Wrath, the novel entails a different failure of pursuit.
Whereas the Joads are on the cusp of a changing national structure, and so are illequipped to “update” their dreams, the Levovs blithely ignore the more solidly
established world of their contemporary America. By the mid twentieth century, the
frontier imagination no longer delineates an ideal of endless new beginnings on a virgin
landscape. Rather, it delineates an American world teeming with opportunity and
spaces for advancement within the current national system.

The physical land of

America is still vital in the twentieth century, but not as a space of untouched and
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savage purity where a new Adam can thrive. Rather, it is conceived as an abundant
resource, taken advantage of now by industrial and technological forces that increase
the productivity of the land and create business and professional opportunities away
from the land, in cities. It is still the physical presence of America that allows the
American dream to persist, for the myth of the continent still describes a physical place
where opportunity for advancement exists (and this is why America continues to
experience high rates of immigration).
As a structuring metaphor, then, the frontier myth offers us a succinct
description of the national context within which the American dream operates. While
this imaginative conception of the landscape is only one particular version of mythic
space in America, it is the most comprehensive. In describing a literal experience, the
frontier depicts the nation as an abundant space of opportunity for the attainment of
American ideals, for it describes a literal space teeming with vegetation, fertile soil, and
resources, and free of the social and cultural constructions of the civilized world. Such
a place is an ideal backdrop for the action of the American Adam, whose Edenic ideal
closely resembles the real fact of the virgin American landscape. As such, the frontier
describes an idea, embodied in the landscape. But when the frontier closes and there is
no more open space to the west, the idea embodied in the frontier continues to function,
for that idea has become an integral part of the American consciousness. The populated,
industrialized, civilized American continent maintains the sense of identity derived
from early American articulations of the land, even as the appearances (indeed, the
facts) of that land undergo constant revision. And so the notion of America as the
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Golden Land of Opportunity is still very much alive, though mutated. The American
Adam is no longer the paradigm for heroism when we reach the twentieth century; his
action, set on the wilderness frontiers of early America, has been supplanted by that of
the self-made man (who is often a business model) who seeks his fortune amidst the
prolific opportunities of the city. But the American dream, subtly shifted, remains
essentially the same, and insofar as it is structured by an understanding of its action’s
context, this study of the frontier myth establishes the dominant metaphor according to
which the American dream finds contextual articulation. In short, the American dream
is always and only achievable in America, because the American continent, as described
by the myth, is the very physical place in which opportunity thrives.
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Chapter Four
Mythic Action:
The Private/Social Paradox of Upward Mobility
In the preceding discussions, we have been considering the American dream in
terms of its most straightforward narrative parts, and identifying underlying mythemic
tensions as central to these parts.

Every mythical narrative has three most basic

structuring principles: an actor (or hero), a setting (which delineates an entire mythic
universe), and an action (which denotes the primary accomplishment of the myth). In
the previous two chapters we have described the American mythic hero as the selfmade man, and the American mythic universe as the idyllic Golden Land of
Opportunity. Our concern here will be the characterization of the overarching action of
the American dream myth. We are accustomed to hearing the very common phrase,
“upward mobility,” in the context of American dream discussions, and this phrase
clearly describes the prevalent action of the American dream, for it emphasizes
movement from one socio-economic sphere to another, “better” one. Nevertheless, the
phrase “upward mobility” is especially noncommittal, for while it seems to imply
whatever sense we attach to it, it concretely describes nothing. In fact, the progressive
action of the American dream occurs according to a very definite set of rules and
expectations, though the language with which we describe it leaves it open to a great
deal of personal interpretation. This seems to be always the case with the American
dream, and in fact we might claim that the dream’s historical persistence is owing to the
very looseness with which this established ideal is commonly described—it creates the
illusion that the American dream is always personally constructed, and therefore
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always a unique personal ideal. The action described by the American dream myth is a
continuing attainment of increasing success. As such, this action is never completed,
though it is constantly becoming more and more complete—much like an infinite
approach to a consistently receding goal (we can call to mind here the concluding lines
of Fitzgerald’s Gatsby). Because success is never fully accomplished, the American
dream continues to hold relevance for every American, whatever their socio-economic
station. Our understanding of this mythic action depends wholly on our understanding
of the American idea of success, and the perpetual motion that this idea implies.
The idea of success in America is complicated, because it describes two separate
and often competing spheres of action: the public and the private. The American dream
guarantees the opportunity for any given individual’s material rise (often at the expense
of another individual), while at the same time it encourages progress on a national level
according to a set of communal ideals. Public and private progress need not necessarily
be at odds with one another according to the model of the American dream, yet they
often are, owing to the looseness of interpretation for which the dream allows. Progress
in America, conceived on a private scale, is most commonly associated with increasing
wealth—it has a definite material referent. Celeste McLeod writes that “Money is the
key word to the history of the United States.” Our understanding of the American
dream—as both an abstract and a material ideal—has been and is still deeply tied to the
attainment of wealth. McLeod continues, citing some early sources to emphasize the
long-term persistence of this ideal:
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Long before the colonies became an independent nation, the desire for wealth
was already a national obsession. “The only principle of life propagated among
the young people is to get money, and men are only esteemed according to what
they are worth—that is, the money they are possessed of,” an observer in New
York City reported in 1784.

A century later the French traveler Alexis de

Tocqueville noted this same quality: “In America then everyone finds facilities,
unknown elsewhere, for making or increasing his fortune. The spirit of gain is
always on the stretch, and the human mind, constantly diverted from pleasures
of imagination and the labours of the intellect, is there swayed by no impulse but
the pursuit of wealth.”1
What we see here is that historical observers have always perceived the importance of
wealth to American society. Indeed, wealth has been the dominant understanding of
success in America.2 It is not just the attainment of wealth that is emphasized in this
passage, though; it is the increasing attainment of wealth. The American dream is about
sustained gain, such that its action is never accomplished for an individual. “Success,”
MacLeod, Horatio Alger, Farewell, 8.
To emphasize this point, MacLeod lists many of the success manuals that sprung up in
the nineteenth century, for their titles attest to the prevalence of the American cult of
success as wealth:
Some manuals had the word “success” in their titles; others used “rich” or
“money.” Thus were The Foundations of Success (1843), Elements of Success (1848),
Success in Business (1867), The Secret of Success in Life (1873), The Elements of Success
(1873), another Success in Business (1875), Successful Folk (1878), How to Succeed
(1882), Successful Men of Today and What They Say of Success (1883), The Law of
Success (1885), Success in Life (1885), Keys to Success (1898), Successward (1899), The
Atainment of Success (1907), How to Get Rich (1866), Money and How to Make It
(1872), The Art of Making Money (1872), Money for the Million (1872), On the Road to
Riches (1876), How to Become Rich (1878), and The Art of Money Getting (1882).
(MacLeod, Horatio Alger, Farewell, 9)
1
2
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then, is not a fixed goal towards which Americans strive, but is rather a receding goal
always defined relative to one’s current socio-economic standing.
And yet, success in America is also defined as relative to another’s socio-economic
standing, such that a wealthier and more prominent citizen sets a standard for those
who have attained lesser degrees of success (conceived socio-economically). 3 This
dynamic of large-scale relativism becomes more complex when we consider the extent
to which one individual’s rise always affects another’s, or may even be dependent on
another’s decline.

MacLeod notes the tension in this dynamic, describing an

atmosphere in which opportunity exists for all, but also a labor structure that forces the
subjugation of the poor for the service of the rich. She writes,
But the super-rich were not the only people who prospered, one can argue; the
average immigrant fared better in America than he or she would have back home.
There is no doubt that immigration to the United States brought opportunity and
money to millions at all points along the economic spectrum. But there is also no
doubt that the wealth of the super-rich depended in large part on cheap labor.
Millions of workers remained in poverty in order that a few people might

This idea is succinctly presented in Sinclair Lewis’ Babbitt, which serves as a quaint
depiction of upper middle-class mobility and its accompanying dissatisfactions. In one
passage, we are given a detailed account of some guests whom Babbitt has over for
dinner. The evening is one of great frustration for Babbitt, because his guests are well
below Babbitt’s own social station. He tolerates their presence, therefore, but vows
never to invite them over again because they are so below them. Not much later in the
novel, Babbitt and his wife attend an acquaintance’s home as guests, and they are
treated in the same way that Babbitt treated his previous guests: the Babbitts are below
the station of their hosts, and so will never be invited to return. The juxtaposition of
these scenes is ironic, of course, and demonstrates the importance of relative social
standing to people’s own sense of success.
3
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prosper. The men and women who worked in the factories, mines, and railroads
of the titans had scant opportunity to exchange rags for riches; they were lucky if
they could feed and clothe their children on what they earned for ten to fourteen
hours of labor each day.

Frugality was a necessity, not a virtue, for these

workers who were exempt from the American dream.4
This dynamic is hard to reconcile, for it insists on universal opportunity for Americans
within a context of forced cheap labor. Thus, while some citizens do indeed rise, their
rise appears to necessitate the socio-economic decline of others.5 In the end, we see that
the relativist nature of success in America (that one’s attainment of success is relative to
oneself and others, and so endless) breeds a competitive spirit that resists the larger
public ideal of universal liberty and equality.6

Ibid., 13-14.
J. B. Bury comments on this fact that seems to undercut the doctrine of progress in his
seminal book on the subject, The Idea of Progress. He writes,
But against all this technical progress, with the enormous expansion of industry
and commerce, dazzling to the man in the market-place when he pauses to
reflect, have to be set the exploitation and sufferings of industrial workers, the
distress of intense economic competition, the heavier burdens of preparation for
modern war. The very increase of “material ease” seemed unavoidably to
involve conditions inconsistent with universal happiness; and the
communications which linked the peoples of the world together modified the
methods of warfare instead of bringing peace. (Bury, The Idea of Progress, 332)
6 This is the large-scale dynamic of John Dos Passos’ comprehensive USA Trilogy. Over
the course of three novels, the narrative develops many, many protagonists who
demonstrate a great deal of diversity in their separate American pursuits, and yet these
distinct American actions are all unified under the same general American ideas of
progress, success, effort, and money. In short, the trilogy demonstrates an abundance
of American action, constantly reaching for the commonality amongst all the American
diversity. Its context, though, is a sharply capitalist, industrially and technologically
innovative, and turmoil-driven America. In describing such a world of extreme
mobility, communication, and economic determination, Dos Passos creates characters
4
5
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For while socio-economic definitions of individual success prevail in America,
for all individuals, the humanitarian ideals promoted by the nation outline a very
different version of political success. The American project is fundamentally a
governmental experiment whose end is the promotion of a more just civil society. For
this reason, the American nation outlines its larger ideals in terms of humanitarian
justice: all men are entitled to certain rights, which they possess by nature, and it is the
sole purpose of government to ensure that these rights are upheld. But the rights
guaranteed by the American government—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
most notably—are often in direct tension with the social milieu in which the action of
the American dream is accomplished. In short, the accomplishment of the American
dream, for a few individuals, at times necessitates the suspension of nationally inherent
rights (as when the vast majority of African Americans are literally enslaved in order to
promote the success of Southern agrarianism and to generate wealthy plantation
holders, for instance).

We are confronted, now, with the mythemic tension that

structures the American dream action: public and private models of success in America
do not function together harmoniously; and yet, strangely, both continue to function
integrally in the American consciousness.
Everett Carter describes two seminal documents that separately detail these
private and public lines of pursuit, locating a model for the individual’s advancement in
Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography, and a model for social development outlined in the

who, collectively, demonstrate this dynamic of relative and competitive American
society.
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Declaration of Independence. These two documents together, he writes, embody the
practice of the myth:
The Declaration summarized the colonists’ belief in the essential goodness of
man and nature, in the value of common sense, in the ability of men
everywhere—after having been put in possession of a correct knowledge of the
facts—to know the truth; Franklin’s Autobiography proclaimed the possibilities of
the individual as he is organized into societies of his own making and his own
choice. Together, Jefferson’s Declaration and Franklin’s Autobiography constitute
the classic statements of the way in which American culture has generally made
sense of the universe and of man’s place in it: the style, the myth, the dream, the
official faith, or whatever other terms we choose to depict the “imaginative idea
which—whatever its truth—induces men to feel and act.”7
Carter goes on to emphasize the very concrete meaning of these texts, first by dissecting
the language of the Declaration of Independence to demonstrate that the document
reads as an analytical statement of American values. The document famously identifies
three very secular human rights—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. “Here,”
writes Carter, “frankly and openly, human well-being—by implication the basic fleshly,
as well as spiritual delights—was idolized as the end and object of all human
organization.” 8 Moreover, Benjamin Franklin made a slight alteration to the text,
dropping the phrase, “We hold these truths to be sacred” in favor of the more
scientifically axiomatic, “We hold these truths to be self-evident.” This simple edit
7
8

Carter, The American Idea, 30-1.
Ibid, 32.
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loads the phrase with secular rather than spiritual idealism and firmly roots the
American consciousness in the scientific (experimental and experiential) tradition. In
promoting a view of humanity as innately possessed of certain inalienable rights
(liberty and equality), the American government establishes a new ideal for social
organization—one which sets everyone on an equal plane where they can freely pursue
happiness. But general human betterment (in a social context) is always the overt goal
here. In assuring the universal distribution of inherent rights, America accomplishes
the existence of those very ideals, which is to say that the belief in and practice of
equality breeds real equality. A belief in the inevitability and value of human progress
erupts naturally out of this discussion, for the nation is committed to the sustained and
increasing guarantee of these rights, and has been historically invested in expanding the
nation’s parameters for an increasingly more widespread distribution of these inherent
human rights.9
Sacvan Bercovitch describes the importance of a progressive view to the
formation of early American culture, in his seminal work, Ideology and Classic American
Literature. I quote it here at length:
But we cannot begin to account for the powerful grip that the progressive
viewpoint has had on the minds of Americans if we think of it only as an
expression of narrow class interests. Quite apart from its manifest usefulness to
enterprising capitalists, the idea of history as a record of progress was attractive
Because these rights are conceived as inherently human, rather than inherently
American, the American nation has felt a certain entitlement—indeed, a responsibility to
humanity—to guarantee, as much as possible, the universal (global) possession of these
rights.
9
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to many other Americans for many other reasons. To begin with, it was—is—
intrinsically appealing. Its implicit confidence in human rationality is flattering
enough but its cosmic hopefulness, when joined, as it had been by the philosophes
of the Enlightenment, with the idea of liberation from the oppressive rule of
monarchs, aristocrats, and priests—which is to say, with a vision of a more just
and egalitarian society—lends the idea of progress the enormously gratifying
quality of unconstrained moral generosity. To believe that things are, or soon
will be, getting better for most people was particularly desirable in a culture
freeing itself from the strong hold of Calvinism and its tortuous, finally
hypocritical way of justifying self-centered behavior. The belief in progress not
only helped to assuage the guilt arising from self-concern, it gave selfadvancement a warrant of innocence. In nineteenth-century America, indeed,
the progressive world view provided a kind of conceptual umbrella for a large
cluster of prevalent attitudes: the imperatives of the quasi-religious work ethic;
the idea that equality of opportunity, or upward social mobility, was available to
any industrious (white male) adult; and the distinctive millennial fantasies
nurtured by evangelical Protestantism.10
Owing to a variety of historical circumstances, America was ripe for the adoption of a
progressive

worldview,

and

belief

in

progress

consequently

organizes

our

understanding of experience in America. The American dream, in fact, is overtly a

10

Bercovitch, Ideology and Classic American Literature, 40-41.
158

progressive ideal, for it encourages steadily increasing progress for the individual and
for society.
Of course, the sense of the term “progress” here is quite specific, referring to the
steadily increasing attainment of social human rights. The nation does not exist for the
purpose of perpetual advancement of itself, but rather for the sustained guarantee that
its citizens might ever approach a more naturally complete version of themselves. This
is accomplished in America by an insistence on social equality, and in fact the doctrine
of equality propounded in America is supposed to be the very definition of progress,
according to the theorist J. B. Bury in his important book, The Idea of Progress. Bury
describes de Tocqueville’s endorsement of equality as the new end of human progress,
writing that
Among the competing theories of the time, and sharply opposed to the views of
Comte, was the idea, derived from the Revolution, that the world is moving
towards universal equality and the obliteration of class distinctions, that this is
the true direction of Progress. This view, represented by leaders of the popular
movement against the bourgeois ascendency, derived powerful reinforcement
from one of the most enlightened political thinkers of the day. The appearance of
de Tocqueville’s renowned study of American democracy was the event of 1834.
He was convinced that he had discovered on the other side of the Atlantic the
answer to the question whither the world is tending. In American society he
found that equality of conditions is the generating fact on which every other fact
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depends. He concluded that equality is the goal of humanity, providentially
designed.11
If we adopt de Tocqueville’s perceptions of American culture, we see clearly that in
executing a design of social equality (ordered towards universal liberty), America is
identifying itself as a progressive nation. In the global context of Bury’s study, this
identification amounts to America’s revision of the historical paradigm of progress. In
the context of our own study here, we see that the humanitarian progressive ideal of
equality is the end implied in the American dream pursuit—or at least one of them.
The notion of equality is obviously in direct tension with the notion of a competitive
economy and a relative sense of one’s own wealth: these features depend on the
disparity between individuals, not their equality. We will have to consider the dynamic
engendered by the coexistence of these competing American goals.
First off, we must clarify the meaning of equality within this context.

As a

political ideal in America, equality refers to a level playing field of opportunity for all
individuals, rather than a general sameness of station. Traditionally, these senses of
equality have been termed “equality of opportunity” and “equality of condition.”12
When we make this distinction, it is intended to emphasize that all Americans are only
equal in the sense that they all have an equal opportunity to pursue their innate and
inalienable rights.13 This does not mean that they will all attain the same rewards and
favors for their effort; it only means that all Americans—regardless of any inherited
Bury, The Idea of Progress, 315.
As referenced in Parks, Capitalism in Early American Literature, 93.
13 Or, in other words, all Americans have an equal opportunity to pursue the American
dream.
11
12
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conditions—are given an equal chance to seek success (because all are equally entitled
to do so, and because the opportunities for advancement are presumably so abundant).
It has long been clear that America is a land of equality of opportunity and not of
condition. Andrew Jackson himself makes this distinction clear in a veto of the charter
of the Bank of the United States, writing:
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of
government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist
under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth
cannot be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of
Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is
equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to
these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities,
and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful,
the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who
have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors themselves, have a
right to complain of the injustice of their Government… If [government] would
confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors
alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified
blessing.14
Jackson is here disparaging the practice of conferring titles, and all such similar acts of
nepotism and the granting of other unfair advantages.

14
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But he is very clear, in

denouncing these unjust practices, that establishing such an equality of opportunity is
very different from establishing a real equality of condition.
That an equality of condition has never existed in America should be clear; the
establishment of a real equality of opportunity has itself been a constant and ongoing
struggle. Esmond Wright nicely characterizes the complex duality of supposed and real
equality in America, highlighting some of the key discrepancies that stand out in
American history. He writes,
In the New World as in the Old, equality meant equality of chance, not equality
of reward; diversity of racial and economic origins could produce unrest and
violence, as in the lynching of Negroes or in the War Between the States; nor has
equality of opportunity been matched by easy acceptance of differences of color
or of religion or of taste; the price of diversity of origins has been to stress
conformity rather than individualism, the normal rather than the eccentric.15
This is an interesting conclusion that Wright draws out of the American emphasis on
equality: it breeds conformity.

And yet, he insists, it breeds a unique brand of

multicultural conformity, for “where differences [between cultures] could be reconciled,
the life of the nation has been deepened and enriched and made distinct from any other
by the infinite variety of its component stocks.”16 It seems that Wright is refraining
from adopting a definite position here, for he emphasizes a kind of “diverse
conformity,” if we can understand such a thing. Suffice it to say, for this discussion,
that the sense of equality in America is one of opportunity, and that the promotion of
15
16
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equality of opportunity has the effect of consolidating citizens towards a unified
purpose.17
Because socially progressive movement in America is always towards a
supposed “better” (human) position, progress in America is a virtue by which humans
fulfill their natural ends.

Economic prosperity and material luxury are not the

progressive ends implied here—at least not directly. This enterprise is more idealistic,
privileging increased equality and liberty as the hallmarks of “natural” progress. And
yet, in assuring a right to the pursuit of happiness as well, the Declaration of
Independence makes a strikingly vague statement. Perhaps we can assume, given that
the Declaration is steeped in the classical tradition, that happiness carries a definite
Aristotelian reference to a composed and dutiful life of virtue—happiness is the
tenuous balance between vicious extremes.

In failing to really set a definitional

boundary for the term, however, “happiness” becomes no more than “one’s personal

Lawrence Chenoweth argues, in The American Dream of Success, that the American
success ethic clearly privileges individuals who are successful, and so encourages
supremacy over equality. He writes,
Why do so many citizens fail to see the elitist orientation of success ideologists?
At its root, the success ethic encourages supremacy, not equality. Articles in
Reader’s Digest and The Saturday Evening Post regularly praised successful figures
who rose “to the top” or were “the best in the world.” To be sure, Americans
point with pride to their tendency to root for the underdog. In doing so,
however, they reveal an interest in the struggling achiever rather than the
downtrodden. If the underdog succeeds, he is praised; if he fails, he is soon
forgotten. (Chenoweth, The American Dream of Success, 10)
It is not really surprising that a success ethic would privilege the successful; this only
seems natural. But, in privileging those who do accomplish their socio-economic goals,
the success ethic does not promote supremacy over equality. Rather, it has consistently
used success stories in order to stress the importance of general equality of opportunity.
At any rate, failure to succeed does not strip one of their equal opportunity to pursue
success.
17
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idea of happiness,” and this is the point at which material fortune can easily become
emblematic of real, American progress.18 Indeed, absolute luxury, social position, and
financial freedom can easily be taken for the virtuous conclusion of human progress—
hence these trappings hold such importance for contemporary American culture.19
Let us be careful, however, not to completely demonize the socio-economic
paradigm of the American dream, whatever social evils have no doubt sprung from it.
As we saw in our discussion of the self-made man, concrete wealth is not necessarily at
odds with the nineteenth-century moral American hero.

Rather, wealth almost

functions as a testament to his heroism and as an indication of his eternal salvation.
This is because, in the nineteenth century, wealth is rooted in the ethic of the
industrious worker. George Cotkin discusses a turn-of-the-century paradigm shift that
impacts our discussion here, for it involves a cultural re-conception of the success-aswealth paradigm. Cotkin writes,
The success ideal, whether in the hands of Carnegie, Alger, Conwell, or Whitaker,
was predicated on an image of American society as open to change yet
As we have seen over and over again, the basic ambiguity inherent in the American
dream is what allows myriad versions of the myth to persist. Socio-economic progress
is one dominant version of the myth.
19 We see a hint of this transition—from ideal to material paradigms of progress—in the
alteration of “property” for “the pursuit of happiness” in early drafts of the Declaration
of Independence. The 1774 Declaration of Colonial Rights enumerates “life, liberty, and
property” as the inalienable human rights guaranteed by the government. Of course,
when the Declaration of Independence appears, these rights have been revised to read,
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Replacing a natural right to property with
a natural right to happiness implies some similarity between the two terms: in some
sense, property ownership was identifiable with the pursuit of happiness. The pursuit
of happiness is ultimately used, presumably, because it is a more inclusive term. We
must be aware, though, that the pursuit of happiness in this context does not merely
connote a humanitarian ideal; it also must connote a material one.
18

164

dependent on fixed moral values. These merchants of success literature might be
seen as having pandered to a crass materialism that some cultural custodians
found at the root of American cultural decay.

But actually, these authors

stressed the social utility of wealth. Their beliefs were firmly rooted in the ethos
of the producer. It was the responsibility of both the capitalist and the worker,
they maintained, to give fair value for the money invested in either products or
labor. Pride came from production; production was the source of pleasure and
wealth. Success did not come overnight; it was a result of carefully cultivated
habits, along with a dose of luck. But these ideals, rooted in the producer ethic,
were already under siege by the late 1880s as a new ethic, based on consumerism,
gained popularity and became a cultural force of immense proportions.20
We will discuss this new ethic of consumer culture in the next chapter, but for now let
us concern ourselves with the sense of wealth that inheres in the nineteenth century.
We see in Cotkin’s discussion that, for the early proponents of this success-as-wealth
ethic, wealth appears as the very natural result of moral effort. It is not the sole end of
the American’s pursuit, but neither is it a negligible one. Rather, wealth is the natural
reward for industrious labor, and the wealthy individual (who acquires his fortune
according to the moral paradigm of the self-made man) will use his wealth for the
general benefit of society (ideally). Whether or not this paradigm is met in fact, the
persistence of it as an ideal attests to a dominant understanding of wealth in nineteenthcentury America. When wealth becomes the direct and primary object of the American

20
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dream pursuit in the twentieth century, this is due in large part to this nineteenthcentury understanding of it that sustains a sense of wealth’s inherent respectability.
We see these material goals taking precedence more clearly when we survey the
individualistic statement of American idealism found in Franklin’s Autobiography,
which establishes the paradigm for the self-made man narrative in America. Franklin
repeatedly emphasizes human industry as the hallmark virtue of the American success
story; notably, such success is marked by social affluence and material prosperity. We
will not give great attention to Franklin’s text here, as it has been discussed in a
previous chapter, but it is necessary to emphasize the importance of Franklin’s
autobiography to the national paradigm for the attainment of success.

If the

Declaration of Independence is idealistic, then Franklin’s Autobiography is no less so.
Clearly, though, these texts belong to wholly different genres (the one being a public
national statement, the other a personal narrative). As such, they accomplish very
different ends, but they nevertheless work in harmony towards the production of a
unified national project—as Carter says, the one document outlining a social mission,
and the other an individual’s concrete pursuit of what that mission delineates. The
Declaration, then, asserts a set of standards ordered to the accomplishment of social
betterment via an emphasis on individual betterment (often figured in terms of socioeconomic prosperity), while Franklin’s Autobiography details a historical individual’s
material rise, which rise is accompanied with appropriate acts of social benevolence.
Franklin was himself acutely aware that private material reward is an essential
spur to industry, and so is ultimately necessary for general social well-being. Lynn A.
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Parks quotes Franklin, from a 1784 letter to Benjamin Vaughan, in her discussion of the
topic:
Suppose we include in the Definition of Luxury all unnecessary Expence, and
then let us consider whether Laws to prevent such Expence are possible to be
executed in a great Country, and whether, if they could be executed, our People
generally would be happier, or even richer. Is not the hope of being one day able
to purchase and enjoy Luxuries a great Spur to Labour and Industry? May not
Luxury, therefore, produce more than it consumes, if without such a Spur People
would be, as they are naturally enough included to be, lazy and indolent?21
Parks comments: “This sentiment echoes the hard lesson learned by the leaders of the
Jamestown and Plymouth colonies, the lesson that self-interest is a strong driving force
which needs to be properly harnessed for the good of both the individual and the
community.”22 According to the ideal standard, personal material reward drives the
individual to increase production, and that increased production contributes to the
general good of society.

Hence, in theory, the national paradigm guarantees an

individual’s right to self-betterment, while the exemplary self-made man text
emphasizes the individual’s responsibility to social betterment—the end result being a
simultaneous private and public progressive movement.

This harmonious socio-

political ideal, however, is seldom actually accomplished. Rather, mis-interpretations of
these ideals encourage an individual to adopt completely self-interested modes of socioeconomic increase, while the larger political ideal of social betterment tends to
21
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denounce individual success, which so often is only reached at the socio-economic cost
of others. We are confronted with a problem, quite simply put, of whether to privilege
progress on an individual or a social scale, since these ends are so frequently contrary.
The American dream, of course, casually asserts that they are not contrary, but rather
that they harmoniously work together towards an increasingly better society, which
society is composed of increasingly better citizens. This public/private tension, which
the myth of the American dream calls no tension at all, is the primary mythemic
relation relevant to our discussion of progress as the prevalent action of the American
dream.
The tension that may exist between a public good and a personal success is the
single most disruptive quality of the American dream, for it is at this juncture that even
as one American dreamer advances towards fulfillment, an entire group of collective
strivers must then fail as a direct consequence of the individual’s success. Indeed, each
citizen’s progress has a definite impact on the whole socio-economic order of things,
either locally or, in the case of extreme increase, nationally or even globally. Frank
Norris explores this peculiar nature of consequential success with the coherent and
impressive symbol of the Chicago wheat-trading pit in his aptly titled novel, The Pit.
Norris’ novel consists of two narrative actions and both revolve around respective
metaphorical “pits.” While Curtis Jadwin negotiates the economic terrain of the wheat
trade (figured prominently as a sucking whirlpool), his wife, Laura, circles the
emotional abyss of her increasingly solitary married life. We will concern ourselves, for
the purposes of this discussion, with the narrative action of Curtis Jadwin.
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Jadwin is consistently and clearly depicted as the novel’s hero—as an American
hero—for his brilliant ability to single-handedly gain and manage control of the entire
American wheat industry. His virtue (if we call it such) is, quite simply, economic
savvy. As Ernest Marchand writes, “Jadwin is unquestionably the hero of The Pit.
However Norris deplored the economic consequences of speculation, he could not
withhold his admiration from Jadwin for his boldness, his energy, his resource, and the
magnificent scope of his designs.”23 Jadwin’s action throughout the novel, while it is
always tending more and more to his ultimate downfall, is marked by terrific,
extraordinary rise. This material ascension is concretely embodied in the rising value of
wheat, such that the cost of wheat comes to signify Jadwin’s real value as an individual.
Put another way, the novel sets up a one-to-one correspondence between the value of
wheat and the measure of Jadwin’s life, such that he is entirely defined by his material
standing. (Incidentally, the fact that Jadwin’s career functions in this way is the direct
and immediate cause of his wife’s own ongoing flirtation with tragedy.) The first half
of the novel sets the stage for Jadwin’s great feat—cornering the wheat market—by
demonstrating his more minor, always successful, trades, through which he amasses his
great fortune. Indeed, the first half of the novel paints a lovely portrait of American
success, securing for Jadwin a fortune comparable to any of the wealthiest of Americans.
Having amassed this great fortune, and having all of the appropriate trappings to
signify it (Gretry, Jadwin’s right-hand broker, aptly remarks on Jadwin’s great Central
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Park house, “I suppose, now, it all represents a pretty big pot of money”24), he sets out
for even greater success. Progress, in the American spirit, must be unending, and so
while Jadwin already has every material luxury he could possibly attain, his “work” is
never finished. Jadwin is not defined by the materiality of his great fortune, which is
why his character is so interesting. Rather, he is defined by the far less material, far
more constructed and slippery, value of wheat. What this essentially means is that the
value of wheat is not representative for Jadwin— in the sense that it does not represent
things he can purchase or otherwise do with money. He already has everything he
could buy.

Rather, the value of wheat is directly indicative of the total worth of

Jadwin’s whole life.

Hence cornering the wheat market, which is financially

unnecessary for Jadwin, is his single greatest accomplishment. William B. Dillingham
argues that Jadwin “speculates not because he wants money but because of his
instinctive urge to gamble and, through chance, control and master.”25 Dillingham is
right to emphasize control as the primary object of Jadwin’s enterprise (and Jadwin is
not obsessed with gambling (speculation) for its own sake, but rather because it brings
him this control and power).

The rising value of wheat—which is the rising value of

Jadwin himself—comes from the exercise of this power, and so Jadwin’s corner of the
wheat market essentially allows him socio-economic self-determination.26

Norris, The Pit, 115.
Dillingham, Frank Norris, 81.
26 Socio-economic self-determination is arguably the greatest accomplishment that an
American dreamer can boast, for it represents the pinnacle of success detached from
external influence. In other words, it amounts to socio-economic freedom, because it
assigns a status that is not relatively determined.
24
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Jadwin’s successful wheat enterprise is a direct result of his ability to identify a
clear opportunity and to act on it. An abundant wheat crop drives the price of wheat
down (from roughly ninety cents per bushel to sixty cents). Jadwin is able to anticipate
that this abundant wheat crop will be followed by a terribly sparse one, and so he acts
quickly and diligently to purchase—all on his own—the entire May wheat crop in
America. When wheat fails in nearly every other country around the world, Jadwin
then holds a grossly controlling interest in the entire global supply of wheat, literally
keeping huge warehouses full of the wheat that he now owns. Consequently, the price
of wheat steadily climbs from sixty cents per bushel to a dollar and fifty cents, for
Jadwin now controls the wheat crop and may set the price wherever he sees fit:
Then at last the news of the great corner, authoritative, definite, went out over all
the country, and promptly the figure and name of Curtis Jadwin loomed
suddenly huge and formidable in the eye of the public. There was no wheat on
the Chicago market. He, the great man, the “Napolean of La Salle Street,” had it
all. He sold it or hoarded it, as suited his pleasure. He dictated the price to those
men who must buy it of him to fill their contracts. His hand was upon the
indicator of the wheat dial of the Board of Trade, and he moved it though as
many or as few of the degrees of the circle as he chose.27
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This moment in the novel—the point at which Jadwin has a genuine and indisputable
control of the nation’s wheat—marks the point of Jadwin’s ultimate greatness.28 As
wheat reaches its inevitable ceiling of value, though, so also does Jadwin. There is no
place to go except for downward, for Jadwin cannot continue to increase the cost of
wheat (new crops begin to come in, and he cannot possibly purchase all of this new
wheat29), and nor can he sell off the entire stock he has at a profit. At the height of his
success, Jadwin cannot see the ceiling. He remarks to Gretry:
…I’m going to swing this deal right over into July. Think I’m going to let go now,
when I’ve just begun to get a real grip on things? A pretty fool I’d look like to
get out now—even if I could. Get out? How are we going to unload our big line

Jadwin’s great accomplishment here is rooted in the symbol of the wheat-trading pit,
a symbol that Barbara Hochman finds is “among the most vital symbols in Norris’s
work.” She writes,
The Wheat Pit may be taken, first of all, as the ground upon which both Jadwin
and Laura struggle for a form through which to affirm and stabilize themselves.
For Jadwin, obviously, the Pit—the actual, literal Wheat Pit at the Board of
Trade—becomes the arena within which he tests his capacity to predict and
impose his will upon the future price of wheat. He would second-guess and
dominate “the very Earth itself” (374) and by so doing would assert the
incomparable superiority of his knowledge, his clarity of vision, and his capacity
to exercise control over men and events. (Hochman, The Art of Frank Norris, 99,
101)
In this sense the pit, which is an overtly tragic symbol, is the ground on which Jadwin
attempts to exercise absolute socio-economic power. Jadwin’s action represents a kind
of culminating American dream action; it fails because in the end, as always, this kind
of final success recedes away from Jadwin.
29 Indeed, the new crops coming in are abundant. Because Jadwin has driven up the
price of wheat, he has created a huge economic boon across the nation. Consequently,
wheat farmers are getting wealthier every day, and so they continue to plant more
wheat. As a result, there is simply too much wheat for Jadwin to purchase on his own.
28
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of wheat without breaking the price on us? No, sir, not much. This market is
going up to two dollars.30
Of course, the market cannot sustain a wheat value of two dollars per bushel, and with
the onset of new crops Jadwin’s competitors are able to work together to drive the price
of wheat down to a more standard cost, which amounts to the total devastation of
Jadwin’s financial standing, leaving him with absolutely nothing. In the true American
spirit, Jadwin and his wife desert their extravagant home and their many possessions
and luxuries, heading out West for a fresh start, and so the novel concludes.
The time during which Jadwin holds a corner on the wheat market, though, has
abundant and vast consequences on the national and global economies in which he is
operating. While Jadwin’s economic corner amounts to certain devastation for the
wealthy traders in the pit, it amounts to something quite different for the average
American citizen.

Jadwin’s corner is accompanied with a huge economic boon

throughout the nation, for the value of wheat is now so high that those who grow and
sell it are doing wonderfully. One representative of the wheat growers enters the pit to
give an address:
He explained that all through the Middle West, all through the wheat belts, a
great wave of prosperity was rolling because of Jadwin’s corner. Mortgages
were being paid off, new and improved farming implements were being sought,
new areas seeded, new live stock acquired. The men were buying buggies again,
the women parlour melodeons, houses and homes were going up—in short, the
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entire farming population of the Middle West was being daily enriched. In a
letter that Jadwin received about this time from an old fellow living in “Bates
Corners,” Kansas, occurred the words,—
“—and, sir, you must know that not a night passes that my little girl, now
going on seven, sir, and the brightest in her class in the county seat grammar
school, does not pray to have God bless Mister Jadwin, who helped papa save
the farm.”31
Interestingly, here, Jadwin’s appropriation of such extraordinary wealth really does
mark him as an American hero—both in terms of his displaying typically American
qualities of business and economic heroism, and by virtue of his having “saved” the
majority of the American farming population.
This dynamic of large-scale economic consequence is precisely that with which
we are concerned here.

Jadwin is an individual success-seeker in the midst of a

collective society of similar success-seekers, and a rampantly capitalist economic
structure dominates these characters’ actions. Consequently, Jadwin is at once a great
American hero of the people and a monstrous threat to the consolidated wealth of the
nation. His power over the wheat market is, in effect, a power to make poor men
wealthy and wealthy men poor, and in a few instances he exercises this power directly
on specific individuals. This large-scale economic fluidity is markedly American, so
that our American hero (Jadwin himself) is one who can single-handedly alter the value
of a resource at his personal discretion. Jadwin is not merely powerful because he is
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incredibly wealthy; rather, his very power rests in his control of the wealth all around
him. And, true to the stock history of the American hero, Jadwin’s own personal rise to
extravagant wealth has its humblest roots in mid-Western farm life.

As Joseph

McElrath writes, “Curtis is a country boy who came to Chicago for the resolute pursuit
of the American Dream. He has made a killing in real-estate ventures and, still a young
man, is the verification of the Franklinesque success myth.”32 It is, then, in a typically
(i.e. paradigmatic) “American” way that Jadwin rises from impoverished obscurity to
renowned wealth, and onward to absolute control of his trading industry. It is the
capitalist economic system that allows for this rise, and it is in the capitalist economic
system that we find the overarching tension between public and private interests.
The character of Jadwin remains consistently sympathetic throughout the
novel—we hope for his success and mourn his inevitable failure. Written with direct
reference to classical models of the tragic hero, Jadwin’s character comes to embody an
economic vision of America that ultimately cannot be sustained. Jadwin is instantly
recognizable as a great man, “though not preeminently good;” he has a distinct and
defining tragic flaw, which amounts to economic hubris (or pride); and his great fall is
not due to vice or depravity, but to a great error in judgment. Like the classical tragic
hero, he is relatable because he is at once great and flawed. As Marchand describes him,
“Unlike Shelgrim [of Norris’ The Octopus] he is no austere and inscrutable figure, no
shadowy presence everywhere felt as the moving power behind events but seldom seen.
He is exhibited in a human and sympathetic light with all his foibles and weaknesses;
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we hear his familiar speech, we see him in his shirtsleeves.”33 Because his character
functions according to a classical model of tragedy, Jadwin’s actions similarly carry
appropriate social ramifications (in the sense that social tragedy is classically embodied
and explored through the dramatic action of a tragic hero). Traditionally, the tragic hero
is one who heroically challenges the forces of fate (however “fate” comes to be socially
embodied), and ultimately loses. Norris’ novel appropriately assigns the role of fate to
the American economy (to which all citizens are subject), and locates a coherent tragic
abyss in the symbol of the wheat-trading pit. The classical mechanism according to
which the novel functions imbues Jadwin’s action with significant social relevance, such
that his corner of the wheat market and subsequent collapse attests to the fatalistic
reality of the American capitalist economy. In the end, Jadwin cannot gain absolute
control and completely restructure the distribution of wealth at his own personal
discretion.

While his powerful effort to do so may mark him for greatness, his

inevitable failure is a concrete attestation to the monolithic economy according to which
success and failure are simultaneously made possible.
Jadwin’s enterprise fails because it directly challenges the force that governs
American socio-cultural experience. According to the extensive symbolism of the novel,
a challenge to the American economy really amounts to a direct challenge of classical
fate. The capitalist economy in America is thereby implicated as deterministic and
unsympathetic, and entirely unmovable. But Jadwin’s tragic brilliance flashes for a
moment on the stage of the wheat-trading pit, and he does attain the status of greatness
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even as he fails monumentally. What his action demonstrates is the structure governing
successful progress in America—upward mobility occurs according the stringent
economic rules of the American capitalist system, according to which one individual’s
progress will always, at least in part, determine another’s. Jadwin exercises a position
of power, for a little while, and so stands as a representation of the failed attempt to
defeat this system. Other literary representations have centered their focus on victims
of the socio-economic system, and in doing so have sought to explore the socioeconomic realities that structure personal progress towards success.
This persistent tension between personal (i.e.: material) success and social
betterment is explored in detail in Edith Wharton’s 1905 novel, The House of Mirth. Lily
Bart craves a high degree of financial independence that is blatantly unavailable to her
as a single woman. Quite simply, her socially gendered position excludes her from her
very American aspirations. The ostensible tragedy of the novel lies in Lily’s failure to
secure a respectable and wealthy husband, but the real tragedy of the novel lies much
deeper. Lily Bart is tragic, not because she declines the attentions of multiple gentlemen,
but because she actively resists the social structures that deny her self-sufficiency and
ultimately fails in that resistance. She openly seeks wealth and status—there is no
question about that—but she challenges the social standards that will allow her these
things only by marriage.34 As Katherine Joslin so neatly summarizes: “If a woman
chooses to discard the usual plot of marriage and her subsequent economic dependence

Diana Trilling writes that The House of Mirth “is nothing if not a novel about social
stratification and the consequences of breaking the taboos of class.” Trilling, “The House
of Mirth Revisited,” 105.
34
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on a man, then what? Exactly who is she? In more practical terms, how is she to earn
her own way? [. . . ] The further question for her [Lily], for women in general, is: If not
marriage, then what?” 35 The answer to this question is unsatisfactory, for Lily’s
character is written on the cusp of a shift in the social hierarchy of her day (evidenced
through such characters as Rosedale, whose sudden ascendency into elite society
challenges the whole notion of “old” money and respectability), and Wharton really
sees no current options for a Lily Bart, outside of marriage. Hence her challenge of
society ends in confrontation with a tragic abyss—the dark mass of unknown
experience that lies outside of high New York society opens up to swallow Lily whole
and crush her.

Lily’s most prevalent desires, for economic prosperity and social

independence, are mutually exclusive given her position, and yet they are so bound up
together that she is simply not interested in one without the other. The object of her
pursuit resembles the reconciled versions of private and public success in America. The
problem is that no such reconciled version prevails in America, and Lily is wholly
unable to choose.
Now, it is necessary to mention that Lily Bart is often not the most sympathetic
character. She flashes from one mood or sensibility to the next in a matter of several
paragraphs, she alters the course of her actions almost constantly, and she really has
done nothing to deserve the financial independence to which she feels so entitled. In a
rather harsh (but realistic) characterization of Lily, Maureen Howard argues that she
“lives at the edge of permissible behavior” and is “hardly an innocent.” Indeed, we
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must not be reluctant to assign some responsibility for Lily’s tragedy to Lily herself.
Howard continues,
Her fate would not concern us if she were [innocent].

The House of Mirth

becomes a forceful moral tale because Wharton reveals Lily as conventionally
corrupt, jaded, snobbish, aging, yet an exceptionally beautiful and quirky
product of her society. A sport of nature, she is just unconventional enough in
her self-awareness, and her contempt for the pleasurable life she is addicted to,
not to consolidate her gains, consistently revealing her flaw of irresolution. Lily
Bart is unwise and uncertain in estimating her worth, investing heavily in the
ornamental woman she was fated to be, given the accident of her birth, placing
little value on the useful woman she might have chosen to be against the odds.36
Howard is correct in her characterization of Lily, and these qualities of her character do
make her interesting if not sympathetic. Even still, the novel attempts to position Lily’s
plight in a sympathetic light, for she is, after all, a clear product of her social
circumstances, and if she is less than ideal, it is the very social structures which she
seeks to challenge that have made her so. Lily’s tragedy is that she has been created by
social institutions to play a purely ornamental role in a world of elaborate finery. She
has been conditioned to desire a set of material luxuries that she cannot attain without
surrendering her independence, and yet the driving force behind her desire for material
luxury is the social independence that it could afford her. Caught in this societal
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paradox, Lily Bart experiences firsthand the cruel unreality of the American dream
paradigm—at least insofar as it is exclusive of female pursuit.
It is the character of Selden who most clearly embodies the unmarried and
financially independent lifestyle that Lily so desires, but even his life is ultimately
unsatisfying to her. At the very opening of the novel, Lily meets Selden at the train
station and visits his apartment—a complex scene that sets the tone of the novel’s
ensuing action. Her first words upon entering Selden’s apartment—spoken just after
she sinks into a “shabby” leather chair (this word, “shabby,” comes to stand for Lily’s
great financial fears)—are as follows: “How delicious to have a place like this all to
one’s self! What a miserable thing it is to be a woman.” 37 Lily’s statement here
summarizes the whole tension she feels; Selden’s apartment attests to his financial and
social independence, yet it is only available to him because he is a man. This gendered
distinction is important to the novel, for it is the basis of Lily’s plight. In the context of
the American dream, Lily occupies an excluded position as a woman. Joslin makes this
point clear:
As perhaps the best social historian of her day, Wharton studies the phenomenon
of marriage in turn-of-the-century capitalist America, where the male barters to
own a female and the female negotiates to secure a male. The novel presents the
dilemma of the single woman, a capitalist commodity, who must earn her social
place by enticing a wealthy male into marriage.38

37
38

Wharton, The House of Mirth, 5.
Joslin, Edith Wharton, 52-53.
180

According to Joslin’s classification, the female figure is no more than an object within the
American dream paradigm in this historical moment, and so she is not free to pursue
the American dream from within the traditional subject position. Lily’s attempt to
accomplish her ideal, despite her societal lack of a subject position, does mark her
character for greatness. Her failure, in accordance with established tragic models, is not
unexpected.39
As Lily and Selden’s conversation continues, Selden suggests the character of
Gerty Farish, a single woman who has her very own New York flat. Meant to model a
life that is open to Lily, Gerty’s style of independence is wholly unacceptable to Lily,
because her life is inundated with that “shabbiness” that Lily so detests. Lily remarks
that “she has a horrid little place, and no maid, and such queer things to eat. Her cook
does the washing and the food tastes of soap. I should hate that, you know.”40 No, the
life of Gerty Farish is far too poor and shabby for Lily’s socially refined tastes. And yet,
while she can admire Selden and even envy his social (male) position, even his lifestyle

Trilling describes Lily’s conflict as one between her practical good sense (material)
and the pull of her spirit (ideal):
It is clear that what Mrs. Wharton is captured by in Lily Bart is her ambiguity of
purpose, the conflict between her practical good sense and the pull of spirit. And
what makes Lily a heroine for the reader—one of the greatly appealing heroines
of fiction, worthy of association with Emma Bovary and Anna Karenina—is the
ultimate triumph of spirit over good sense, even though the transcendence
guarantees her destruction. (Trilling, “The House of Mirth Revisited,” 109)
We can read Trilling’s analysis, if we reframe it slightly, in terms of the American
dream. This material/ideal tension that Trilling locates in Lily is an echo of the same
tension contained in this aspect of the American dream’s action. In attempting to
resolve this tension, and in finally not succumbing to the societal pressures of
respectable marriage, Lily becomes a great tragic heroine in the tradition of the
American dream.
40 Wharton, The House of Mirth, 5.
39
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is inappropriate for a woman of Lily’s tastes and sophistication.

Uninterested in

marrying for wealth, Selden can nevertheless travel in lofty social circles because his
masculinity affords him a certain freedom to do so. Lily remarks,
“Ah, there’s the difference—a girl must [marry], a man may if he chooses.” She
surveyed him critically. “Your coat’s a little shabby—but who cares? It doesn’t
keep people from asking you to dine. If I were shabby no one would have me: a
woman is asked out as much for her clothes as for herself. The clothes are the
background, the frame, if you like; they don’t make success, but they are a part of
it. Who wants a dingy woman? We are expected to be pretty and well-dressed
till we drop—and if we can’t keep it up alone, we have to go into partnership.”41
The expectations to which Lily here refers are the loftiest of feminine social standards of
the time, and they simply cannot be met without an incredibly substantial disposable
income. As Lily herself puts it, “you know I am horribly poor—and very expensive.”42
Notably, Selden is not very sympathetic to Lily’s plight. She requires a great deal
of money, yes, but she is and has been one of the finest, most elegant and desirable
candidates for marriage among her social set. But that is precisely her problem—she
quite literally embodies the whole feminine paradigm to which she is so resistant,
which makes that paradigm very difficult to resist. The novel consistently insists that
Lily has been raised to serve no practical purpose whatsoever; she is meant to be purely
ornamental, and she is meant only for respectable marriage. Hence Selden refers to
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marriage as her vocation.43 Indeed, the attitude her mother had adopted after the loss of
the Bart family fortune speaks directly to this upbringing. We are told,
Only one thought consoled her [Lily’s mother], and that was the contemplation
of Lily’s beauty. She studied it with a kind of passion, as though it were some
weapon she had slowly fashioned for her vengeance. It was the last asset in their
fortunes, the nucleus around which their life was to be rebuilt. She watched it
jealously, as though it were her own property and Lily its mere custodian; and
she tried to instill into the latter a sense of the responsibility that such a charge
involved.44
In this attitude—an attitude implicitly adopted by the majority of Lily’s social set—Lily
is the crowning asset of some as yet unrealized (but grand) fortune. She cannot resist
expensive luxury and social prominence because the very nature of her character
demands these things.
Unfortunately for Lily, marriage is the only means she has of attaining
extravagant wealth, and “marriageability” is the only skill she possesses. Towards the
end of the novel—after Lily has been disinherited by her aunt and expelled from her
social circle—she takes up in a dingy apartment and tries her hand at manual labor.
She is shortly dismissed from her position as seamstress, however, owing to her
inefficiency—she simply lacks any professional ability. Our narrator reflects,
She had learned by experience that she had neither the aptitude nor the moral
constancy to remake her life on new lines, to become a worker among workers
43
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and let the world of luxury and pleasure sweep by her unregarded. [. . . ]
Inherited tendencies had combined with early training to make her the highly
specialized product she was: an organism as helpless out of its narrow range as
the sea-anemone torn from the rock. She had been fashioned to adorn and
delight [. . . ]45
If we now return our attention to the American dream, we can see how Lily’s
aspirations and ideals of success contribute to our discussion. The duality inherent in
the mainstream definition of success in America is the very duality that Lily cannot
reconcile.
In one passage of the novel, Selden straightforwardly asks Lily to define her
understanding of success, to which she replies: “Why, to get as much as one can out of
life, I suppose. It’s a relative quality, after all.”46 Lily’s answer is vague at best, but this
is unsurprising. She knows full well what she can achieve by grace of her beauty and
social sophistication, but she cannot equate the attainment of wealth and status with
success because the means of attaining these things—through marriage—is prohibitive
to her in its own way. Selden counters her statement with his own, far more liberal,
definition of success: “’My idea of success,’ he said, ‘is personal freedom.’” When asked
to

elaborate—freedom

from

what?,

wonders

Lily—Selden

continues:

“From

everything—from money, from poverty, from ease and anxiety, from all the material
accidents.

To keep a kind of republic of the spirit—that’s what I call success.”47
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47 Ibid.
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Abstract in its own way, Selden’s definition is exactly the kind of statement we are
accustomed to hearing in regards to the American dream.

Rooted in an ideal of

personal freedom, the American dream purports that success is measured according to
one’s increasing independence from these material accidents that Selden references. In
Lily’s case, these material accidents are none other than wealth and status, and we see
as Lily and Selden’s conversation continues that the greatest difference in these two
characters is how they perceive wealth and status. For Selden, this sense of freedom
directly implies that one need not be wealthy or socially affluent in order to be
successful, so long as they are free from an immobilizing concern over these things.
Selden’s own life—as represented consistently through the novel—attests to the
viability of his position.

Lily, however, sees the matter quite differently.

She

summarily states that “the only way not to think about money is to have a great deal of
it.”48 Here is the striking difference in Selden and Lily’s positions, and Lily’s view
essentially determines the tragic path that she will follow.
Much of the tension generated by the American dream lies in the frequent
discrepancy between the humanitarian ideal and the practical application of that ideal.
Selden is able to inhabit his “republic of the spirit” because his understanding of the
ideal has not been sullied by experience of the real world. Lily, on the other hand, has
been raised to be dependent on wealth and status, and she cannot conceive of an ideal
of success that is not innately tied to the possession of these things. But it is Lily’s
ongoing contact with Selden that ultimately ruins her, for he spurs in her the desire for
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self-sufficient happiness that is not dependent on outward trappings, even while she
refuses to relinquish her dependency on these outward trappings. According to Irving
Howe, Lily’s dilemma can be boiled down to a problem of taste. He writes that “Lily
Bart is a victim of taste, both good and bad: she has a natural taste for moral and
esthetic refinements which causes her to be repelled by the world of the rich, and she
has an acquired taste for luxury that can be satisfied only in that world.”49 As a result,
Lily is unable to sacrifice herself to a gentleman in marriage, and yet she cannot be
happy without the financial and social prestige of such a marriage.

Lost in the

discrepancy between the ideal and the reality of the American dream, Lily’s career
naturally ends in tragedy.50
We ought to say a few more words about Selden’s conception of success, for he
presents a very American idea in the “republic of the spirit,” and if we are to
understand Lily’s failure, we must first understand the ideal that she fails to realize.
Monetary wealth and social well-being are certainly implied in the American dream,
but they are never stated as ends in themselves. These material accidents are just that—
too concrete and “real” for the very abstract American dream ideal. The American
dream merely promises an equal opportunity for personal and social betterment; it does
not define a set a concrete goals, nor does it suggest any practical paths for the

Howe, “A Reading of The House of Mirth,” 124.
Some might argue that Lily Bart finds redemption at the conclusion of the novel.
Others, no doubt, might find quite the opposite if they read her death as suicide. For
the purposes of this discussion, I am avoiding the question as it is irrelevant. Lily’s
predominant mood and understanding in the novel characterize an American attitude,
regardless of what she does later, and we are concerned here with that dominant
characterization of her.
49
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attainment of such goals. If it did so, then it would be easy enough to point to countless
instances in which the American dream has failed, time and again.

Lily believes,

throughout the novel, that she is entitled to physical luxury of the highest order. We
cannot blame her too much for this, for her life’s education has taught her this lesson
and she has been bred to occupy no other surroundings. Nevertheless, the American
dream has made her no such promise, and her tragedy does not attest to any flaw in the
American paradigm. Indeed, Lily passes up many, many opportunities for “successful”
marriage; she is simply not interested in the compromise. To be sure, Lily’s failure is no
one else’s fault, and if she is a victim she is victimized by her own refusal to
compromise mutually exclusive values.

Lily’s America prohibits her from having

Selden’s lifestyle, because of her sex, but we know full well that Selden’s limited means
and social standing would always be inadequate for her. Lily’s tragedy is finally a
result of her upbringing and conditioning; it is not a result of an unfulfilled American
promise.
Whereas Lily’s action highlights the limitations of her sex in light in of her need
for extravagant wealth and luxury, and thereby draws out the discrepancy between
Lily’s social situation and her personal one, Toni Morrison’s most recent novel, A Mercy
(2008), attempts to situate the large scale social institution of slavery in the context of
one man’s very early American dream. Morrison demonstrates that one man’s material
rise directly affects the racial and classist paradigms that are just beginning to develop
around him, such that his American dream action, which is his upward mobilization,
greatly contributes to the institutionalization of racism and slavery.
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In this sense,

Morrison means her protagonist to be representative, and her novel develops the social
ramifications of an individual’s material rise.
Toni Morrison’s A Mercy is unique to her canon of novels, though it certainly
continues the development of an earlier idea in her work. I mean here the figure of
memory, most elaborately explored in her novel Beloved, but at least indirectly present in
all her novels.51 Morrison’s work has been concerned with the memory of an intensely
racialized (and all too frequently racist) memory of America’s history. In Beloved, she
traces with intense narrative detail the personal ramifications of slavery itself, gesturing
all the while towards the more public implications of that private experience. In A
Mercy, Morrison’s project follows this governing idea down a different course, reaching
back before the institutionalization of slavery and the regional social structure that is
founded on it, to a generative moment of racism in the raw American wilderness. Her
novel is a struggle to remember those things that have been lost to memory, those
experiences that generated a long-standing system whose realities must consistently be
recalled, but which are themselves beyond the scope of recorded history. As such, A
Mercy is an imaginative response to the demands of a cultural memory and seeks to reMarilyn Mobley finds that Morrison’s Beloved adapts the inherited form of the slave
narrative in order to more fully represent slave experience for a contemporary audience,
and in order to reposition that experience within the context of memory. She writes,
I would like to suggest that the intertextual relationship between Beloved and the
slave narratives—the genre that began African-American literary tradition in
prose—offers significant interpretative possibilities for entering the hermeneutic
circle of this novel. More specifically, I would like to argue that Morrison uses
the trope of memory to revise the genre of the slave narrative and thereby to
make the slave experience it inscribes more accessible to contemporary readers.
(Mobley, “A Different Remembering,” 69)
A Mercy continues this same tradition that Mobley is addressing in Beloved; it is a
tradition that runs through much of Morrison’s work.
51
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create American history in light of the vision explored consistently in each of
Morrison’s proceeding novels.
A Mercy tells a story of early American identity formation (at once personal and
national), through which social structures emerge and relations between individuals are
established (these relations being largely based on invented classist distinctions). At the
center of the novel are the personal narratives of four women living on Jacob Vaark’s
early farm settlement: Jacob’s wife, Rebekka; and his three “slaves”: Lina (a nativeAmerican adoptee), Sorrow (a mongrel girl who is given to Jacob), and Florens (a young
slave whom Jacob accepts in partial payment of a debt owed him). Jacob Vaark’s
narrative contextualizes all the others in the story, for the women are subject to his
action, and it is Jacob’s narrative (and his alone) that is directly concerned with the
American dream. Having tried his hand at farming and learned that he could break
even but never turn a profit, he takes up the business of trade—a career that, by the
beginning of the novel, has brought him to the home of Mr. Ortega, a wealthy Virginian
slave owner, to collect on a debt. Jacob’s visit to Ortega’s home proves to be the
formative experience that propels Jacob into a headlong pursuit of wealth and status
(Jacob himself being an orphan of no special standing).
Approaching Ortega’s house, Jacob stops a moment to appraise it:
Two wide windows, at least two dozen panes in each, flanked the door. Five
more windows on a broad second story held sunlight glittering above the mist.
He had never seen a house like it. The wealthiest men he knew built in wood,
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not brick, riven clapboards with no need for grand pillars suitable for a House of
Parliament. Grandiose, he thought…52
Soon after entering, he joins Ortega and his family for dinner—an event that only
further propels him on his future path. We are told that,
Dinner was a tedious affair made intolerable by the awkwardness Jacob felt. His
rough clothes were in stark contrast to embroidered silk and lace collar. His
normally deft fingers turned clumsy with the tableware. There was even a trace
of raccoon blood on his hands. Seeded resentment now bloomed. Why such a
show on a sleepy afternoon for a single guest well below their station?
Intentional, he decided; a stage performance to humiliate him into a groveling
acceptance of D’Ortega’s wishes.53
The sense of humiliation that Jacob feels over dinner is deeply significant (as it
frequently tends to be in American dream narratives). Following on the heels of his
abuse, Jacob’s disdain swiftly evolves to intense desire. The subject of his apparent
humiliation, that is to say, becomes (quite naturally) the object of his envy. After dinner,
Ortega makes clear specifically what he can offer Jacob: slaves—an offer Jacob sharply
turns down because his farm is too small to require the additional help, and he is
wholly unwilling to trade in human flesh. But Jacob does end up accepting Florens, the
little slave girl in too big shoes whose mother begs Jacob to take her, having witnessed
Jacob seeing the little girl “as a human child, not pieces of eight.”54
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54 Ibid., 166.
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The scene of Jacob’s acceptance of Florens is a complicated one, for it marks
Jacob as a slaveholder while simultaneously emphasizing his internal resistance to the
practice of trading humans. “God help me if this is not the most wretched business,”55
he thinks to himself, but he then immediately accepts Florens as partial payment of
Ortega’s debt, believing that perhaps Rebbeka will welcome a child on the farm, having
just lost another infant. Without intending to do so, Jacob overtly participates in the
practice of slavery, before it has been firmly institutionalized in America. While he may
mean no real harm, he effectively marks himself as a slaveholder—a status he will later
require for the designs he crafts for his future.
On his return journey, he stops a night at a nearby inn and saloon, where he
hears embellished stories of the rising rum trade. These thoughts couple nicely with his
recollection of Ortega’s home—once the site of ostentatious humiliation, Ortega’s great
house quickly becomes for Jacob the object of his dreamy envy. As he prepares for bed,
we are told,
Now he fondled the idea of an even more satisfying enterprise. And the plan
was a sweet as the sugar on which it was based. And there was a profound
difference between the intimacy of slave bodies at Jublio and a remote labor force
in Barbados. Right? Right, he thought, looking at a sky vulgar with stars. Clear
and right. The silver that glittered there was not at all unreachable. And that
wide swath of cream pouring through the stars was his for the tasting.
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The heat was still pressing, his bed partner overactive, yet he slept well
enough. Probably because his dreams were of a grand house of many rooms
rising on a hill above the fog.56
The diction in the above passage speaks clearly to the substance of the American
dream—a dream impulse that lacks the formal shape with which we now understand it.
Jacob’s American dream is as wild and raw as the landscape in which he will enact it.
The rum enterprise is a new and exciting opportunity that ought to bring all the
trappings of success—a success that Jacob can now measure against the tangible image
of Ortega’s wealth. 57 Despite these bright dreamy illusions, though, the passage
contains a note of darkness in Jacob’s reflection about slave ownership. In this scene,
Jacob realizes unquestionably that the dream he is designing will require slave labor for
its realization. Despite his reluctance to do so, Jacob will participate in the slave trade
because the accomplishment of his goals depends on it.
It is Jacob’s wife who first begins to recognize the change that has come over her
husband as she struggles to reconcile the urgency of their immediate needs with her
husband’s increasing desire for useless fancy. “If on occasion he brought her young,
untrained help, he also brought home gifts [. . .] gifts that were becoming less practical,
even whimsical,” we are told. The passage continues,
A silver tea service which was put away immediately; a porcelain chamber pot
quickly chipped by indiscriminate use; a heavily worked hairbrush for hair he
Ibid., 35.
As we have seen, the goals of the American dream are relative. Jacob does not desire
his great house until he witnesses Ortega’s; in this sense, Ortega’s accomplishments
create a standard that Jacob feels compelled to meet.
56
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only saw in bed. A hat here, a lace collar there. Four yards of silk. […] a mirror
framed in silver. Having seen come and go a glint in his eye as he unpacked
these treasures so useless on a farm, she should have anticipated the day he hired
men to help clear trees from a wide swath of land at the foot of a rise. A new
house he was building. Something befitting not a farmer, not even a trader, but a
squire.58
Rebekka’s apprehension over Jacob’s sudden and inexplicable desire for fineries stems
from her literal station in life. “We are good, common people, she thought, in a place
where that claim was not merely enough, but prized, even a boast.”59 Rebekka is not
here assigning herself to some lower and arbitrary class, for whom Jacob’s signs of
wealth are well out of “proper” reach. Rather, she is emphasizing the discrepancy
between her and Jacob’s very real, often dire, needs and such useless trappings. The
fact of Rebekka’s life is hardship and toil, not leisure and luxury. But when she raises
these concerns to her husband, Jacob tells her, simply, “Need is not the reason, wife,”
and that “What a man leaves behind is what a man is.” When Rebekka tells him that “a
man is only his reputation,” Jacob responds, “Understand me. [. . .] I will have it.”60
This proves to be the final word on the subject, and the massive enterprise of Jacob’s
grand home (complete with intricately detailed ironwork) is begun.
Jacob’s great house—in its various stages of completion—looms over the
narrative as a backdrop for its developing senses of early race relations.
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For, in

pursuing his own early American dream on fresh, nowhere near socially
institutionalized terrain, we watch develop the racist and classist structures that grow in
response to unrealized early American social idealism. Near the beginning of the novel
we are offered a brief portrait of race relations prior to slavery’s direct role in them.61
We are told,
Half a dozen years ago an army of blacks, natives, whites, mulattoes—freedmen,
slaves and indentured—had waged war against local gentry led by members of
that very class. When that ‘people’s war’ lost its hopes to the hangman, the work
it had done—which included the slaughter of opposing tribes and running the
Carolinas off their land—spawned a thicket of new laws authorizing chaos in
defense of order. By eliminating manumission, gatherings, travel and bearing
arms for black people only; by granting license to any white to kill any black for
any reason; by compensating owner’s for a slave’s maiming or death, they
separated and protected all whites from all others forever.62
In exploring this sense of white and black race relations, the novel presents two clear
and distinct figures, both of immediate African descent. One is the slave girl Florens,
whom Jacob takes out of pity; the other is a free black ironworker, who is responsible
for the very impressive construction of the massive iron gate guarding Jacob’s new
stronghold.

Morrison’s novel is, after all, attempting to discover and explore a pre-slavery space
of American racism.
62 Ibid., 10.
61
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The juxtaposition of a free and an enslaved African, who become entangled
together in a passionate sexual affair, serves as an overt exploration of the quality of
enslavement. It is the ironworker, perhaps more than any other character in the novel,
who is most assured of his own self-worth and is in fullest control of his own physical
and mental faculties.

His affair with Florens—intensely physical—is marked by a

uniquely non-animalistic distinction. It is Sorrow who relates their lovemaking, having
witnessed them in secret. She is struck and confused by their very manner of their
lovemaking, for it resembles nothing of the violent and hurried rape with which she is
herself familiar:
The blacksmith and Florens were rocking and, unlike female farm animals in
heat, she was not standing quietly under the weight and thrust of the male.
What Sorrow saw yonder in the grass under a hickory tree was not the silent
submission to the slow goings behind a pile of wood or a hurried one in a church
pew that Sorrow knew.

This here female stretched, kicked her heels and

whipped her head left, right, to, fro. It was a dancing. Florens rolled and twisted
from her back to his. He hoisted her up against the hickory; she bent her head
into his shoulder. A dancing. Horizontal one minute, another minute vertical.63
Such a representation of their union directly opposes the inherited stereotype of early
black sexuality. Their lovemaking is human, but even more than that it is artistic, a
dancing. Pivotally, the narration continues: “It all ended when the blacksmith grabbed
Florens’ hair, yanked her head back to put his mouth to hers. [. . .] It amazed her to see
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that. In all of the goings she knew, no one had ever kissed her mouth. Ever.”64 This
kiss is the defining moment of their lovemaking—a violently passionate sexual act that,
by its very nature, stresses the humanity of the lovemakers. These are not rugged
savages or “natural slaves,” the narrative insists.
Florens’ first person narrative sections all take place around the event of her
journey to the blacksmith, who returns home after the completion of his work. She
must travel alone to find him on the hope that he will be able to cure Rebekka, who has
taken ill after Jacob’s death. Florens is wholly and completely consumed with her
desire for the ironworker, a point she stresses regularly throughout her narrative. But
her journey to him brings about a kind of racial awakening through experience—it is on
her dangerous quest that she really comes to learn that she is black, and what the
immediately consequent dangers are for her. Stopping to rest a night at the home of a
widow, she finds herself subject to the harsh and heathen religious understandings of
her race. When the villagers arrive at the widow’s house in the morning to investigate
whether her daughter is demonic (she has a lazy eye which is taken as a sign of the
devil), they see Florens with her coal black skin and immediately see the devil in her.
Fearful and horrified, they lead Florens out back where they force her to strip and begin
to examine her in a way almost identical to the examination of a slave for labor
potential. “Without touching they tell me what to do,” she relates. “To show them my
teeth, my tongue. [. . .] They look under my arms, between my legs. They circle me,
lean down to inspect my feet. Naked under their examination I watch for what is in
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their eyes. No hate is there or scare or disgust but they are looking at me my body
across distances without recognition.”65 Narrowly making her escape, Florens feels the
implications of their inspection and reaches some new understanding of her racial
status—it is as though, by the villagers’ treatment of her, she becomes self-consciously
black, a clear indication from the novel of the constructed quality of racial assignation.
“You have the outside dark as well,” Florens says (“you” being always the blacksmith).
“And when I see you and fall into you I know I am live. Sudden it is not like before
when I am always in fright. I am not afraid of anything now. The sun’s going leaves
darkness behind and the dark is me. Is we. Is my home.”66
Florens suddenly finds comfort in the racial status of the blacksmith, his race
hitherto being an attractive quality, but bearing little importance beyond that. She
stands on tenuous ground at this point: she has been made aware of racial difference,
which marks her as a slave, and yet her desire for the blacksmith, which comes to be
largely predicated on their shared blackness, is her only understanding of freedom.
Hence she comes to understand that the classification of “slave” or “free” is determined
by the context of her surroundings. She reflects, upon finally arriving at the
blacksmith’s home, that she will never leave him:
We talk of many things and I don’t say what I am thinking. That I will stay.
That when you return from healing Mistress whether she is live or no I am here
with you always. Never without you. Here I am not the one to throw out. No
one steals my warmth and shoes because I am small. No one handles my
65
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backside.

No one whinnies like sheep or goat because I drop in fear and

weakness. No one screams at the sight of me. No one watches my body for
how it is unseemly. With you my body is pleasure is safe is belonging. I can
never not have you have me.67
Floren’s attitude here is one of complete and total dependence. When she learns that
the blacksmith has taken in a small foundling child, and that she must watch the boy
while the blacksmith is away tending to Rebekka, she is overwhelmed with jealousy
over their relationship. She relates, “I worry as the boy steps closer to you. How you
offer and he owns your forefinger. As if he is your future. Not me.”68 The blacksmith
returns from his journey just at the moment when Florens is violently attempting to
hush the child’s fearful screams and tears; she dislocates his arm in doing so, throwing
the blacksmith into a rage. Florens and the blacksmith have a hurried exchange, which
speaks directly to Florens’ own developing sense of enslavement:
I want you to go.
Let me explain.
No. Now.
Why? Why?
Because you are a slave. [. . . ]
I am a slave because Sir trades for me.
No. You have become one.
How?
67
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Your head is empty and your body is wild.
I am adoring you.
And a slave to that too.
You alone own me.
Own yourself, woman, and leave us be. [. . . ] You are nothing but wilderness.
No constraint. No mind.69
The blacksmith’s words are harsh, and at their sound Florens breaks, unable to make
sense of her status as free or slave.
The blacksmith’s sentiments are echoed at the end of the novel by Florens’ own
mother, in a final chapter that takes place closer to the novel’s opening action, when
Jacob is accepting Florens from Ortega. Reflecting on the scene, Florens’ mother says,
It was not a miracle. Bestowed by God. It was a mercy. Offered by a human. I
stayed on my knees. In the dust where my heart will remain each night and
every day until you understand what I know and long to tell you: to be given
dominion over another is a hard thing; to wrest dominion over another is a
wrong thing; to give dominion of yourself to another is a wicked thing.70
Florens is finally unable to craft a definition of herself apart from her relation to others;
she is slave or free according to what she is told and how she is treated, not according to
any personal self-knowledge. This lack of real self-awareness, the novel implies, is the
result of Florens’ limited scope of experience. She lacks a positive sense of her identity
because that identity has been constructed for her, by racially prejudiced communities
69
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and slaveholders. When Jacob accepts Florens, he sees her as a human child—a vision
far superior to that of Mr. Ortega, who is beginning to see Florens as a sexual object
(hence Florens’ mother’s urgency to re-place her daughter with Jacob). And yet, it is not
enough that Jacob does perceive Florens as human, for he still accepts her as a slave,
and her status at his house does not change. Florens is unable to construct her own
sense of identity in this world where she is forced into an enslaved status. Although
Jacob can see the artificiality of Florens’ slave status, and therefore has the power to
help set her free, he requires her slave status for his great venture. When Florens’
mother offers her daughter up to Jacob—indeed, begs him to take her—it is because she
sees in Jacob something different from what she sees in Ortega. She says,
When the tall man with yellow hair [Jacob] came to dine, I saw he hated the food
and I saw things in his eyes that said he did not trust Senhor [Ortega], Senhora or
their sons. His way, I thought, is another way. His country far from here. There
was no animal in his heart. He never looked at me the way Senhor does. He did
not want.71
This assessment of Jacob is true enough in the moment she thinks it—we recall Jacob’s
initial great distaste for Ortega’s elaborate show.
distaste quickly changes to compulsive desire.

And yet, we know that Jacob’s

With the prospect of Jacob’s great

monument to himself on the horizon, he cannot afford to be so humanitarian. Jacob
requires slaves to attain his American dream. Florens’ mother observes that Jacob
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“does not want,” and yet we watch the slow and steady development of Jacob’s desire.
By the time he is building his house, Jacob “wants” very much.
Jacob’s American dream pursuit, then, is directly responsible for the enslavement
of Florens. The novel means this relationship to be representative, so that we can see
the necessary ties between individual material rise and the diminishment of others’
freedoms. Far from an idealized portrait of great men rising to further greatness (our
traditionally inherited model of the American dream), Morrison’s novel insists that this
degree of wealth and success is always dependent on the enslavement of another—
whether though literal, institutional slavery, or through the arbitrary assignment of
perpetually limited social status. What the novel demonstrates is the complexity of
Florens’ understanding of herself as slave, against the backdrop of Jacob’s enterprise.
We can conclude from this novel that, even in its earliest, rawest incarnation, the
defining motivation of the American dream necessitates the literal and/or figurative
enslavement of others: that is, the social idealism inherent in the idea of personal rise is
always predicated on the real fact of social subjugation.
We begin to see that the action of the American dream consists in a complex
social dynamic of rising and falling individuals, such that no one progresses in America
without directly affecting another’s progress. Moreover, these competitive individual
pursuits are coupled with idealist social aims as well, and we have seen the effect that
one individual’s private rise can have on the entire society.

Despite these often

contradictory pursuits, though, the action of the American dream remains intact as a
result of its mythic articulation. That action is fundamentally progressive (for humanity

201

generally as well as for the individual) insofar as it seeks a sustained increase of social
and personal position. The underlying action of the American dream, then, is at once
socio-economic upward mobility and ever-expanding social idealism. Both pursuits are
sustained in America, even though they may at times interfere with one anther, because
the mythic understanding of these diverse interests appears to resolve them in a
dynamic that privileges personal, material gain as a spur towards social benevolence.
Conversely, the social idealism of the American dream, in guaranteeing equality of
opportunity and freedom for the pursuit of happiness, creates the social milieu
necessary for private upward mobility in the first place. Indeed, the American dream
depends on the sustained pursuit of both individual and public (social) progress, for
neither can be accomplished without the other.

We can see, then, why it is so

mythically important to resolve the discrepancies between these success-objects (even if
that resolution is only apparent and not real). The primary action described by the
American dream—and that constitutes one of the dream’s central structural tenets—is
finally one of progressive action (on both an individual and a social scale) towards a
constantly receding (because relative) goal of success.
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Chapter Five
The American Dream in the 21st Century:
A Literary Consideration

Our previous discussion makes clear that the American Dream functions in a
predominantly mythic capacity, such that it maintains cultural relevance throughout
the course of its ongoing development. The basic structure of the American Dream
myth establishes a set of basic narrative paradigms that, collectively, determine an
appropriately revisable model for individual and national rise (which, as we have seen,
ultimately amounts to an economic measure of increasing success).

This broadly

figured national myth has been generally accepted in one form or another throughout
American history, despite consistent challenges to its validity as a practical model for
betterment. This to say, essentially, that there has always been a great divorce between
the idealism of the Dream and the probability of its realistic accomplishment (in fact,
this observable division is precisely the overarching tension that maintains the Dream’s
status as cultural myth).

Some periods in American history have undoubtedly

challenged the Dream’s authenticity more than others; the Great Depression or the Civil
Rights Movement, for instance, take a far more anti-Dream stance than the immediately
post World War II America. Our contemporary America, however, poses perhaps the
greatest challenges to the Dream myth that have ever been raised, in what ultimately
amounts to a rising public desire to completely dispel the whole notion of the American
Dream and reveal it as mere empty fantasy. This harshly anti-Dream attitude is the
result of a longer historical perspective and an acute sense of the very real socio-
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economic problems that plague the vast majority of American citizens today. Moreover,
with the onset of advanced communication technologies, the realistic circumstances of
millions of Americans are far more difficult to ignore. The very reality of impoverished
and socially outcast members of American society directly challenges the American
dream, which appears to ignore realistic circumstances out of preference for apparently
unattainable ideals. Works of literary fiction have always adopted an ambiguous stance
towards the American dream, if not frequently raved against it outright. American
fiction of the last decade, however, has adopted a slightly less obvious anti-dream
attitude, either by dramatizing an imagined reality where the dream is quite dead and
then considering this new American terrain, or by anticipating a world so overrun by
dream ideology that it ceases to have any connection to actual lived experience.
Contemporary impressions of the American dream are bleak, although American
dream rhetoric continues to persist in social and political dialogue. In the genres of
popular self-help guides and financial planning books, an overwhelming rhetoric of
restoration pervades American dream discussion, openly implying (and in some cases
directly stating) that the dream is now defunct and in need of complete overhaul. The
national economic crisis of the past decade is undoubtedly responsible for these
sentiments; any threat to the financial integrity of the American nation and American
people results in widespread panic over the perceived loss of that idealism in which the
whole national project is rooted. The American dream holds cultural relevance, as we
have seen, so long as the American people can perceive its practical efficacy. Of course,
as we have also seen, this practical efficacy is synonymous with concrete financial value.
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So long as a majority of Americans continue to expand their net worth, Americans are
inclined to trust in the reality of the American dream. When Americans’ assets begin to
lose value, when there is a large-scale loss of jobs, houses, cars, etc., and when
opportunities to correct these misfortunes are virtually non-existent, faith in the
American dream crumbles quickly. Historically, belief in the viability of the American
dream has been restored whenever the economy once again becomes favorable for
Americans. Currently, Americans fears are rooted not merely in the collapse of their
economy, but in the possibility that their economy had reached an inevitable ceiling
that can never be broken, and so will be impossible to restore. The traditional belief in
endless financial, social, and political increase now runs head into the fear of an
unbreakable ceiling of value.
Paul Auster’s most recent novel, Sunset Park, is set in the desolate landscape of
the 2008 financial crisis, and it characterizes this new American terrain in terms of a
dead American dream.

The novel adopts the abandoned American home as its

predominant symbol for this economic collapse, and through this repeated symbol we
see a sharp portrait of a financially unstable nation. The opening of the novel describes
the current occupation of Miles Heller (the protagonist), who cleans out foreclosed
homes that have been abandoned by their owners and are still full with personal
possessions. We are told,
For almost a year now, he has been taking photographs of abandoned things.
There are at least two jobs every day, sometimes as many as six or seven, and
each time he and his cohorts enter another house, they are confronted by the
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things, the innumerable cast-off things left behind by the departed families. The
absent people have all fled in haste, in shame, in confusion, and it is certain that
wherever they are living now (if they have found a place to live and are not
camped out in the streets) their new dwellings are smaller than the houses they
have lost. Each house is a story of failure—of bankruptcy and default, of debt
and foreclosure—and he has taken it upon himself to document the last,
lingering traces of those scattered lives in order to prove that the vanished
families were once here, that the ghosts of people he will never see and never
know are still present in the discarded things strewn about their empty houses.1
If Auster’s novel adopts a bleak and crushing view of the current state of the American
people, it does so because the story is filtered through Miles’ own perception, which
must be decidedly stark given his daily labor. Moreover, the initial description of Miles
Heller that is given to us paints him as anything but the traditional American hero—his
whole sensibility seems to oppose the basic structure of the American dream:
He is twenty-eight years old, and to the best of his knowledge he has no
ambitions. No burning ambitions, in any case, no clear idea of what building a
plausible future might entail for him. He knows that he will not stay in Florida
much longer, that the moment is coming when he will feel the need to move on
again, but until that need ripens into a necessity to act, he is content to remain in
the present and not look ahead. If he has accomplished anything in the seven
and a half years since he quit college and struck out on his own, it is this ability
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to live in the present, to confine himself to the here and now, and although it
might not be the most laudable accomplishment one can think of, it has required
considerable discipline and self-control for him to achieve it. To have no plans,
which is to say, to have no longings or hopes, to be satisfied with your lot, to
accept what the world doles out to you from one sunrise to the next—in order to
live like that you must want very little, as little as humanly possible.2
Miles’ lack of ambitions and resistance to planning a future strikingly position him in a
very un-American vein. Perhaps because he chronicles the apparent failure of the
American dream in his own context, though, we accept him as a spokesman for a postdream America.
While no major critical work has been done on Auster’s novel (it is too recent),
treatments of Auster’s work in general offer us a bit of context for considering Sunset
Park. In his book, Paul Auster’s Postmodernity, Brendan Martin contends that “New York
City serves as a backdrop to many of Auster’s writings, and Auster evokes the
postmodern notion of urban dislocation in order to compliment his fictional
narratives.” 3

New York City is, indeed, the backdrop for Sunset Park, and its

representation in the novel continues Martin’s thesis that Auster makes use of the city
as a context for American urban dislocation. Auster is a postmodernist in Martin’s
reading, and Martin does devote some attention to defining postmodernism through a
historical analysis. He concludes that literary postmodernism most notably consists in
“ontological skepticism, foundational indeterminacy, and an overwhelming lack of
2
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cognitive identity.” 4

Essentially, these are all more precise terms for subjective

dislocation or fragmentation.

Postmodernism thus describes rootlessness, lack of

cohesive self, and innate distrust. In short, this postmodern “mood” makes for an apt
characterization of the world of Sunset Park.

This should not be surprising, since

Auster’s newest novel is merely continuing a pre-established trend in Auster’s work.
But the effect of this postmodern world in Auster’s novel, according to Carsten Springer,
is the establishment of crisis.5 Springer finds the repeated motif of postmodern crisis
across Auster’s novels (again, up to but not including Sunset Park), and it is an apt
characterization of Sunset Park.

The characters in Auster’s newest novel are

undoubtedly in the midst of a literal economic crisis, the effect of which is to throw the
entire paradigm of the American dream into full crisis. In Sunset Park, postmodern
crisis is the result of economic collapse, and economic collapse is a sign of American
dream disillusionment.
If Auster’s novel attempts to characterize an America in the midst of the collapse
of its dream idealism, it nevertheless represents the persistence of the shell of such
idealism.

Indeed, the endurance of abandoned houses is a testament to this

representation, for the houses have not been destroyed outright, but merely vacated.
Auster’s novel creates a space where we can reflect on the meaning of an America that
has been stripped of its citizens’ implicit trust in the inviolability of its core values, but
this American space is nevertheless populated with countless monuments and
testaments to the old dream. In fact, the dominant symbol in the novel—the abandoned
4
5
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American home—takes absolute center stage in the novel, whose action is centered
around a group of mismatched people who move into an abandoned home in New
York city. This action, in which four very different American adults take advantage of a
collapsing economy in order to live rent free and off the public radar, is a decidedly
non-traditional American action. Rather than working persistently towards some great
socio-economic goal, these characters openly live off a failed American dream.
It is an old friend of Miles’, Bing Nathan, who first conceives of the idea of
moving into an abandoned home in the neighborhood of Sunset Park, and who recruits
the house’s tenants. Bing Nathan’s character is marked by a striking disillusionment
with America, which essentially serves as his own personal justification for moving into
the house. Of Bing’s attitude, we are told:
Since the war in Vietnam, which began nearly twenty years before he was born,
he would argue that the concept known as America has played itself out, that the
country is no longer a workable proposition, but if anything continues to unite
the fractured masses of this defunct nation, if American opinion is still
unanimous about any one idea, it is a belief in the notion of progress. He
contends that they are wrong, that the technological developments of the past
have in fact only diminished the possibilities of life. In a throwaway culture
spawned by the greed of profit-driven corporations, the landscape has grown
ever more shabby, every more alienating, ever more empty of meaning and
consolidating purpose.6
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This passage does a great job of characterizing Auster’s world in the novel, for while
America is ostensibly falling apart, even a wholly disillusioned character like Bing
recognizes that the belief in American progress, even if misguided, is still powerfully
alive and well. It is this tension that sustains the novel, for the persistence of belief in an
ideal that no longer appears to exist is precisely what allows us to see this post-dream
America as a genuine American space. This theme, while represented symbolically by
the vacant house, is repeated personally for Bing in his occupation.
Bing Nathan operates his own small business, a repair shop for old objects, called
The Hospital for Broken Things. This shop is “devoted to repairing objects from an era
that has all but vanished from the face of the earth: manual typewriters, fountain pens,
mechanical watches, vacuum-tube radios, record players, wind-up toys, gumball
machines, and rotary telephones.”7 Bing’s shop is a testament to his faith in the past
and his distaste for all the technological advancements of his contemporary era. It is
fundamentally anti-American, in a way, for the little shop focuses its unwavering gaze
on artifacts from the past, great technological gadgets that once attested to the glorious
advancement of America but are now defunct in a hyper-digital age. Bing himself
shuns all new technologies, as they embody and promote a future America that, for
Bing, lacks all traditional substance. Indeed, Bing “takes it for granted that the future is
a lost cause, and if the present is all that matters now, it must be a present imbued with
the spirit of the past. That is why he shuns cell phones, computers, and all things
digital—because he refuses to participate in new technologies” (53).

7
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Because Bing

believes that the American experiment has run its course—that America really has no
future at all—his practice of Americanism must be relegated to his faith in the past, and
in this way he seeks to preserve an old idea of American exceptionalism through the
literal preservation of these artifacts of American greatness. It is important to mention,
though, that Bing’s business is not a great success, and the majority of his income at the
shop comes from framing pictures. Indeed, this commercial testament to the pastpreserving-present ultimately falls flat, for America (regardless of Bing’s own opinions)
remains steadfastly focused on the future with no genuine regard for these blatantly
irrelevant relics of another (even if recent) age.
The tension that sustains Auster’s novel lies in this perceivable distinction: that
the contemporary appearance of America is fundamentally at odds with the prevalent
sustained belief in America’s greatness. This tension is, as it were, a natural property of
the American dream, which always imagines a future that is better than its present
condition. Bing’s vision of America (which is one at least implicitly shared by his other
housemates), supposes the death of the American dream while leaving no room for its
potential resurrection. And yet, as the novel continues, the characters act out quite
traditional personal dramas in the context of this supposed American wasteland. By
nature of their actions—Miles’ reparation of his broken family ties, Alice‘s completion
of her dissertation, Ellen‘s pursuit of her passion for painting—the “tenants” of the
Sunset Park house each engage their own articulation of an American dream (even if
that pursuit is not directly figured as such). Indeed, their house becomes not a retreat
from a failed American project, but a space for the rebuilding of American values and
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accomplishments. And yet, the house is nevertheless a constant reminder of the current
failure of the American economy (and, therefore, of the American dream). Herein lies
the complex symbolic meaning of the Sunset Park house: it at once attests to the death
of America even as it acts as a space for American re-creation.
The condition of the Sunset Park house upon Bing’s first discovering it begins its
characterization as a symbol. We are told,
They broke in one night and discovered that there were four bedrooms, three
small ones on the top floor and a larger one below, which was part of an
extension built onto the back of the house.

The place was in lamentable

condition, every surface coated with dust and soot, water stains streaking the
wall behind the kitchen sink, cracked linoleum, splintered floorboards, a team of
mice or squirrels running relay races under the roof, a collapsed table, legless
chairs, spiderwebs dangling from ceiling corners, but remarkably enough not
one broken window, and even if the water from the taps spurted out brown,
looking more like English Breakfast tea than water, the plumbing was intact.
Elbow grease, Ellen said. That’s all it was going to take. A week or two of
scrubbing and painting, and they would be in business.8
Clearly this abandoned home is in bad shape. But even as the narrator’s description of
the house enumerates a long list of problems, damages, and general filth, the
description ends with a familiar American sentiment: a bit of sustained hard work, and
the house will be livable once again.

8

And yet, there is a persistent un-American
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substance underlying this apparent success-through-hard-work principle, for the
house’s occupants will be illegally inhabiting a foreclosed home and intentionally
dodging the most basic tenet of American capitalism: the simple exchange of money for
goods and services. The Sunset Park project is always doomed to failure, for it is an
attempt to live off the death of the American dream according to the very principles
that have died. It is an attempt to assume the traditional American lifestyle without
paying any of the debts incurred by that lifestyle—indeed, by sidestepping the very
system that has made the American dream lifestyle possible at all.
And so, the characters who occupy the Sunset Park home do engage in dramatic
actions of self re-creation, but they do so in the context of an American dream vacuum,
as it were. The house they inhabit, during the period of their occupancy, is represented
as totally isolated. It exists in a lived-in neighborhood, certainly, but its foreclosed and
abandoned status leaves it vacant and completely unattended to, such that no one is
aware of the faux-tenants’ presence.

While living in this house, the occupants

accomplish goals of self-discovery and self-fulfillment, such that their communal living
project offers them each a chance to assess the current state of their lives and shape the
directions of their futures. The novel covers a period shortly before the tenants move in,
through to their inevitable eviction, but it stops abruptly with the event of that eviction.
Because the novel centers around the symbolic representation of the apparently dead
American dream through the image of the vacant house, it is only appropriate that the
novel end with the characters’ departure from that house. Given the thematic center of
the novel, this ending point is a structural necessity. We are not concerned here with
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the real death of the American dream or its real resurrection in the characters’ postSunset Park lives. Rather, the novel is unwaveringly focused on developing its action
solely within the context of this apparently dead American dream. As a symbol of the
failed American project, the occupancy of the vacant home provides Auster with a
context for exploring the supposed death of the American dream (which supposition
stems from the 2008 economic crisis), without actually having to admit or deal with the
real death of the American dream.
We might be interested to consider, then, just what exactly is gained through
Auster’s reflection in this invented explorative context. For this question, we do best to
turn our attention to the novel’s protagonist, Miles Heller. Miles is an interesting
character to consider, because the shape of his life is always figured in terms of his
ongoing struggle with the questions of progress and accomplishment. In short, Miles is
consistently concerned with the “Americanness” of his own life in an increasingly less
American context. When we are first introduced to Miles, we are given an insight into
his present-centered, anti-goal-oriented nature (quoted earlier), and we learn of his
seven-year estrangement from his parents. Miles’ redemptive action, if we are to locate
one, centers around his slow reconciliation with his parents—an action that requires
Miles to develop a fuller contextual understanding of his relation to others and the total
shape and direction of his life. When he explains the reason for his estrangement to his
mother, he describes a fundamental disillusionment with the most basic American
dream values. He says,
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I did want to become a better person. That was the whole point. Become better,
become stronger—all very worthy, I suppose, but also a little vague. How do
you know when you’ve become better? It’s not like going to college for four
years and being handed a diploma to prove you’ve passed all your courses.
There’s no way to measure your progress. So I kept at it, not knowing if I was
better or not, not knowing it I was stronger or not, and after a while I stopped
thinking about the goal and concentrated on the effort [. . . ] I became addicted to
the struggle. I lost track of myself. I kept on doing it, but I didn’t know why I
was doing it anymore.9
This problem that Miles details is a common one, especially within a contemporary
American context.

Pursuit of the American dream has always run the risk of

privileging the pursuit itself over the goal of the pursuit. In a world of economic
collapse, where the possibility for actually attaining goals is all but removed and
citizens are left with the pursuit alone—a pursuit that will yield no return at all—this is
a bleak attitude to have. It is easy enough to understand the Miles that opens Auster’s
novel in this context of his previous failed suppositions.

Miles is, in short, a

disillusioned American hero—disillusioned by his failure to distinguish between his
goals and the pursuit of those goals. And so, it is unsurprising that, as the novel opens,
Miles is a man without ambition who lives only in the present moment and makes his
living off the failed ambitions of others. Indeed, in light of this understanding of his
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character, it is quite natural that Miles would accept Bing’s offer to move into the Sunset
Park home.
Miles’ progress at Sunset Park, then, is marked by his re-conception of pursuit
and reward in America, and by the re-establishment of appropriate goals for pursuit.
When we see Miles at the novel’s end, though, fleeing New York City after he and his
fellow occupants’ eviction, his departing sentiment is, perhaps, not what we would
expect. By the novel’s end, Miles is still no proponent of traditional American dream
ideology. He has repurposed his life, but he is no living attestation to a pre-Sunset Park
spirit of America. Rather, he has traded the value of hope in the future for one of
contentment in the present. Miles does not depart Sunset Park to discover a revitalized
American dream spirit, but rather re-enters the American wasteland that opened the
novel. His sentiments, as he crosses over the Brooklyn Bridge, conclude the novel:
[. . . ] and as the car travels across the Brooklyn Bridge and he looks at the
immense buildings on the other side of the East River, he thinks about the
missing buildings, the collapsed and burning buildings that no longer exist, the
missing buildings and the missing hands, and he wonders if it is worth hoping
for a future when there is no future, and from now on, he tells himself, he will
stop hoping for anything and live only for now, this moment, this passing
moment, the now that is here and then not here, the now that is gone forever.10
There is no question that the conclusion of Auster’s novel offers a bleak vision of
America, and there is really no way to sugar-coat this final sentiment. Miles looks out
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at the greatest of American cities, and he sees what is gone rather than what still stands.
He does not see potential or sustained greatness, but only failure and hopelessness. His
closing thoughts offer a way of occupying this American wasteland, of “getting
through” the hardship that is now America, but they offer no possibility for the positive
reinvention of America. Because there is finally no hope for America in Miles’ vision,
and he is left only with the constantly fleeting moment of “the now,” there is essentially
no substance, no purpose to America. The novel closes with the same presentation of
American space that characterizes its opening, such that, finally, the novel stands as an
imaginative characterization of a “post-American dream” America in stark relief. The
novel offers no defense of the American dream and no vision of its restoration; it merely
considers a select group of American characters as they try to make sense of their lives
in a dreamless world, and demonstrates the bleak convictions that they gradually come
to adopt.
The indication of Auster’s bleak vision of America is no critique of his novel,
however; it merely attests to the phenomenon of recent literary representations of the
death of the American dream.

Whereas Auster creates an American wasteland,

however, other novelists have adopted different means of exploring the current state of
the American dream, drawing very similar conclusions out of diverse original contexts.
Standing in stark opposition to the land of foreclosed homes and empty bank accounts
of Auster’s novel, Chris Bachelder creates a hyper-technological America that is
chronically obsessed with consumerism in his 2001 novel, Bear v. Shark. Far from a
wasteland, Bachelder’s America is over-filled with luxuries, entertainments, and
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absolute national self-satisfaction. If Auster’s novel contemplates the persistence of
residual American substance after total economic collapse, Bachelder’s novel
contemplates the natural conclusion of America’s current trend of hyper-consumerism
and unending increase, separate from the governing ideals that established the
American dream. Indeed, Bachelder’s novel describes an almost perfectly successful
America in order to consider the American dream in terms of absolute
commercialization.
Whereas Auster’s bleak America is represented in his slow, meticulous prose
style, Bachelder’s novel adopts a suspiciously light tone and whimsical prose, switching
genres from chapter to chapter and favoring short, overly-general statements that
participate in a variety of popular cultural motifs in an attempt to characterize the
dangerous levity of American consumerism. At the center of Bachelder’s novel is a
super-large-scale entertainment event—an epic battle between a technologically
advanced mechanical bear and shark—and this battle becomes emblematic of the
existing substance of American culture. As a metaphor for exaggerated consumerist
entertainment, the Bear v. Shark event consumes the entire American population,
becoming the biggest craze to ever hit America, and affecting virtually every aspect of
American popular culture. The novel is consistently humorous, and the underlying
comedy helps maintain the novel’s detached and light tone (which, in turn, sustains the
novel’s understanding of American culture’s lack of substantial value). The Bear v.
Shark event (“versus” is always presented in its abbreviated form: “In today’s hectic
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world, Mr. Norman thinks, who has time to say ‘versus’? It’s always vee”11), is outlined
for us early on in the novel, in a chapter titled “Bear v. Shark: The Question.” The very
short chapter, in its entirety, reads:
The question is simple, as are most profound questions.
Given a relatively level playing field—i.e., water deep enough so that a
Shark could maneuver proficiently, but shallow enough so that a Bear could
stand and operate with its characteristic dexterity—who would win in a fight
between a Bear and a Shark?12
The irony of designating this query as a profound question is immediately apparent,
and such humor is persistent in Bachelder’s novel. As we soon find out, all of America
is intently focused on this upcoming battle of the beasts, and our protagonists—the
Norman family (perhaps there is intended a play on “normal” in the family’s last name,
as they are generally representative of middle America)—are set to attend the event in
Las Vegas. The event itself is extremely exclusive; with only around 20,000 tickets
available (the exact number is never specified), the best tickets immediately go to the
most elite members of American society, while some 15,000 are available through a
lottery: “Over 21 million (21,000,000) people entered the lottery, and the lucky winners
were given the opportunity to buy two tickets for $2,500 each.”13 The sheer expense
and exclusivity of the event directly attests to its symbolic status as an image of the
height of American consumerism. The Norman family is attending the event because
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child Curtis Norman was the lucky winner of a ticket-giveaway essay-writing contest,
for which contestants “were to write a 250-word response to the question, ‘What does
Bear v. Shark mean to America?’”14 Printed later in the novel, Curtis’ essay is written
with the simplicity of a grade school student and demonstrates a rudimentary
understanding that Bear v. Shark is the basic substance of American culture. The
essay’s short conclusion reads, “In closing, my gardener is Dutch and he doesn’t have a
culture. But America is great because it has a culture and Bear v. Shark helps us have a
culture.”15 While Curtis’ conclusion may be based on misinformation about the Dutch
(the abundance of discrepant information is a central theme in the novel), it
nevertheless attests to the many blind assumptions made about America based on the
Bear v. Shark event.

The question to which Curtis’ essay responds is, really, the

question that the novel itself is most concerned with, and as the novel progresses we do
get a more and more concrete sense of just what, exactly, Bear v. Shark means to
America.
If Bear v. Shark is the central event of the novel, it is not the only spectacle or
consumable object that characterizes American culture in the novel. Bachelder’s book
reaches after every good or service that can be advertised, and presents it in the context
of advertisement (and frequently in the immediate context of Bear v. Shark), such that
the American terrain becomes nothing more than an endless series of essential luxuries
that are necessary for happiness. The novel opens with Mr. Norman waking up one
morning, and focuses on Mr. Norman’s pillow, the “Vibra-Dream Plus.”
14
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The

scintillating, womanly characterization of the pillow, together with the vague reference
to an American dream in its name, make this an appropriate figure for the opening of
the novel. We are told, “This blindingly white pillow, for which operators are standing
by, cradles Mr. Norman’s face and curves seductively, ergonomically, up to his ears,
into which it purrs and coos like a lover.”16 Here, the American product becomes the
fulfillment of sexual fantasy and the only available means for complete relaxation; it
becomes a necessity, a prerequisite for happiness. In fact, “She (the pillow) just wants
Mr. Norman to rest easy after a long day at the office. She understands. She cares. She
grazes his earlobes when she speaks.”17 The personification of the pillow works in
reaction to a perceived lack: Mr. Norman no longer sleeps in his bed with his wife, but
sleeps on the den sofa, and so, naturally, the pillow fills the void left by his absent wife.
Further, the Vibra-Dream plus “is the official cordless pillow of Bear v. Shark II.”18
Bacheler’s opening symbol, then, embodies the consumerist spirit of the novel as it
relates to the basic need for happiness and satisfaction, and does so all in the context of
Bear v. Shark.
This model is repeated with a great variety of consumable symbols, reaching its
concise climax in a brief discussion of passing billboards:
These billboards perform countless miracles of conjunction: cologne and power
are joined in natural and sensible union, the corner office shown to be the telos of
the fresh, manly scent; bottled water leads inexorably, syllogistically, to quirky
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individualism; baked cheese snacks and Happiness become indistinguishable;
Seasoning Pouches and harmonious families reprise the chicken-or-the-egg
conundrum.19
The core perversion of Bachelder’s America is contained in the simple line, “baked
cheese snacks and Happiness become indistinguishable.” This is a direct appeal to the
problematic vagueness of the American dream, which lacks a clear statement of ideal
goals for pursuit. When “happiness” is left undefined as the object of the American
dream, it becomes synonymous with baked cheese snacks insofar as that American
dream becomes commercial. When material goals fully supplant traditional American
idealism, the result is the marketing excess of Bear v. Shark’s America, and happiness
becomes a terrifically fragmented idea with only relative meaning.
These symbols of consumerist excess permeate Bachelder’s text, and the novel is
all the more effective because of the context of misinformation that surrounds these
abundant symbols. Questions in Bear v. Shark are frequently resolved with speedy
Internet searches; never-mind the abundant discrepancies in search results. Matthew
Curtis comments that, “What you have to remember is that a person who reads the
Sunday New York Times gets more information than a French villager in the eighteenth
century got in his whole lifetime.”20 There is much to comment about this simple
statement. For one thing, the credibility of the claim itself is never verified. Like so
many other “facts” in the novel, the credibility of this claim lies in its verbalization: if
spoken, it becomes just as true as anything else that is spoken. Indeed, when the other
19
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members of the family challenge the veracity of the claim, the challenge does not really
serve to disrupt the veracity of the original claim, but only to establish alternate
veracities. Information becomes so fragmented that a multiplicity of meaning erupts,
and anything is true so long as it can be traced to a source, however dubious. The
family’s conversation continues:
Mrs. Norman says, “The way I heard it was that a person who habitually reads
newspapers knows more, in essence, than an eighteenth-century French person.”
Curtis says, “The point is that it’s hard to know what to believe.”
Mathew says, “No, the point is that there is a lot of stuff to believe.”
Mr. Norman says, “Isn’t the point that you shouldn’t believe anything?”
The waitress says, “Aren’t those all the same point?”21
Here meaning becomes completely lost in the idea that everything means everything
else. The waitress’ statement is somehow conclusive (it does effectively conclude the
discussion), but all it really states is that there is such a diversity of contrary meanings
that speech is, ultimately, meaningless. When information is adopted wholeheartedly
with no regard for its veracity, “truth” becomes inconsequential, or at least entirely
relative.

In one brief chapter of the novel, we are given the following striking

characterization of information in America, which helps us to bolster this discussion
(the passage is structured like a Jeopardy “answer,” the “question” for which is, Who is
Neil Postman):
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In his long-out-of-print book Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the
Age of Show Business, this shrill cultural critic wrote, “A pseudo-context is a
structure invented to give fragmented and irrelevant information a seeming use.
But the use the pseudo-context provides is not action, or problem-solving, or
change. It is the only use left for information with no genuine connection to our
lives. And that, of course, is to amuse.”22
This description describes perfectly the nature of information in Bachelder’s novel.
With the production of multiple contexts, information becomes a relative affair, and any
claim can be made just as accurate as any other so long as it is rooted in some context,
however fabricated.

The purpose of this pseudo-context, of course, is purely

amusement. As it pertains to the overwhelming practice of advertisement in the novel,
such pseudo-contexts allow the culture of American consumerism to persist in this wild
excess. Every billboard is just as true as every other, and consequently there erupts an
endless variety of things utterly necessary for happiness.
And so, Bachelder’s novel thrusts the reader into an America overwhelmed with
the need to satisfy every desire that can be fabricated by advertisers, with the Bear v.
Shark event representing the pinnacle of the manufacture of desire.

In the novel,

Americans across the board (with the exception of anti- Bear v. Shark terrorists23), feel
the desire to attend the event as a necessity, and several chapters of the novel enumerate
the things people are willing to do for tickets. Ranging from degrading activities to
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shockingly immoral ones, the list includes the following: “I’d off my grannie for a ticket.
I’d rassle a bear for a ticket. I’d give up my television for a ticket,” “I’d kill the family
pet for a ticket,” “I’d drink real piss for a ticket,” “I’d eat broken glass for a ticket,” and
a patrol guard at the Las Vegas border who lies about having a crippled son whose
dying wish is to attend the event.24 Bear v. Shark, of course, is an entertainment event,
whose sole purpose is to amuse; Americans’ fascination with only the best possible
amusement, therefore, dominates—defines, even—American culture in the novel.
According to the simple logic of the novel, the natural conclusion of Americans’
obsession with increasing material luxury and amusement is something like Bear v.
Shark. The American dream, bastardized into the mere pursuit of luxury and pleasure,
contextualized by abundant misinformation and endlessly manufactured desire, finally
culminates in a battle extravaganza that openly endorses the shallowness of
contemporary American culture.
Auster and Bachelder, then, provide us with distinct visions of the contemporary
American dream; and yet, despite the great differences in their contextual American
worlds, the similarity between their visions is striking. Both novelists deal with a
disillusioned America, one through the representation of decay and the other through
that of abundance. Both Americas ultimately lack real cultural substance: the value of
traditional American idealism has been either lost through personal financial crisis, or
forgotten through the constant gratification of every fickle desire. In both novels, the
disillusioned state of America is the result of the dissipation of traditional American
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dream values. Cormac McCathy, in his 2006 novel The Road, develops this paradigm of
disillusionment several degrees further, exchanging Bachelder’s vibrant America or
Auster’s foreclosed wasteland for an American space that is scarcely recognizable as
such. The Road is set in a harshly post-apocalyptic America (the cause of apocalypse
never being stated), in which nearly every sign and practice of civilization is completely
and utterly gone. McCarthy’s terrain in the novel is post-American, such that even
remnants of a previously thriving culture are scarce and unrecognizable.

If other

contemporary authors have dramatized the slow death of the American dream,
McCarthy dramatizes the sudden and absolute death of American civilization in its
entirety.
Indeed, McCarthy’s physical terrain is barely recognizable as American, and we
really must consider whether his novel can be treated in light of American civilization
and culture, or whether it merely represents a totally a-national, post-civilizational
space that has no ties whatsoever to its previous civilization. Although the world of The
Road is most definitely stripped of any preexisting culture, the particular manner in
which McCarthy represents that world is key to understanding its larger context. Some
of McCarthy’s earlier novels provide us with a model for understanding The Road, even
as The Road diverges significantly from these works. I mean here the depiction of an
untamed Western frontier that pervades such works as Blood Meridian, All the Pretty
Horses, The Crossing, and The Plain. McCarthy’s depictions of the terrain and physical
space in The Road directly reference the early Western frontier that he has developed
elsewhere, such that McCarthy’s post-civilizational America very closely resembles the
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pre-civilizational America that he writes about in other novels. This offers us a frame of
reference for looking at The Road, for an appeal to the terrain of the American Western
frontier sets this novel in an American context, and allows us to look at it in terms of
post-Americanness.
Consider two passages, the first from Blood Meridian, and the other from The
Road:
For the next two weeks they would ride by night, they would make no fire. They
had struck the shoes from their horses and filled the nailholes in with clay and
those who still had tobacco used their pouches to spit in and they slept in caves
and on bare stone. They rode through the tracks of their dismounting and they
buried their stool like cats and they barely spoke at all.25

He pushed the cart and both he and the boy carried knapsacks. In the knapsacks
were essential things. In case they had to abandon the cart and make a run for it.
Clamped to the handle of the cart was a chrome motorcycle mirror that he used
to watch the road behind them.26
The similarity in tone here is striking, but may be no more than stylistic. The similarity
in description, however, demands our attention.

The sense of pervasive danger

characterizes both passages, as does the need for almost constant, secretive travel. The
raw and wild Western frontier is a world where everyone is both hunter and hunted,
and the same is true in the post-American wilderness of The Road.
25
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It is the

overwhelming lack of organized civilization that marks the similarities in these two
worlds. Indeed, the very landscape itself is nearly identical when we compare the preAmerican frontier to the post-American wilderness. Although there are, of course,
significant differences in landscape depiction, the landscape ultimately carries the same
connotations of fear and sterility in both novels. Again, to sample two passages:
All night the sheetlightning quaked sourceless to the west beyond the midnight
thunderheads, making a bluish day of the distant desert, the mountains on the
sudden skyline stark and black and livid like a land of some other order out
there whose true geology was not stone but fear. The thunder moved up from
the southwest and lightning lit the desert all about them, blue and barren, great
clanging reaches ordered out of the absolute night like some demon kingdom
summoned up or changeling land that come the day would leave them neither
trace nor smoke nor ruin more than any troubling dream.27

On the far side of the river valley the road passed through a stark black burn.
Charred and limbless trunks of trees stretching away on every side.

Ash

moving over the road and the sagging hands of blind wire strung from the
blackened lightpoles whining thinly in the wind. A burned house in a clearing
and beyond that a reach of meadow-lands stark and gray and raw red mudbank
where a roadworks lay abandoned.28

27
28
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These descriptions speak for themselves: barren desolation and endlessly expanding
fear and sterility characterize these landscapes.

As Lydia Cooper writes in her

comparison of the worlds of Blood Meridian and The Road, “The Road depicts a world
even bleaker (if possible) than the world of Blood Meridian, but the novel nevertheless
privileges the haunting obligation of ethical behavior, indicating that the darkest
possible world may not be entirely bereft of people able to believe in human
goodness.”29 We will address this “haunting obligation of ethical behavior” shortly, for
it adds the crucial significance that makes this novel more than just a bleak
characterization of a post-apocalyptic world. In this context, though—and especially
coupled with McCarthy’s other Western novel landscape depictions—we can see that
the universe of The Road is undoubtedly American, even if that America is scarcely
recognizable to us as such.
But that unrecognizability of the American terrain is precisely what makes The
Road so compelling, for in thrusting its protagonists into such a world, the novel
demands that we shift our perception of America. No longer do we see America as the
land of hope and opportunity, and gone is the dreamy idealism that once defined a
nation. What strikes us about this landscape is the utter absence of the American
dream. Our heroes progress in constant motion, following the unending paths of the
leftover interstates, but they are not headed towards any distinct goal. Rather, constant
motion forward is the only alternative to death, or worse. Still, the protagonists are
marked as heroes by the way they maintain a sense of purpose, however abstract.

29
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Repeated several times in the novel, the father and the boy are “carrying the fire” with
them on their journey.30 Of course there is no literal fire here, and this figurative flame
takes on a vague significance of culture as the novel develops. In the absence of
structuring social paradigms, our heroes are heroes precisely because they sustain the
idea of culture in a world where it cannot be enacted. In a world of theft, rape, murder,
mutilation, torture, and rampant cannibalism—a world of total lawlessness, in other
words—the man and the boy (by nature of their existence and persistence) carry
forward a standard of human decency and moral perseverance.
We cannot discuss the state of the American dream in McCarthy’s world, for it
occupies no place in the novel. Social ascension is impossible in the absence of society,
and material betterment cannot happen in a brutal wasteland. What we are presented
with, though, is a world starkly defined by the lack of this ideal—indeed, by the lack of
any idealism whatsoever. Within our discussion of contemporary treatments of the
American dream, McCarthy’s novel contributes a sense of utter post-Americanness,
replacing constant increase and security with the incessant need for basic survival.
McCarthy does not show us the slow degradation of American values, but rather the
sudden moment of their complete extinction. It is quite fitting, then, to consider this
novel alongside those that dramatize various “states” of the American dream in context,
for it at once stresses precisely what is at stake, and also offers a backdrop of absence
against which to consider the dream.

30
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And yet, a few husks of American cultural symbolism do linger in the novel, as,
for example, when the man offers a coca-cola to his son. The scene is brief: “He [the
man] slipped the boy’s knapsack straps loose and set the pack on the floor behind him
and he put his thumbnail under the aluminum clip on the top of the can and opened it.
He leaned his nose to the slight fizz coming from the can and then handed it to the
boy.”31 The coca-cola is introduced into the narrative suddenly—it is leftover from a
toppled over soda machine that the man discovers at a looted convenience store. The
boy has never had a soda before, and he lacks any context for understanding the
experience. A coca-cola might have functioned as a powerfully complex symbol of
American cultural identity in a novel such as Bachelder’s, one rich with cultural context,
but in McCarthy’s novel the coca-cola is almost entirely divested of significance as a
symbol. Apart from the cultural context of American consumerism, the symbol is
utterly flat. The man insists that the boy drink the soda himself (when the boy offers
some to his father), and the boy realizes: “It’s because I wont ever get to drink another
one, isn’t it?”

His father responds, “Ever’s a long time.”32 This is an interesting

response, for it contains a note of hope in the future—a possibility that the boy will one
day drink another coca-cola.
For, despite the total destruction of American culture, a loose sense of hope does
persist, and some clear Edenic goal is reached (at least for the boy, who represents the
post-American hero far more fully than his father, who is more transitional). In the
context of post-American identity, we can read the Eden of the novel’s conclusion in
31
32
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American terms, for it actively engages the traditional American symbolism of the new
Eden. The boy-hero of the novel passes from one world to another in the novel’s final
pages. In the moment that his father passes away, another man emerges to “rescue” the
boy, taking him away to a hidden away paradise in the mountains. This new terrain,
though we see very little of it, is a paradise to the boy because there are other children
there, these people are not cannibalistic, and the man says that they, too, are “carrying
the fire.” The following depiction of this new space—in stark contrast to the novel’s
dominant spatial metaphor of the endless road—concludes the novel:
Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains. You could see
them standing in the amber current where the white edges of their fins wimpled
softly in the flow. They smelled of moss in your hand. Polished and muscular
and torsional. On their backs were vermiculate patters that were maps of the
world in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put
back. Not made right again. In the deep glens where they lived all things were
older than man and they hummed of mystery.33
The imagery in this passage is clearly in line with that of Edenic paradise; yet the
imagery here does not actually describe the new spatial terrain. It describes a past
reality and insists that the past cannot be restored.

Kenneth Lincoln, in Cormac

McCarthy, describes the ambiguity of this passage, unable finally to decide whether the
passage details “an old an renewed dream, or an illusion without rainbows.”34 He finds
that the imagery must be significant to the novel’s action, but that the novel offers no
33
34
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definitive answer as to whether this is a real and future paradise or merely a space
informed by a long-ago paradise. Ultimately, we must conclude that the ambiguity
here is the point. McCarthy does not offer an ultimately redemptive vision at the end of
his post-apocalyptic tale, but neither does he offer a condemned one. In the space of
apocalypse, the novel appears to contend, there is no certainty; only the drained husks
of forgotten cultural symbols persist, and an immaterial ethic that is passed on amongst
a small few.
In representing a post-American world, McCarthy’s novel makes an overt
contemporary comment on the American dream as indicative of American culture.
McCarthy’s representation in the novel strips the American dream (or American
culture) of its progressive emphasis. The world of The Road is fundamentally antiprogressive; in fact it represents a total civilizational regression. In the absence of
opportunity for progress (and we must here distinguish between progressive action
that leads to enhanced circumstances and the monotonous forward motion of the father
and son’s journey down the road which is not progressive), American culture simply
ceases to exist.

Now, McCarthy’s novel does not represent cultural hardship; it

represents cultural annihilation. In the stark contrast between American idealism and
the world of The Road, we see the absent features of American culture that had bred the
myth of the American dream. We see, ultimately, that the devastation of Americans’
belief in progress—that the very literal loss of opportunity for advancement—results in
the total defeat of the American dream.
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The novels discussed here have all been published in the last decade, and as such
they represent a sampling of contemporary artistic treatments of the American dream.
Our study has been concerned with dominant representations of the American dream
in the twentieth century (where the myth finds its most complete articulations) and the
historical basis of the myth in early American culture. But the historical study of the
myth only takes us so far. Because the history of the American dream has been one of
revision and adaptability—the American dream has always taken on meaning specific
to those historical and regional American sub-cultures that have adopted it—our
understanding of the dream is dependent on how that dream functions in
contemporary society. For this reason, the novels of Paul Auster, Chris Bachelder, and
Cormac McCarthy have been selected to represent current attitudes about the American
dream, within which context we can assess the relevance or the viability of the
American dream today.
And what we see in these novels is a strong spirit of disillusionment, albeit
figured in different ways. These contemporary treatments of the American dream seek
to overtly challenge the myth by indicating prevalent social attitudes that distort the
ideal.

In Sunset Park, Auster paints the American dream apart from its economic

guarantees.

In the face of failed economic expectations, we see that the idealism

inherent in the dream attempts to persist but ultimately cannot without the literal
signifier of socio-economic mobility. In Bachelder’s Bear v. Shark, we have an alternate
representation. Bachelder’s novel represents the height of economic consumerism and
constructs a version of the American dream that is wholly independent of social
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idealism. This intensely materialistic dream stands as a very realistic possibility for the
future of American culture if it continues in its obsession with a strictly socio-economic
understanding of the American dream. Finally, McCarthy’s The Road looks beyond the
space of American experience and into a post-American terrain where the American
dream cannot exist, and in doing so indicates the real death of America in the face of
anti-progressive forces. These novels, taken together, offer bleak attitudes about the
American dream. But it seems that their intent is not to discourage American dreaming,
but rather to redirect it. These novels emphasize pitfalls or dangers that arise from
misconceptions of the American dream, and ultimately they call for a re-appropriation
(through a reconsideration) of the myth. This is an important cultural task that must be
performed. While the year of 2008 brought countless protestations against the viability
of the dream, the years since have once more attested to Americans’ persistent belief in
this ideal. But, as the novelists discussed here stress, the understanding of that dream
must be reassessed in times of crisis. Auster, Bachelder, and McCarthy stress that, in reconceptualizing this American ideal, we must emphasize its socio-economic
parameters, its social idealism, and the progressive worldview that underlies the whole
ideal. In the face of disillusion, Americans must re-enact a tradition that has been their
longstanding heritage: they must continue to shape their American dreams.
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Conclusion
American Dream / American Reality
The foregoing discussion has considered the American dream as a large-scale
and historically persistent cultural myth, and has attempted to analyze the underlying
structure of that myth in order to reveal consistent trends in American experience.
What we have found, given the American dream’s mythic structure, is that the dream is
composed of certain narrative elemental paradoxes, and these paradoxes are apparently
resolved through their mythic articulation. While we have located several distinct
paradoxes—in the self-made man, the frontier metaphor, and the action of upward
material and social mobility—we find that there is a larger, more general paradox at
work that informs each of these elemental relations and ultimately describes the
fundamental tension of experience that the American dream exists to resolve. I mean
here the general discrepancy between ideal and reality in America. The most significant
tension inherent in the American dream is contained in the very term we use to describe
it: it is a dream, and so naturally pitted against reality.
Because this American myth is a dream, it connotes hope: hope in the future, that
one will progress to increasing socio-economic prosperity; hope that opportunities do
exist in abundance (this hope has the force of faith in America); hope that the national
social ideals of liberty and equality will be ever-expanding and increasingly guaranteed
for all individuals. How interesting, we might reflect, that the novelty of the American
project rests largely on its persistent reliance on hope. As such, the American dream
really describes a set of expectations derived from the precedent of real experience.
This once more attests to the overarching tension that governs the American dream, for
236

the spirit of dreamy hope in the future is not derived from realistic circumstances that
overtly challenge the dream; it is, rather, rooted in real, concrete experience that attests
to it. And yet, realistic circumstances often do challenge the dream’s idealism—such
circumstances are just never the ground on which the dream is based. Indeed, the fact
that reality confirms the viability of the ideal at the same time that it denounces it is
precisely what interests us here.
Americans believe in the American dream, despite realistic challenges to its
accomplishment, because there are also very real experiences in America (indeed, an
abundance of them) that demonstrate the dream as a seemingly practical ideal. Thus
the myth is caught up in an essential paradox of experience (as myths always are), and
exists to resolve the discrepancy between American idealism and American reality. It
does so by positing that the dream is rooted in experiential precedent, and so assumes a
concrete reality wherein the dream can be enacted. Without a concrete iteration of one’s
dream, that dream cannot exist. And yet, as we have seen, “successful” American
dreams are those that attempt to bridge this real/ideal chasm, usually by assigning
some material (i.e. real) value to an ideal pursuit, such that the American hope can be
realized (made real) in some empirical reality. We can recall Fitzerald’s The Great Gatsby
here, for this is the primary accomplishment of the novel’s protagonist and is the very
reason we esteem the novel so highly as a paradigmatic American dream narrative. We
will bring to mind, once more, the stunningly effective symbol of Daisy Buchanan’s
voice.
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In remarking that Daisy’s voice is “full of money,”1 Gatsby locates a concrete and
material referent for his ideal hope.

Through his “incarnation” of Daisy, he

accomplishes a colossal American dream (which secures him the narrator’s respect,
despite Gatsby’s failure).

Daisy herself represents all of Gatsby’s very immaterial

ideals: his hope for love, happiness, and security. And yet, as a literal figure, she
embodies the socio-economic goals that Gatsby already has in mind when he meets her.
Gatsby’s imaginative appropriation of Daisy results in her figurative incarnation—
Gatsby’s immaterial hopes and dreams are made real, are embodied, in the physical
person of Daisy Buchanan, who is not just wealthy and socially elite but rather embodies
socio-economic abundance.

Her voice, then, is a perfect symbol for the material

idealism that Daisy engenders, for a voice appears to lie midway between the physical
and the immaterial. Daisy’s voice is empirical, and so “physical” in the sense that it can
be perceived or sensed. And yet, there is nothing genuinely “material” about a voice,
because it lacks tangibility. As a symbol for the embodiment of an ideal paradigm
within a material reality, then (her voice is full of money), Daisy’s voice functions as the
preeminent symbol of Gatsby’s design, and is a potent narrative representation of how
the myth resolves itself as both ideal and reality.
Despite the vitality and complexity of Gatsby’s dream, the use of symbolic
characterization may offer little practical relevance to an American dreamer (though it
certainly offers critical clarity for analytical purposes). We might recall, then, the more
practical advice of Walter Lippmann, when he suggests that future or past idealism is

1
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rooted in escapist desire and that “the real effort of the imagination [. . . ] is to weave a
dream into the turning present.” 2 Though Lippmann does not elaborate on the
meaning of this cryptic turn of phrase, our present discussion sheds light on it.
Lippmann’s discussion discredits the American vision that disregards present
circumstances in favor of dreamy hopes about the future or about the past. And yet this
statement does attest to the importance of dreaming, but only insofar as one’s dreams
(or hopes) are firmly, concretely rooted in the reality of the present moment—which is,
of course, always receding away. Thus the future bears an important relation to the
present, and one’s hope in the future must always find a precedent in the practical
present moment. A few conclusions can be drawn here. First, hope in the future (the
American dream) is unrealizable without action in the present moment (hence success
or reward—a future aspiration and an ideal—is always predicated on personal
industry—a present activity and a reality). Second, because the present moment is
always slipping into the past and the future into the present, one’s dreams must then be
perpetually revised—hence Lippmann refers to “the turning present” in order to
emphasize dynamism over stasis.

Finally, despite his condemnation of “false”

American dream attitudes, Lippmann is here encouraging participation in the properly
conceived, realistic American dream (and yes, there is a clear paradox in a “realistic
dream,” but we will let that paradox stand, as it is descriptive of the mythic resolution).
This discussion has a great deal of contemporary relevance, for in light of
economic crises Americans have always challenged the potential for the dream’s

2
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realistic accomplishment. And yet, what we find (in this discussion, which has its roots
in early twentieth-century American dream theory, as well as in our preceding
discussion of the repeated disillusionment with the dream in the contemporary
American novel) is that Americans need to revise their sense of the American dream
rather than dispel the whole myth.

Such a revision will not amount to a “new”

conception of the American dream, but rather will restore this older sense of it that we
are discussing here. In light of severe economic hardship, Americans tend to lose their
implicit faith in the American dream, which always depends on real instances of
accomplishment.

Because loss of belief in the dream stems from economic

circumstances, Americans have a tendency to read the dream as a purely socioeconomic ideal (especially in the moment of its disillusionment), for that is the aspect of
the dream under direct siege by economic downturn. In light of severe economic
adversity, then, the revitalization of the dream depends on a resurrection of its social
and humanitarian ideals—for these have traditionally provided the ground on which
the whole socio-economic pursuit is based.
This is all to say that, despite the challenges made to it, the American dream is no
less relevant today than ever in American history. It would be easy enough to adopt
the rhetoric of the American dream here, as much recent political discourse has done,
and propound a spirit of faith in America and hope in the nation’s sustained progress as
a world power and the inevitability of the economy’s eventual rise. Yet these idealistic
national hopes remain empty if they are not grounded in the real possibility of
America’s ability to progress onward.

Belief or hope alone is insufficient for the
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accomplishment of the national paradigm, as we have seen. And yet, how can we be
prepared, in this moment of crisis, to address the question of whether America is
capable of progressive rise? We can no longer adopt the nineteenth-century American
worldview, which witnesses endless territorial expansion as a direct testament to the
realistic accomplishment of American ideals. On the global field of national experience,
America’s presence as a world power is now being seriously questioned, or at least
challenged, and no idle fantasies will save us. Fiction does not supply us with an
answer, but only diagnoses the problem.
I am not in a position to answer this question, as it is a speculative one. We can
observe, though, that innovation has been the tradition of the American nation: its
democratic governmental structure is a political innovation; its emphasis on human
progress is a social innovation; its constant westward expansion through to the end of
the nineteenth century is a sustained testament to innovative civilizational processes;
and business, economic, and technological innovation have characterized the spirit of
twentieth-century America (in the absence of literal frontier space). We have discussed
the persistence of the frontier as a spatial metaphor in Chapter Three, and it is relevant
to our contemporary moment, which must locate a new frontier space of experience on
which to exercise the American dream. This is the challenge that awaits the American
people now, and it is the same challenge that Americans have historically met again and
again: to innovate new fields of experience wherein the American cultural spirit—that
tradition of the American dream that has been our ancestry and heritage—can assert
itself once more.
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